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Summary 
 
Chance, in the sense of the incalculable, the indeterminable, names the limit of every 
estimation of the truth. Whereas traditional philosophical discourses aspire to transcend 
this limit, deconstruction affirms on the contrary its necessity; not as a higher principle 
that relativizes truth and renders all our calculations futile, as is commonly suggested by 
flippant appropriations of Derrida’s work, but as a structural property within every 
event and every concept, every mark. Rather than a mere impediment to the pursuit of 
truth then, the incalculable forms a necessary correlative of the pursuit itself. 
Deconstruction effectively attests to and exemplifies the dependence of every 
philosophical discourse on its irreducible, inherent limitation. With reference to 
numerous commentaries on Derrida’s work, Chapter 1 shows that the unconditional 
indeterminability of a deconstructive, methodological identity is indissociable from 
deconstruction’s critical import. And as Chapter 2 verifies in turn, focusing now 
primarily on Derrida’s lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ and the performative aspects 
of his writing, deconstruction’s appeal to the accidental and the idiomatic is not a call to 
irresponsibility and a turning away from theory; it is what ensures its remarkable 
theoretical consistency. 
Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, Richard Rorty and William James, Chapter 
3 demonstrates that any attempt to regulate chance cannot help but put chance to work 
instead. Not even fiction can arrest its contaminating force. Reading Derrida alongside 
Edgar Allan Poe, Chapter 4 posits that the commonsensical conception of chance as a 
deviation from the truth is bound up with an uncritical notion of literary writing as sheer 
untruthfulness, and hence as the site of pure chance. The constitutive pervasiveness of 
chance bears out, in the first place and above all, the instability of the limit that 
separates fiction from non-fiction, truth from non-truth. 
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Introduction 
 
In a sense, a study on chance is a contradiction in terms. Any study that adheres 
to reason is constituted in opposition to chance, out of the desire to withhold its effects. 
The indeterminable, the unpredictable, the incalculable, denotes a problem that needs to 
be solved, a limit that, in the name and with the aid of reason, one aspires to transcend. 
The fortuitous, the accidental, what happens to happen, for no apparent reason, has no 
bearing on truth and knowledge. Its parasitical import is thus precisely what a 
philosophical investigation must contain and, if possible, completely eliminate. One 
wants to arrive at a safe conclusion, provide a positive answer and produce a 
measurable result in place of an uncertain ‘perhaps’. A study that concedes chance in 
advance would be a study destined to err; impossible.  
At the same time, however, and by the same token, chance also carries a positive 
or, more precisely, a non-negative significance. It denotes an opportunity, it signals an 
opening, that is also the opening of reason, the very possibility of truth and knowledge. 
Indeed, every study on any subject becomes possible on account of that which resists 
comprehension; a singular ‘perhaps’ will have always been its point of departure. The 
‘possible’ is not only what we have failed to fully grasp but also what we have yet to 
investigate. The indeterminable is what calls for the response to the other, what leaves 
room for the response of the other. Chance gives reason to reason; necessary. 
It appears, as a consequence, that chance carries within itself two directly 
opposite meanings. On the one hand, it signifies what stands in the way of our 
calculations and, on the other, what paves the way for our calculations. It is what a 
study needs to fend off at all cost and what it needs to embrace first and foremost. A 
concept at odds with itself, a threat and an opportunity at once, chance constitutes both 
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the condition of impossibility and the condition of possibility of the pursuit of truth as 
such.  
Traditional philosophical discourses tend to privilege the first, more troublesome 
and less favourable, definition of chance and to repress the second. Naturally, an 
unconditional commitment to the ideal of perfect knowledge and absolute truth entails a 
categorical hostility towards the effects of chance. The haphazard is to be controlled, the 
indeterminable to be determined, the accidental ignored and the irregular accounted for. 
But what would become of philosophy itself if it were to successfully eliminate chance, 
once and for all? And what of the philosopher? What would remain of the future if 
nothing were left surprise us, if everything were rather predictable? As Jacques Derrida 
will affirm in a short essay entitled ‘As If It Were Possible, “Within Such Limits”…’, 
insofar as the pursuit of truth aims toward the effacement of what instigates it, then 
what ensures its survival can only be the irreducible possibility of its inadequacy.  
 
inadequation must always remain possible for interpretation in general, 
and the response in turn, to be possible. This is an example of the law 
that binds the possible to the impossible. An interpretation that was 
without flaw, a self-comprehension that was completely adequate would 
not only mark the end of a history exhausted by its very transparency. 
By prohibiting the future, it would make everything impossible, both the 
event and the coming of the other, the coming to the other.
1
 
 
 
Derrida invites us thus to consider the two seemingly opposite definitions of chance as 
inextricably intertwined, to imagine, in other words, the lexical ambiguity of chance as a 
necessity. It is because there is chance, Derrida posits, because the chance of chance 
persists despite our best efforts to determine and evade its force, that our studies become 
                                                          
1
 Jacques Derrida, ‘As If It Were Possible: “Within Such Limits”…’ in Negotiations: Interventions and 
Interviews, 1971-2001, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 
360. 
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possible in the first place, that they stand a chance. Appealing to what he calls in the 
same essay ‘a new thinking of the possible’,2 Derrida proposes thereon to conceive of 
the limit of reason as its indispensable, structural condition, the impossible as what 
comes to pass.  
Are we destined to err, then? And who will decide our fate? Reductive and 
unsophisticated readings of Derrida’s work often tend to misconstrue this affirmation of 
the necessity of chance as a sterile veneration of indeterminacy that simply signals the 
futility of traditional philosophical aspirations and the hollowness of philosophical 
rigor. Hence, uncritical supporters of Derrida embrace, for instance, deconstruction’s 
committed antifoundationalism as philosophy’s liberation, its lucky break so to speak, 
while his inflexible critics condemn it by the same token as philosophy’s inexorable 
ruination, its dead-end. And whereas the former understand deconstruction to be an 
affirmation of the future’s ultimate unpredictability, a joyful acceptance of life’s 
contingencies, the latter interpret it as a resignation before the responsibilities of the 
present instead, the dreadful foundation of an a-political, chaotic nihilism. In truth, 
however, Derrida’s work resists both these readings at once. And it resists them 
absolutely and unconditionally; deconstruction is neither a probabilization nor a 
relativization of truth.  
As this thesis will show with reference to a wide range of texts, the 
deconstructive questioning of the essential presuppositions that have shaped the history 
of western metaphysics – if such a thing exists – should not be mistaken for the mere 
inversion of the significance of chance in favour of its second, more positive definition. 
On the contrary, the ‘experience of the impossible’, as Derrida defines deconstruction, 
is the articulation of the inherent and constitutive duplicity of chance, an affirmation of 
                                                          
2
 Ibid., p. 361. 
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its necessity that does not seek to control, evade or overcome its disconcerting effects. 
Rather than the negotiation of the two contradictory consequences of ‘perhaps’, 
deconstruction constitutes the remarking of their nonnegotiable, irreducible 
incompatibility. Chance, we will argue, forms the necessary and impossible condition of 
every mark, every concept and every event; it is ‘an impasse of the undecidable through 
which a decision cannot not pass’:  
 
But how is it possible, one will ask, that that which makes possible 
makes impossible the very thing that it makes possible, thus, and 
introduces – as its chance – a non-negative chance, a principle of ruin 
into the very thing it promises or promotes? The im- of the im-possible 
is indeed radical, implacable, undeniable. But it is not simply negative or 
dialectical: it introduces the possible; it is its gatekeeper today; it makes 
it come, it makes it turn […] [H]ere is an impasse of the undecidable 
through which a decision cannot not pass. All responsibility must pass 
through this aporia that, far from paralyzing it, puts in motion a new 
thinking of the possible. It ensures its rhythm and its breathing: diastole, 
systole, and syncope, the beating of the impossible possible, of the 
impossible as condition of the possible. From the very heart of the 
impossible, one hears, thus, the pulsion or the pulse of a 
“deconstruction.”  
Hence, the condition of possibility gives the possible a chance but 
by depriving it of its purity. The law of this spectral contamination, the 
impure law of this impurity, this is what must be constantly 
reelaborated.
3
 
 
Any attempt to present or re-present this ‘law of spectral contamination’ remains, of 
course, impossible by reason of the law itself. The ‘constant reelaboration’ of the 
‘impure law of this impurity’ presupposes that one submits to the law’s unbearable 
demands. The affirmation of the necessity of chance cannot but put chance to work. As 
if it were possible then, this study will venture to elucidate some of the most 
fundamental aspects of his thought through a concentrated analysis of the paradoxical 
economy of chance.  
                                                          
3
 Ibid., pp. 361-2. 
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Chapter 1 will interrogate a number of critical texts that seek to capture Jacques 
Derrida’s thought and propose that deconstruction’s critical force rests on the 
unidentifiability of a deconstructive methodology. Chapter 2 will analyse, in turn, more 
closely the unidentifiability of chance itself with regard to the deconstructive 
compositional space, and thereby demonstrate that deconstruction’s theoretical 
coherence is an effect of the untenability of a deconstructive theory. Chapter 3 will 
revolve around the problematic relationship between deconstruction and pragmatism. 
Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, William James and Richard Rorty on 
account of their shared ‘belief in chance’, it will suggest that the history of philosophy 
can be read as a constant renegotiation of the significance of chance that strives to 
maintain its possibility as the possibility of its regulation. Chapter 4, lastly, will confirm 
that the necessity of chance inevitably destabilizes the clear-cut distinction between 
literary and non-literary writing. Through the detailed analysis of two short stories by 
Edgar Allan Poe in light of Derrida’s writings on the singularity of the literary text, it 
will argue that, contrary to our most fundamental critical presuppositions, the literary 
event cannot be identified with the text that makes it possible; it bears within itself, as a 
necessary condition of its structure, the chance that it is other than itself.   
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1. READING CHANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
I will thus attempt to resist once more the impulse toward or expectation of position 
taking. To those who are waiting for me to take a position so they can reach a decision, 
I say, “Good luck.”1 
 
1.1. Un-introducible 
` 
Every treatise on Jacques Derrida’s work assumes a grave responsibility. In 
order to respond, and before the response, one makes a commitment: to faithfully 
present Derrida, to do justice to his work. As soon as one decides to write something on, 
about, against or in the name of Derrida, one is first of all required to establish his 
viewpoint in relation to a particular subject, to situate his oeuvre within a certain 
philosophical or historical context, furthermore to pinpoint and clarify some of his most 
significant propositions, to outline the fundamental principles or motifs of his thought 
and, when necessary, even to try to break down his line of argumentation. Derrida says: 
‘Even before speech, in any case before a discursive event as such, there is necessarily a 
commitment or a promise […]. From the moment I open my mouth, I have already 
promised; or rather, and sooner, the promise has seized the I which promises to speak to 
the other […]. This promise is older than I am.’2 A promise then is at the origin, the 
                                                          
1
 Jacques Derrida, ‘For the love of Lacan’ in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, trans. Peggy Kamuf, Pascal-
Anne Brault & Michael Naas, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.41.  
2
 Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of 
Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory, ed. Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, trans. Ken Frieden 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 13-4.  
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necessary condition of every critical response to Derrida. It is a promise, however, one 
cannot keep. Because no matter how insightful a response might be, it is destined to fall 
short of its task; no matter how celebratory or accusatory, it is bound to eventually miss, 
to betray Derrida. Every treatise on Jacques Derrida’s work is founded on an impossible 
contract. 
Even when not this explicit, a certain awareness of an essential failure that 
comes with the very attempt to read and explain Derrida, to represent his thought, 
permeates all the critical studies devoted to his work. Deconstruction, commonly a 
metonym for Derrida’s body of work and the abundant scholarship it has inspired in its 
wake, rather than an identifiable theory, movement or method, often seems to stand for 
an emblematic figure of elusiveness and indeterminability, the ‘proper name’ of the 
impossibility of naming. ‘[I]s there some thing called deconstruction? This is a crude 
question, crudely asked’, Julian Wolfreys remarks, as he proceeds to investigate at great 
length a whole host of actual and potential misconceptions of Derrida’s legacy.3 His 
rich and meticulous monograph Deconstruction*Derrida, neatly arranged into the 
‘Introduction: “Deconstruction, if such a thing exists…’’, ‘Part I: The Make-Believe of 
a Beginning’, ‘Part II: Preparatory to Anything Else’ and ‘Part III: Some Supplementary 
Afterword(s)’, reads overall more like an introduction to introductions: in its evident 
unwillingness to define, so as not to betray, deconstruction, in its desire to respond 
without responding, it never really begins. The same can be said for the majority of such 
texts, prefaces, forewords and other commentaries that assume and address Derrida’s 
work as a whole. As Martin McQuillan shrewdly observes in his own introduction to 
Deconstruction: A Reader ‘perhaps an introduction (with its suggestions of rigour, 
unpredictability, marginality, deceptiveness and paradox) is the proper place for this 
                                                          
3
 Julian Wolfreys, Deconstruction*Derrida (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 25. 
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thing [deconstruction], if it were not for the fact that it makes the “proper” one of its 
abiding objects of study.’4  
In this light, Nicholas Royle’s indispensable Jacques Derrida, part of the 
Routledge Critical Thinkers series, deserves perhaps the most attention. Right from the 
get go and without biting his tongue, Royle puts into question the usefulness, the 
possibility even, of a book like the one he has been assigned to compose, which by 
definition and in its very program would claim mastery of Jacques Derrida’s oeuvre and 
thus the ability to introduce him to the uninitiated, to simplify, summarize and explicate 
his texts. In the first chapter, entitled ‘Why Derrida?’ in accordance with the publishing 
guidelines, Royle interrogates the problematic assumptions that a question of this sort 
entails and so he exposes its baffling absurdity. Similarly, in the ensuing chapter entitled 
‘Key Ideas’, rather than Derrida’s key ideas, Royle lays bare the inapplicability of the 
notion of ‘key ideas’ when it comes to this particular thinker. In this spirit, Royle’s book 
unfolds then as an extensive, paradoxical argument against its own promise, a warning 
off any study like his own that seeks to determine and delimit Derrida. Summing things 
up in the conclusion, ‘After Derrida’, Royle writes:   
 
[Derrida’s] thinking is fundamentally incompatible with the project of a 
text (such as this one was supposed to have been) that sums up the 
author’s work, beginning with a neatly packaged explanation of why this 
work might be worth reading and ending with a likewise neatly 
packaged survey of what it was all about and what impact it has had on 
other thinkers.
5
 
 
But could it really be otherwise? Indeed, as one might argue, every major 
philosopher’s work is equally challenging; that no single response can claim to convey 
                                                          
4
 Martin McQuillan, ‘Introduction: Five Strategies for Deconstruction’ in Deconstruction: A Reader, ed. 
Martin McQuillan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 2.    
5
 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 143. 
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its significance, exhaust its implications or contain its effects should go without saying 
really. Grappling with a thinker as prolific, ambitious and influential as Jacques Derrida 
cannot be anything but a daunting task, and a supplementary reminder may therefore 
strike one as a tedious academic cliché, and a suspiciously superfluous one at that. After 
all, doesn’t one have to give it a shot and respond regardless of the cost? And in fact, 
hasn’t one always already responded? Doesn’t Royle himself undertake the very project 
he seems to renounce? Agreed, ‘every other is every bit other [tout autre est tout 
autre]’, as Derrida’s famous dictum goes.6 But when all is said and done, insofar as it 
does not constitute an excuse for not venturing to respond at all, this sort of quandary 
about the difficulties and risks involved could very well be taken as a thinly veiled 
excuse for a critic’s rather inexcusable shortcomings, or else, even worse, as a 
euphemism of Derrida’s essential incomprehensibility. 
If Derrida’s advocates have a hard time convincingly dismissing this sort of 
scepticism toward deconstruction, it is actually because it is not unfounded. This is why 
the preeminent Derridean scholars do not even attempt to dismiss it; on the contrary. 
The truth of the matter is that, strangely enough, Royle is indeed echoing here the 
remonstrations of all those vocal adversaries and despairing students of deconstruction, 
who contend that Derrida is just too difficult, impenetrable, virtually unreadable and 
hence outright refuse to deal with deconstruction and ‘deconstructionists’ alike. Rather 
than challenging or contradicting their reluctance, all serious Derridean scholarship in 
fact seems to justify the reasons behind it. ‘Derrida is hard to follow’, Derek Attridge 
admits in his turn, playing exactly on the phrase’s inherent ambiguity, on the always 
possible possibility that the other takes it at ‘face value’, so to speak, that is, the 
                                                          
6
 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), p. 68. 
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possibility or the hazard, that the other takes it out of its context and repeats it 
otherwise.
7
 Of course, as anyone familiar with Derrida’s work will lose no time 
clarifying, as if to put things right, this alleged difficulty is by no means attributable to a 
lack of rigor on Derrida’s part, just as it is also not simply reducible to the complexity 
of his analyses or to his unconventional and oftentimes inscrutable prose; despite 
appearances, these are actually the effects rather than the causes of Derrida’s resistance 
to the interpretative grasp. What is it that makes Derrida so difficult then? And what 
makes this difficulty remarkable? What makes ‘deconstruction’ so singularly 
indeterminable? For better or for worse, as this chapter will demonstrate with reference 
to a number of excerpts from Derrida’s writings, it remains that this difficulty, this 
indeterminability, is impossible to attribute to anything whatsoever; it is absolutely 
unanalyzable, undialectizable, unaccountable, and as such absolutely determinative; 
there will have been no right context for it, no correct meaning attached to it; it remains 
to be thought. 
‘We cannot get a grip on deconstruction’, in Gayatri Spivak’s words.8 It is well 
understood; deconstruction is un-introducible; this is the first rule of the deconstructive 
club, its ‘opening lines’, to recall the subtitle of Marian Hobson’s excellent book on 
Derrida’s work.9 As easy as it is to repeat and paraphrase this over and over again, it 
remains nonetheless tremendously challenging to consider its import and implications, 
to follow through its consequences. For Derrida is disarming, and ‘fundamentally’ so, as 
                                                          
7
 Derek Attridge, Reading and Responsibility: Deconstruction’s Traces (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010), p. 51.  
8
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘At the Planchette of Deconstruction is/in America’ in Deconstruction 
is/in America: A New Sense of the Political, ed. Anselm Haverkamp (New York: New York University 
Press, 1995), p. 244. 
9
 Marian Hobson, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).  
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Royle says. And like Attridge, we should ‘not expect to catch up’.10 Taking a closer 
look at two particularly inventive texts, Nicholas Royle’s After Derrida (1995) and 
Geoffrey Bennington’s ‘Derridabase’ (1993), which against all odds endeavour to 
account for the constitutive indeterminability of Derrida’s thought, this chapter will 
confirm that, in the first place, deconstruction will have been the assumption of the 
grave responsibility of one’s response, without guarantees.  
 
1.2. Double bind 
 
 
As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my absolute 
singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and 
duty. I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him and I answer 
for what I do before him. But of course, what binds me thus in my 
singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, immediately propels 
me into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice.
11
  
 
While every response to the other necessarily entails the sacrifice of the other’s 
singularity, as Derrida persistently reminds us, the impossibility to determine and 
faithfully represent specific Derrida’s viewpoints is nevertheless incommensurable to 
the impossibility to determine and faithfully represent any other’s viewpoints. And the 
reason is that precisely this impossibility, this untranslatability, constitutes the subject of 
Derrida’s work; it is Derrida’s viewpoint as such. As in this passage from The Gift of 
Death, so throughout his career, with every single lecture, essay and interview, Derrida 
indefatigably strives to display or, better still, to allow for the irreducible resistance of 
the other to interpretative appropriation, to reckon with the effects of the inherent and 
therefore necessary limitations of responsiveness, with the incalculability of 
                                                          
10
 Attridge, Reading and Responsibility, p. 55.   
11
 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 68. 
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responsibility. In this way, however, he raises the stakes for his own readers: it is not 
only, not simply, not at all, not anymore, that they cannot avoid betraying the 
singularity of Derrida’s texts; rather, they absolutely must do so. In order to be faithful 
to Derrida, one is obliged, first and foremost, not to. The failure that accrues specifically 
to the responses to his work is therefore heterogeneous to the very order of success and 
failure; it carries within itself a chance. And hence a critical reader’s admission of guilt 
before Derrida can be neither overlooked nor mistaken for a passing, sterile comment on 
the role of critical discourse in general; despite itself, it constitutes in fact a reading of 
Derrida. Conceding the impossibility to determine Derrida, one will have just begun 
determining Derrida.  
Reflecting on the chances of his own venture to offer an introduction to the 
philosopher’s oeuvre, Geoffrey Bennington, another prominent reader of Derrida, 
writes: 
 
Programmed excuses: it is, of course, impossible to write a book of this 
sort about Derrida. I do not mean the – real – difficulties of reading or 
comprehension that his texts appear to put up against a first approach. 
[…] But a difficulty which is as it were structural, which has nothing to 
do with the competence of such and such a reader of Derrida (me, as it 
happens). This difficulty hangs on the fact that all the questions to which 
this type of book must habitually presuppose replies, [...] are already put 
to us by the texts we have to read, not as preliminary or marginal to the 
true work of thought, but as this work itself in its most pressing and 
formidable aspects.
12
  
 
Bennington’s plea is again unequivocal: it will have been impossible to respond to 
Derrida, to describe and define deconstruction, since deconstruction ‘itself’, ‘in its most 
pressing and formidable aspects’ puts into question precisely the possibility of definitive 
descriptions. What is particularly interesting about this passage from ‘Derridabase’ is 
                                                          
12
 Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Derridabase’ in Jacques Derrida (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), p. 8. 
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actually its position within the text. Not by chance, Bennington’s ‘programmed excuses’ 
do not simply precede his exposition of Derrida’s thought in the guise of some 
preliminary foreword. Instead, they form part of its main body, of its program, setting 
off its second section which goes by the title ‘Remark’. Bennington immediately adds: 
‘Our little problems of reading-protocol cannot therefore remain enclosed in the space 
of a preface: they are already the whole problem.’13 Reflecting thus on his chances of 
doing justice to Derrida, Bennington will have already taken a chance; which is also to 
say that one can no longer speak of ‘reflection’ here. Bennington’s excuses for the 
necessary limitations of his text will have been part of the text he seeks to exonerate; 
they are that text. Offering his apologies in advance for betraying Derrida, Bennington 
will have already been betraying him. It will have always been too late. Why proceed 
then? Why begin in the first place? And yet, by the same token and for the same reason, 
conceding his inability to successfully illuminate and represent Derrida’s thought, 
Bennington will have already been doing just that. A chance: recognizing the 
impossibility of writing this book, this book will have been made possible. This is the 
closing remark of ‘Remark’: ‘It turns out that what makes our work a priori impossible 
is precisely what simultaneously makes it possible. Give the chance of this encounter a 
chance.’14  
The resistance of the Derridean text to presentation, to systematization, to 
summary expositions and straightforward simplifications is neither some kind of 
misfortune that just happens to befall his readers, as if by accident and despite their best 
intentions to ‘get it right’, nor some parasitical side-effect of Derrida’s attempt to 
communicate his thoughts as clearly as possible. On the contrary, resistance constitutes 
                                                          
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid, p. 15.  
14 
 
the guiding thread of Derrida’s texts, its necessary corollary, and as such its primary 
directive to its addressees. In Royle’s succinct, essentially contradictory, possible 
impossible, formulation: ‘If there is a key idea in Derrida it has to do with an 
interrogation of the “key idea”.’15 The acknowledgment of one’s inability to elucidate 
with accuracy Derrida’s texts constitutes as a consequence neither an innocuous word of 
caution nor a blunt display of modesty; most certainly, it has absolutely nothing to do 
with a pragmatic, relativistic avowal to nonetheless ‘give it one’s best’. Rather, it 
constitutes the remarking of Derrida’s affirmation of the paradoxical law that delimits 
every response to the singular other and binds infinite responsibility with infinite 
sacrifice. That does not make it successful of course; to surrender in advance is not to 
avoid defeat. Insofar as Derrida’s affirmation inevitably complies with and breaches the 
law it proclaims, the same is a priori true for the critic’s remark. Whether retracing or 
repeating as such Derrida’s movement, one will have already passed him by. Betrayal is 
the condition of responsiveness; fidelity to deconstruction presupposes infidelity. It is a 
double bind, an experience of aporia: 
  
So what are we to do? It is impossible to respond here. It is impossible to 
respond to this question about the response. It is impossible to respond 
to the question by which we precisely ask ourselves whether it is 
necessary to respond or not to respond, whether it is necessary, possible, 
or impossible. This aporia without end paralyzes us because it binds us 
doubly. (I must and I need not, I must not, it is necessary and impossible, 
etc.) In one and the same place, on the same apparatus, I have my two 
hands tied or nailed down. What are we to do?
16
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Derrida returns on a number of occasions explicitly to the unsettling effects of 
the double bind.
17
 Yet one could actually argue that the experience of the double bind 
haunts his oeuvre in its entirety, insofar as all of his readings venture to reckon precisely 
with the rupture of identity, the destabilization of authority, the spectralization of 
presence, the unanalyzable and undialectizable suspension of meaning. Rather than their 
overarching or underlying theme then – the conceptual space within which Derrida’s 
texts take place, the experience of the double bind constitutes instead the trail that 
Derrida’s texts trace. Haunted by the double bind, Derrida’s texts turn themselves into 
ghosts; their driving force is also the principle of their undoing, their condition of 
possibility is also a condition of impossibility. His brilliant essay entitled ‘Passions: “An 
Oblique Offering”’ exemplifies the situation, as it turns itself, its own impossibility, into 
its explicit ‘theme’.  
Derrida’s primary concern here is to caution his audience against the very 
tempting and increasingly popular reduction of the deconstructive gesture to a form of 
‘ethics’, to a ‘higher responsibility and a more intractable [intraitable] moral 
exigency’,18 whereby the dreadful confrontation with its own impasse is construed as 
the courageous acknowledgment of its inevitable limitations, and the recognition of its 
groundlessness becomes thus its newly found ground. Simon Critchley’s influential The 
Ethics of Deconstruction (1992), coincidentally published a few months earlier than 
‘Passions’, is the most rigorous attempt to salvage precisely along those lines the 
purpose and the identity of deconstructive criticism from the perceived deadlock of its 
essential double bind, an attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to the question that 
                                                          
17
 See for instance Jacques Derrida, ‘From Signsponge’ in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, trans. 
Richard Rand (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 344-69 and Jacques Derrida ‘Resistances’ 
in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, pp. 1-38.   
18
 Derrida, ‘Passions’, p. 14.  
16 
 
opens his book: ‘Why bother with deconstruction?’19 In contrast, Derrida is more than 
eager to dissociate deconstruction’s name from the convenience of any sort of cushion, 
‘ethical’ or otherwise, that would circumscribe its irremediable, destabilizing force. 
What he is interested in is to leave the question reverberate: ‘What are we to do?’20 
By way of an ‘example’, then, he turns to the present moment, to the situation he 
finds himself in, right there and then, which is, of course, not unlike every situation he 
finds himself in, everything that happens to him. ‘Clearly’, as he will remark, ‘[t]he 
example itself, as such, overflows its singularity as much as its identity. This is why 
there are no examples while at the same time there are only examples [...] The 
exemplarity of the example is clearly never the exemplarity of the example.’21 It is 
certainly not a coincidence that, while originally written in the context of David Wood’s 
Derrida: A Critical Reader and in response to the excellent essays included there, 
‘Passions’ was later republished in another context,22 as if it could apply indeed to any 
context, like a response to responsiveness as such, the introduction to introductions par 
excellence. Derrida turns, then, to this text and patiently proceeds to demonstrate that 
while the call of the other – in this instance David Wood’s invitation to participate in 
this collection of essays – is what makes his essay possible in the first place, the 
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conflicting ethical demands that this call entails simultaneously render any conceivable 
response on his part, any text, as inappropriate as a non-response, no text. In this 
manner, the subject of ‘Passions’ becomes effectively its own radical unjustifiability, 
which is the radical unjustifiability of deconstruction in general. What makes Derrida’s 
response eventually possible, he shows, right here and now, is the ascertainment of its 
impossibility. Invisible in its visibility, readable in its unreadability, Derrida’s 
illustration of the impossibility of doing justice to the other is therefore fundamentally 
split, divided in its origin, and its duality is incommensurable both with the order of 
performativity, since its performance already undercuts its claims, and with the 
orderliness of a metalinguistic self-reassurance, since its claims already undercut their 
reflection. His text remains thus above all incommensurable, irreducible to an ‘ethics’: 
the acknowledgment of its impropriety, of its unjustifiability, the remarking of its own 
impossibility, is anything but its overcoming. The question, no, not even that, the force 
of the question is all that remains: ‘What are we to do?’23   
As a result, ‘Passions’ confounds his audience: on the one hand, it proscribes the 
possibility of a suitable response to its call, as it fends off categorically any attempt to 
appropriate its import. On the other, however, Derrida’s text also seems to 
predetermine, to dictate really, his audience’s response. His illustration of the 
impossibility of doing justice to the other becomes eventually, through an uncanny 
synchronization, the other’s response to his text; always already, it is the other’s 
response to his text. With the same movement, Derrida’s text proscribes and prescribes 
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its reading. Samuel Weber arrives at the same ‘position’ upon reading Derrida’s ‘To 
Speculate: On Freud’: ‘Prescribes and proscribes since that reading – this one, for 
instance – is, structurally at least, in precisely the same position as the “text” it has been 
describing; and this “position”, you will have long since realized, is one that in the strict 
sense it is impossible to occupy, at least for very long.’24 One can only betray Derrida’s 
text; but it so happens, one can only do that by following Derrida to the letter; and vice 
versa. What are we to do? It is impossible to respond here. This aporia without end 
paralyzes us because it binds us doubly. Not by chance, Derrida speaks in the plural:   
 
But also how is it that it does not prevent us from speaking, from 
continuing to describe the situation, from trying to make oneself 
understood? What is the nature of this language, since already it no 
longer belongs, no longer belongs simply, either to the question or to the 
response whose limits we have just verified and are continuing to 
verify?
25
 
 
Who speaks? Is it Derrida or is it the other? Is it Derrida on the other’s behalf or the 
other on Derrida’s behalf? What remains? What is the nature of this language that 
responds through the unconditional acknowledgement of the failure to respond? What is 
the status of this text that negates itself, that takes place in its absence, that appears 
disappeared, tracing the steps of its immobility, unidentifiable, unlocatable, 
unassignable, indeterminable, other than itself?  
 
Of what does this verification consist, when nothing happens without 
some sacrifice? Will one call this a testimony in a sense that neither the 
martyr, the attestation nor the testament would exhaust? And, as with 
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every testimony, providing that it never be reducible, precisely, to 
verification, to proof or to demonstration, in a word, to knowledge?
26
 
 
Everything depends on this. The future of Derrida’s thought in the very least. 
 
No question, no response, no responsibility. Let us say that there is a 
secret here. There is something secret. [Il y a là du secret].27 
 
 
1.3. Too literary 
 
The experience of aporia that every commentator of Derrida’s work endures, has 
to endure, derives from his texts as such. Friends and foes would agree to this: the 
impossibility of determining Derrida is an upshot of his own claims and arguments; the 
problem lies with Derrida, so to speak, the problem is in Derrida – to be found in his 
texts. The impossibility of determining Derrida’s position is determined by Derrida in 
advance, always already, dividing his text at the moment it makes it possible. Derrida’s 
indeterminability is his own, if you will, and in this sense his work is therefore 
exemplarily problematic, the site of an irreducible polemos.   
Indeed, all the criticism targeted against deconstruction through the years, 
regardless how blunt or sophisticated, comes down to this constitutive, originary 
paradox, deconstruction’s fundamental difference with itself, its definitive 
indefinability, its determinative indeterminability. In certain people’s eyes, an 
unconditional immersion in this ‘aporia without end’ ultimately amounts to an 
unfounded negativity, an indiscriminate and apolitical questioning of the entire history 
of philosophy in the name of playfulness. In certain people’s eyes, all that 
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deconstruction does is obsessively seek to expose the necessary metaphysical 
presuppositions of every philosophical thesis and the limitations of every intellectual 
response and from an imaginary position of superiority discard it as worthless. As one 
commentator puts it, ‘[w]hat Deconstruction urges is not a new system of thought but 
scepticism toward all the old ways, which are construed as really one way.’28 Viewed in 
this way, Derrida’s absolute resistance is essentially testament to the inconsequentiality 
of his texts, at best to their literariness or else their infinite ‘deconstructibility’. At the 
end of the day, the impossibility of meeting Derrida’s texts head-on and appropriately 
responding to his thought only serves to establish the pointlessness of even trying.  
As must be clear by now, the issue is not to defend Derrida’s legacy from its 
critics. Not so much because this has already been done extensively, and with 
considerable success,
29
 but, more interestingly, because Derrida himself repeatedly 
addresses these resistances to deconstruction with the utmost earnestness; one might 
even argue it is all he ever does. In ‘Resistances’, he writes: 
 
What drives [pousse] deconstruction to analyze without respite the 
analysistic and dialecticistic presuppositions […] of philosophy itself, 
what resembles there the drive and the pulse of its own movement, a 
rhythmic compulsion to track the desire for simple and self-present 
originarity, well, this very thing –here is the double bind we were talking 
about a moment ago– drives it to raise the analysistic transcendentalistic 
stakes. It drives deconstruction to a hyperbolicism of analysis that takes 
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sometimes, in certain people’s eyes, the form of a hyperdiabolicism. In 
this sense, deconstruction is also the interminable drama of analysis.
30
 
 
While many of Derrida’s self-proclaimed supporters often seem particularly 
eager to affirm that he is not a dangerous nihilist and sweepingly dismiss any objections 
to his work as mere symptoms of a certain philosophical conservatism,
31
 Derrida 
himself makes room for his critics’ concerns and carefully delineates their rationale. 
And, in fact, rather than refuting these concerns, he simply attributes them to a 
difference in perspective instead. Thematizing the deconstructive double bind, directly 
addressing his work’s indeterminability, Derrida incorporates in effect his critics’ point 
of view and thus raises the stakes once again: it is because deconstruction is impossible, 
indeed, he affirms, because it is not, that it becomes possible in the first place; it is 
because it takes place as its self-annihilation, in the non-space of its finitude, as a work 
of mourning, that it resists infinitely. Above all, then, Derrida does not need defending 
from his hard-headed critics because his work actually presupposes their scepticism; 
more than that, it is constituted in anticipation of this scepticism. In a way, 
deconstruction is no more than the response to the criticism it engenders, a polyphonic, 
‘tragicomic drama’, as Weber will also say,32 highly political because lacking a politics. 
Elsewhere, and in response to Paul de Man’s diagnosis that ‘the deconstruction of 
metaphysics, or “philosophy”, is an impossibility to the precise extent that it is 
“literary”’,33 Derrida writes that  
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the most rigorous deconstruction has never claimed to be foreign to 
literature, nor above all to be possible. And I would say that 
deconstruction loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible; also 
that those who would rush to delight in that admission lose nothing from 
having to wait. For a deconstructive operation possibility would rather 
be the danger, the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed 
procedures, methods, accessible approaches. The interest of 
deconstruction, of such force and desire as it may have, is a certain 
experience of the impossible.
34
       
 
What these excerpts clearly illustrate, then, is that the resistances to 
deconstruction are in fact indissociable from the resistances of deconstruction. The 
denigration of Derrida’s work, even the frustrated refusal to read his texts at all, is 
indissociable from the impossibility of doing so successfully. ‘Of course, there is not 
reading and there is not reading’, as Royle reminds us in his seminal After Derrida.35 
Still, that ‘many of those opposing [Derrida] on the grounds that his work is “nihilistic”, 
“unintelligible”, “meaningless” and so on had not read Derrida’s texts’, as he says, is 
certainly not unconnected to the fact that in a sense ‘Derrida’s work will never be 
readable. The reading of Derrida’s texts is always still to come’, as he immediately goes 
on to argue.
36
 And although he seems reluctant to affirm that connection explicitly here, 
After Derrida stands out precisely for its exceptional courage to bear its consequences.  
Unlike many of Derrida’s ‘legatees’, Royle proves admirably sensitive to 
deconstruction’s originary crisis, to the desperate exigency of the deconstructive 
response, the impossibility of the challenge that is writing ‘after Derrida’ – later than, in 
agreement with, in the manner or in pursuit of Derrida, as he explains in the book’s 
introduction. What safeguards the identity and the identifiability of deconstructive 
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criticism, if ‘deconstruction is not an operation that supervenes afterwards, from the 
outside, one fine day’, as Derrida says, but ‘always already at work within the work’?37 
And how should one respond to Derrida’s work itself, if ‘deconstruction is justice’, as 
he writes elsewhere, even more so, if it is ‘indeconstructible’?38 From a number of 
different angles and on account of various close readings, Royle contemplates on the 
after effects of such questions and investigates scrupulously the nature and history of 
the problematic relationship between deconstruction and deconstructive criticism, 
between Derrida and his readership.  
Most notably, on account of Derrida’s professed inability to read and respond to 
Samuel Beckett, ‘whom’, as he says in an interview, ‘I will thus have “avoided” as 
though I had always already read and understood him too well’,39 Royle considers the 
limits and the chances of his own response to Derrida himself. In Derrida’s silent 
resignation before Beckett, his freezing ‘identification’40 with Beckett’s work, Royle 
recognizes precisely the overwhelming, impossible demands of his own task. And in the 
same way that Derrida seems to appropriate Beckett’s work, Royle subtly appropriates 
Derrida’s response to it: ‘How could I write, sign, countersign performatively texts 
which “respond” to Beckett? How could I avoid the platitude of a supposed academic 
metalanguage?’41 In light of these absolute and undialectizable affinities then, between 
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Derrida and Beckett, on the one hand, himself and Derrida, on the other, Royle goes on 
to suggest that perhaps Derrida’s work ‘does not go far enough with its deconstruction 
of the subject, and that a deconstructive resituating of the subject calls to be further 
radicalised.’42 Thereon and in response to the typical and typically vague claims that 
Derrida’s work is ‘too literary’, Royle provocatively suggests that, on the contrary, 
Derrida’s work has perhaps not been ‘“literary” enough’.43 Pointing to Geoffrey 
Bennington’s ‘Derridabase’, which attempts to provide an account of Derrida’s oeuvre 
without quoting a single sentence of his (we turn to this more fully in a moment), Royle 
speculates then, in response to Derrida, after Derrida, on the possibility of an ex-
citational text, where quotations marks will have disappeared and Derrida’s signature 
will have been completely effaced (‘is this not basically what I have always meant to 
say’, Derrida avows, as we will see44), his ‘theory’ infused into language, into a new 
literature that is no longer simply opposable to theory or even distinguishable from it. 
He envisages the possibility of another kind of writing, ‘a theoretically vigilant, 
rigorous and inventive writing which would be radically excitational’,45 indeterminable, 
unassignable, unpresentable, other than itself, a writing that would not claim to ‘respond 
to Derrida’, because always already in response, always already responsible, in 
deconstruction.
46
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What Royle’s daring and thought-provoking reflections above all serve to 
remind us here is that if Derrida was ever in need of defending, it would rather be 
against the temptation to soften the radicalism of his claims and play down the 
disturbing theoretical consequences that it implicates anyone’s response with. 
Aphoristic denouncements of deconstruction, as intolerably dense and unworthy of 
consideration as they might sometimes appear, do not contradict or challenge Derrida’s 
work per se and so should be neither ignored nor quickly dismissed as if they were 
misconceptions of deconstruction’s supposedly proper significance. If there ever was a 
danger for Derrida’s legacy, it would rather consist in the blithe reduction of Derrida’s 
essential indeterminability to some form of liberal openness to meaning in order to 
better accommodate his work, ‘deconstruction’ as such, to the academic status quo. And 
in fact, as Timothy Clark shows in The Poetics of Singularity (2005), this is anything 
but a hypothetical threat. Under the pretence of defending Derrida’s writings, critics 
consistently assimilate the deconstructive desire with a presumably liberating, 
‘supposedly natural drive towards self-assertion in self-definition’.47 In this manner, 
Clark astutely observes, ‘Derrida’s insight is turned into a methodological tool for 
describing once more the interaction of various competing groups striving for 
autonomy. Deconstruction is absorbed as a move or movement in what is basically the 
same old set-up.’48 
Throughout his career, Derrida will never cease to repeat that   
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[d]econstruction is not a doctrine; it’s not a method, nor is it a set of 
rules or tools; it cannot be separated from performatives, from 
signatures, from a given language.  If you want to ‘do deconstruction’ – 
‘you know, the kind of thing Derrida does’ – then you have to perform 
something new, in your own language, in your own singular situation, 
with your own signature, to invent the impossible and to break with the 
application, in the technical, neutral sense of the word.
49
 
 
And the reason he never ceases to repeat this
50
 is that in truth there is really no end to 
the ways one can misinterpret it. In fact, one can only misinterpret it, and it has only 
been misinterpreted. Whether one takes it as no more than an authorization of 
irresponsibility or as a declaration of intellectual independence, as a prop to a relativistic 
linguisticism or as a call for a return to ‘ethics’, as the core of a systematically a-
theoretical antisystematicity or as what is misconstrued in this way, deconstruction 
remains unverifiable; it must remain. If it ‘bears witness to a possibility that exceeds it, 
this exceeding remains, it (is) the remainder, and it remains such’,51 as he will say in his 
conclusion to ‘Passions’. At once too literary and not literary enough, deconstruction is 
‘the remaining of the rest [la restance du rest]’,52 as he puts it in ‘Resistances’, whose 
resistance is infinite ‘because, very simply, it is not. The rest is not or est not [Le reste 
n’est ou n’este pas].’53  
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To conclude then, if Derrida’s indeterminability should never be confused with a 
sterile indeterminacy, in the sense of a pointless, programmatically ambiguous 
experimentation outside the limits of reason, or with ‘mere literature’, it is also and by 
the same token not equivalent to a light-hearted, open-minded respect for the 
unpredictability of the other and the future ‘as such’. The deconstructive gesture, as its 
name would indicate, is not simply negative and destructive, as has been noted 
countless times, but it is also not simply affirmative, in the sense of a carefree positivity, 
since what is being affirmed is no more than an unknowable unpredictability that is 
absolute and therefore as threatening as it is promising. It is with the full force of this 
uncertainty in mind that Derrida’s often repeated and much quoted proposition that 
‘deconstruction is what happens [ce qui arrive]’54 should be read. The same goes for 
Martin McQuillan’s insightful definition of deconstruction as ‘an act of reading which 
allows the other to speak’,55 as well as, finally, Jean-Luc Nancy’s salute to ‘philosophy 
as chance’.56 Deconstruction is chance. And like ‘chance’, it is double, and it is not: 
neither an unregulated accident nor a lucky break, and yet both at once; neither a 
gamble nor an opportunity, and yet both at once. In Royle’s take: ‘Deconstruction is an 
earthquake.’57 Derrida summarizes everything on our behalf, in response to a question 
from the audience during a discussion in London, on 8 March of 1996:  
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I use the word deconstruction “as if” there were such a thing. Initially, 
this word encountered so many objections and such hostility, 
reproaching it with being nihilistic, destructive, negative, that I had to 
insist again and again that deconstruction does not mean destruction, and 
is not negative. But perhaps this strategy was somewhat dangerous, 
because it is not true, there is destruction. There is something 
destructive, not a negative destruction but in the sense that we cannot not 
destroy. So I’m a little uneasy about my own insistence on the non-
destructive character of deconstruction. But it was not simply out of 
strategy that I constantly insisted on its affirmative dimension, on its 
‘yes’. [...] Even when I address someone with a question I have already 
affirmed that I address them, and this affirmation is implied in every 
question and in every negation. It is not an orthodox “yes” but a “yes” 
absolutely prior to everything. [...] Before the word there is a “yes”. [...] 
Now, for the affirmation of deconstruction to be an affirmation, it 
implies the perhaps. I couldn’t repeat or resign the “yes”, I couldn’t say 
“yes, yes” without the space and time opened by the perhaps. Even more 
‘radical’ than destruction is the affirmation of the “yes”, and more 
radical than that is the perhaps, our relation to the other [CD’s 
emphasis]. This relation is not destructive, but the possibility for it to be 
so must remain open. [...] The perhaps is already implied in the 
affirmation, an affirmation implied by deconstruction. This is why I say 
that deconstruction is justice.
58
   
 
 
1.4. Success itself 
 
‘Roughly’ chance or the modality of the perhaps or destinerrance59 is what 
Geoffrey Bennington evokes in order to account for the ‘challenges’ that await every 
response to Derrida’s work. He writes:    
 
The challenge to any philosopher attempting to present Derrida’s work is 
that of explicating why the ‘conditions of possibility’ discovered by that 
work are always also simultaneously ‘conditions of impossibility’ 
(roughly: what makes it possible for a letter to arrive at its destination 
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necessarily includes the possibility that it might go astray; this necessary 
possibility means that it never completely arrives; or, what makes it 
possible for a performative to be brought off ‘happily’ necessarily 
includes the possibility of recitation outside the ‘correct’ context; this 
necessary possibility means that it is never completely happy), and what 
effects this has on thinking.
60
  
 
Bennington’s essay ‘Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very Idea)’, first 
published in 1988, addresses some of the earlier and most thorough attempts to present 
Derrida’s thought as a coherent whole, to organize its fundamental principles and thus 
to reconstitute its philosophical rigor, in contrast to its ‘lighter’ literary applications. 
Focusing primarily on Rodolphe Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror (1986), Bennington 
exposes with unparalleled eloquence and insightfulness the essential and inevitable 
limitations of these attempts. The problem with ‘explicating’ Derrida, as he summarily 
puts it here, is that Derrida’s work shows that explication is only possible in its 
impossibility. As a result, any ‘successful’ reading of Derrida, any reading that ‘arrives 
at its destination’, only becomes possible insofar as it ‘necessarily includes the 
possibility’ that it never completely arrives, which therefore means that it is never 
absolutely successful, never ‘completely happy’.  
But can this ‘challenge’ ever really be met, as Bennington seems to imply by 
calling it that in the passage above? Does Bennington himself, for instance, meet this 
‘challenge’ with this essay of his? Or else, are these ‘effects on thinking’ that Derrida’s 
work necessitates, and to which Bennington refers after that long parenthesis, curiously 
cutting them off from the rest of the sentence, as if insignificant and themselves 
parenthetical, are these ‘effects on thinking’ then really to be thought? ‘Deconstruction 
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is not what you think’ is the title of a little essay of his, coincidentally written on the 
same year.
61
 Derrida from ‘Envois’ countersigns, in other words:  
 
[o]ne of the paradoxes of destination is that if you wanted to 
demonstrate, for someone, that something never arrives at its 
destination, it’s all over. The demonstration, once it has reached its end, 
will have proved what one should not demonstrate.
62
 
 
And from Margins, in other words:  
 
To insist upon thinking its [philosophy’s] other: its proper other, the 
proper of its other, an other proper? In thinking it as such, in recognising 
it, one misses it. One reappropriates it for oneself, one disposes of it, one 
misses it, or rather one misses (the) missing (of) it, which, as concerns 
the other, always amounts to the same.
63
  
 
And again from ‘Resistances’, in yet other words:  
 
By definition a double bind cannot be assumed; one can only endure it in 
passion. Likewise, a double bind cannot be fully analyzed: one can only 
unbind one of its knots by pulling on the other to make it tighter.
64
  
 
Bennington takes up the ‘challenge’ to present Jacques Derrida’s work in 1991. 
What makes his ‘Derridabase’ extremely intriguing in comparison to all the other 
introductions to Derrida which more or less unsuccessfully set out to capture the totality 
of the philosopher’s thought is that it seems to propose a way out of the deconstructive 
double bind and its paralyzing effects. As we will see, however, this is only to better 
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demonstrate the absolute impossibility of doing so. ‘Derridabase’ will have been the 
most spectacular and the most sophisticated determination of Derrida’s 
indeterminability.  
Contrary to Derrida’s forewarning, ‘Derridabase’ appears indeed at first glance 
to ‘assume the double bind’. And the way it does this seems astoundingly simple. Fully 
aware that he cannot offer a just response to Derrida’s texts, Bennington decides to do 
away with them altogether, refraining from quoting a single sentence by the philosopher 
himself. By never addressing Derrida’s work as such, ‘Derridabase’ can claim in effect 
that it does not respond to ‘Derrida’s work’, properly speaking, or else to respond 
without responding, as it would seem most proper. On top of that, Bennington’s 
exposition is also supplemented by a text written by Derrida himself, entitled 
‘Circumfession’, which runs at the bottom of each page as an extended footnote, and to 
which the critic has no access in advance, namely, before he has completed his 
response. As a consequence, the subject matter of ‘Derridabase’ is not identifiable with 
‘Derrida’s work’ in the first place, insofar as one part of it, Derrida’s newest piece, will 
have been necessarily excluded from its scope.  
The book’s apparently authorless and untitled exergue outlines its program, ‘its 
rules of composition’ clearly: 
 
This book presupposes a contract. And the contract, itself established or 
stabilized on the basis of a friendly bet (challenge, outbidding, or raising 
the stakes), has determined a number of rules of composition. G.B. 
undertook to describe, according to the pedagogical and logical norms to 
which he holds, if not the totality of J.D.’s thought, then at least the 
general system of that thought. Knowing that there was to be a text by J. 
D. in the book, he saw fit to do without any quotation and to limit 
himself to an argued exposition which would try to be as clear as 
possible. […] As what is at stake in J.D’s work is to show how any such 
system must remain essentially open, this undertaking was doomed to 
failure from the start, and the interest it may have consists in the test, and 
the proof, of that failure. In order to demonstrate the ineluctable 
necessity of the failure, our contract stipulated that J.D, having read 
32 
 
G.B.’s text, would write something escaping the proposed 
systematization, surprising it.
65
  
 
Written on the basis of this double condition then, the project entitled simply Jacques 
Derrida and comprising Bennington’s ‘Derridabase’ and Derrida’s ‘Circumfession’, 
along with rich biographical information and bibliographical references, presents itself 
as the perfect demonstration, if not the solution, of deconstruction’s inherent 
contradictoriness and Derrida’s fundamental and ‘ineluctable’ indeterminability. 
Synchronizing its responsiveness with that to which it professes to respond and confine 
in its interpretative reach, it lays bare the impossibility of its undertaking, that is, the 
impossibility of a full correspondence. Together, student and teacher seem to stage in 
this manner the latter’s ungraspability and his authorial supremacy before his audience. 
Making sure he will have had the last word, they safeguard his unpredictability; 
calculatedly, they program, they predetermine Derrida’s chance.  
It is not by chance that ‘Circumfession’ actually ends one page before 
Bennington’s text. The last page of ‘Derridabase’ is reserved exclusively for the final 
section of the critic’s response to Derrida’s thought, the last piece of his proposed 
‘general system of that thought’, which is suggestively entitled ‘Envoi’. Here, 
Bennington turns to his audience directly and doubling or supplementing Derrida’s 
confession he concedes: ‘We have, obviously enough, been clumsy. Trying to repeat 
faithfully the essential features of Derrida’s thought, we have betrayed him.’66 In place 
of a proper conclusion, Bennington has no qualms admitting now what he actually knew 
all along, what his book tried to demonstrate in the first place and what is after all at 
stake in all of Derrida’s work, its necessary condition and its inevitable consequence, 
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that is, the irreducible openness of ‘deconstruction’, the impossibility of its 
systematization. Quite appropriately, Bennington seals his treatise negating his own 
endeavour: ‘This is why this book will be of no use to you others, or to you, other, and 
will have been only a hidden pretext for writing in my own signature behind his back.’67 
No wonder Richard Rorty’s verdict, which features in the book’s back cover, hails 
‘Bennington’s account of what Derrida is up to’ as ‘the least pretentious’ he has ‘ever 
read’.  
‘Circumfession’ itself, on the other hand, seems to serve the project’s program 
perfectly, as it consolidates in a number of ways the unpredictability of Derrida’s 
discourse, his absolute resistance to any text that would seek to delimit its force, first 
and foremost that by Bennington which simultaneously unfolds above itself. First of all, 
in its style of composition: spread across a sequence of fifty-nine sections, each one of 
them a single paragraph containing a single sentence, ‘Circumfession’ reads at times 
more like the transcript of an experiment in automatic writing than the meditations of a 
meticulous philosopher; its language is literally unbound, uncontrollable. In addition to 
its breathtaking rhythm, however, ‘Circumfession’ is also surprisingly intimate, all too 
autobiographical, indeed, for a proper, re-presentable philosophical work, as Derrida 
recounts plenty of details from his private life, particularly with relation to the 
hospitalization of his dying mother, and shares with his readers some of his most 
personal thoughts, memories, feelings and experiences. Finally and most importantly, 
throughout the course of this unique text, Derrida addresses directly Geoffrey 
Bennington, who of course can neither listen to him nor respond, and he comments on 
his friend’s endeavour to organize and explicate his body of work. In this manner, 
silently interrupting Bennington’s train of thought, always one step ahead, Derrida 
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remarks again and again the space that the student’s response cannot possibly cover, the 
limit of his proposed systematization – in a word, the futility of his venture. The 
following passage is characteristic: 
 
[...] people will say that I’m giving G. a jealous scene, [...] fighting with 
him over the right to deprive me of my events, i.e. to embrace the 
generative grammar of me and behave as though it was capable, by 
exhibiting it, of appropriating the law which presides over everything 
that can happen to me through writing, what I can write, what I have 
written or ever could write, for it is true that if I succeed in surprising 
him and surprising his reader, this success, success itself, [CD’s 
emphasis] will be valid not only for the future but also for the past for by 
showing that every writing to come cannot be engendered, anticipated, 
preconstructed from this matrix, I would signify to him in return that 
something in the past might have been withdrawn, if not its content at 
least in the sap of the idiom, from the effusion of the signature, [...] that 
would be my rule here, my law for the duration of these few pages, to 
reinscribe, reinvent, obliging the other, and first of all G, to recognize it, 
to pronounce it, no more than that, to call me finally beyond the owner’s 
tour he has just done, forgetting me on the pretext of understanding me 
[...]
68
 
 
Reflecting on the ‘generative grammar’ that seeks to contain him in representing 
him, to tie him within the confines of a certain past, a determinable future, an 
identifiable self, Derrida disrupts or surprises its coherence. If Derrida succeeds, indeed, 
it is because he cannot fail. Unknowably, inappropriably and all so inappropriately, a 
priori, the ‘I’ resists by reason of itself, necessarily. ‘Reinscribing’ himself, Derrida 
‘reinvents’ himself. The one who says ‘I’, who confesses ‘himself’ right there and then, 
makes himself possible and singularly irreducible by subverting or circumventing 
‘himself’, his ‘grammar’ – necessarily. And how could it be otherwise?  One makes 
oneself possible only by exceeding oneself, always already other than oneself. Nothing 
fails like ‘success itself’; if Derrida cannot fail, it is because he cannot succeed. A 
promise will have been at the origin. That is, the subversion, the circumvention, the 
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surprise, chance, will have always been part of the structure of ‘oneself’; it will have 
always been its necessary supplement, just like Derrida’s text is the necessary 
supplement to the grammar it appears to oppose, participating in it without belonging to 
it, its visible/invisible footnote, always never there. In the first place, the singularity of 
the mark will have been its originary division. It survives.  
‘In the best case, we have said everything about deconstruction except the 
supplementary remark whereby it is named in texts signed by Jacques Derrida’, 
Bennington affirms.
69
 Insofar as he concedes that he has already failed, he too cannot 
fail; which is also to say, he too cannot succeed: the ‘invulnerability’ of his 
‘programming machine’, Derrida’s grammar, Derrida ‘himself’, will have been its 
constitutive ‘transformability’. In advance, Bennington knows, what Derrida knows, it 
will have been impossible to determine Derrida, to define deconstruction, to appropriate 
the other and reduce the other’s unpredictability. It will have been impossible for this 
text to fulfil the promise of itself. That is its catastrophe and its chance: before the other, 
it is responsible for itself. Incidentally, ‘Derridabase’ proves ‘faultless’. Derrida 
continues from above: 
 
and it is as if I were trying to oblige him to recognize me and come out 
of this amnesia of me [...] and if it is right, and it is, faultless, not only 
will I no longer sign but I will never have signed, is this not basically 
what I have always meant to say [CD’s emphasis], and given that, for 
something to happen and for me finally to sign something for myself, it 
would have to be against G., as though he wanted to love in my stead, 
and to stop him I was finally admitting some perjury that his 
programming machine couldn’t providentially account for, a thing all the 
more improbable in that his matrix, i.e. mine, that which faultlessly he 
formalizes and which in the past seized hold of me, but when will this 
giving birth have begun, like a “logic” stronger than I [CD’s emphasis], 
at work and verifiably so right down to so-called aleatory phenomena, 
the least systemic, the most undecidable of the sentences I’ve made or 
unmade, this matrix nevertheless opens, leaving room for the 
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unanticipatable singularity of the event, it remains by essence, by force, 
nonsaturable, nonsuturable, invulnerable, therefore only extensible and 
transformable, always unfinished, for even if I wanted to break his 
machine, and in doing so hurt him, I couldn’t do so, and anyway I have 
no desire to do so, I love him too much.
70
    
 
Deconstruction is unidentifiable with itself; this is its very condition of possibility. In 
order to remain remarkable, recognizable, indeed readable, in and as itself, Derrida’s 
text must remain ‘by essence, by force’ open to the other’s determination, to 
Bennington’s ‘programming machine’, for example, which seeks to formalize its import 
and arrest its significance. Which is also to say that ‘Derridabase’ in its turn, and by the 
same token, will have had to remain open as well, ‘extensible, transformable, always 
unfinished’, incommensurable with its subject – with itself, ‘leaving room’ for the 
‘unanticipatable singularity of the event’, for yet another reading, such as Derrida’s 
‘Circumfession’, for example, which at once disrupts and affirms its coherence, disrupts 
it in order to affirm it. It is because ‘deconstruction’ remains indeterminable that the 
possibility of its determination remains fathomable to begin with.  
As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, the indeterminability of Derrida’s work 
is constitutive. It denotes neither this work’s ultimate meaning nor a relativistic 
reservation before its ultimate meaning; one can neither ignore nor contain its force. 
Chance is put to work with the work, at the moment of its coming to be and as the 
condition of its coming to be. In a word, the incalculable in Derrida’s work is this 
work’s incalculability; unverifiable. The deconstructive trace attests to a possibility 
which exceeds itself, to ‘a “logic” stronger than I’, as Derrida says, indistinguishable 
from itself, yet unidentifiable with itself, before itself, yet always to come. ‘But when 
will this giving birth have begun?’ 
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2. WRITING CHANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
In truth I always dreamt of writing a self-centred text; I never arrived at that point – I 
always fall upon the others. This will end up by being known.
1
  
 
2.1. The obvious 
 
What does Derrida believe about chance? Naturally, it will have been impossible 
to determine his viewpoint on chance. Not only because his work is essentially 
indeterminable, in the sense that we had occasion to demonstrate in the course of the 
first chapter, but because chance itself is, of course, indeterminable. In order to be itself, 
chance must be invisible; to determine chance would be first and foremost to betray it, 
to eliminate its chanciness. The logic of this oxymoron seems no doubt obvious enough. 
This is not, however, because it is trivial; far from it. The invisibility of chance is all too 
obvious, indeed, because it is inseparable from the very possibility of seeing, of a ‘point 
of view’ in general, and as such it constitutes no less than the necessary condition of 
phenomenality, of presence, of what comes to pass, what takes place, right here and 
now, before our eyes. The invisibility of chance is obviousness as such (from the Latin 
ob+viam: ‘in the way of’, ‘in front of’).  
Indeed, what would be the foundation, the status and the significance of a 
viewpoint, of this viewpoint for example, once it seriously acknowledged the reality of 
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chance, once it unequivocally gave way to the possibility of indeterminacy in reality? 
How could it avoid succumbing itself at that very moment to its contaminating force? 
Whence would it derive its authority henceforth? Each and every discourse that 
subscribes to reason and aspires to truth is obliged to exclude chance from its scope. 
Philosophy only becomes possible, properly philosophical, on condition that it 
maintains the essential evasiveness of chance, its irreducible resistance to intellectual 
appropriation, on condition that it maintains, in other words, the ‘chanciness’ of chance, 
which is also to say, its ‘insignificance’. Insofar as its gaze is directed towards the 
essential, the knowable, the calculable, the presentable, the thing in itself, philosophy 
must always, in the first place, dispense with precisely the accidental, the circumstantial, 
the parasitical. To allow for chance, for the ‘always possible otherwise’, the ‘always 
possibly not’ of an essential unpredictability in the structure of its trace, would amount 
to giving up on everything else. To speak of chance, to determine and face up with its 
consequences, is to let everything else collapse under its weight.  
‘The sole aim of philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the contingent.’2 Hegel’s 
summary, self-assured definition of the philosophical task leaves no room for doubt. 
There is reason, only insofar as there is no chance, insofar as chance remains 
indeterminable – beyond reason. There is philosophy, as long as it stays clear of chance. 
There is no such thing as a viewpoint on chance.  
Things, however, happen to be a little less straightforward than that. Robert 
Smith in his Derrida and Autobiography (1995) picks up on Hegel’s assertion and with 
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a brilliant, in-depth analysis goes on to question its unsettling implications.
3
 No doubt, 
philosophy’s task is to eliminate chance – Hegel affirms the obvious. The problem with 
his dictum, however, as Smith demonstrates, lies precisely in its self-assurance, that is, 
its groundlessness. Philosophy’s law seems self-evident because it is instituted solely by 
reason of its enforcement, at the moment it is enforced, in the name of no more than 
itself. The problem, as Smith puts it, is that ‘[p]hilosophy can only be as scientific as it 
is legislative.’4  
Smith’s argumentation here follows two lines, which essentially amount to the 
same. His language is extremely sophisticated and his reasoning seems as a result 
particularly intricate, but in reality Smith invokes first and foremost common sense. In 
response to Hegel’s dictum, he contests: can one ever positively and utterly eliminate 
the contingent, the chance of chance? Isn’t chance, by reason of its very nature, that 
which can never be excluded? Isn’t the possibility of the irruption of the unforeseeable, 
the incalculable, precisely that, always possible?  
 
It is always possible that contingency will startle philosophic 
anticipation; it takes the form of the future and opens historical change. 
And, being always possible it amounts in its invariant categoriality to a 
necessary condition or a priori, therefore also taking the form of the 
(absolute) past. As such, any philosophy worth its salt will be obliged to 
take it, the always possible chanciness of contingency, on board. But 
paradoxically, doing so brings on the destitution of philosophy: chance, 
which is necessarily a-philosophical, the limit of reason, is where 
philosophy runs out; a non-philosophical a priori.
5
  
 
                                                          
3
 See Robert Smith, Derrida and Autobiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 13-
28. 
4
 Ibid, p. 14.  
5
 Ibid, p. 23.  
40 
 
To eliminate the contingent is therefore philosophy’s task as much as it is its limit; an 
insoluble problem, an impossible challenge, motivates philosophy by keeping it in 
suspense.  
In consequence, and more rigorously still, Smith points out that insofar as 
philosophy becomes possible at the moment and on condition that it bars chance from 
its view and effectively represses its effects, this must mean that it is also essentially 
contingent on its imminence, that is, on the threat of indeterminability. If the sole aim of 
philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the contingent, as Hegel proposes, this must be 
because the contingent will have always been possible. In order to justify its role as the 
purveyor of truth, the guardian of the determinable and the knowable, philosophy must 
necessarily presuppose the hazard of haphazardness. What would become of 
philosophical enquiry if there was no contingency to be eliminated, if there was no 
accident to distinguish the essential truth from? The problem at hand here is essentially 
one of framing. As the limit of reason, chance remains incommensurable with 
philosophical enquiry only because it is exactly what circumscribes its identity and 
safeguards its raison d’être. In Smith’s words again: 
 
Philosophical enquiry cannot send the contingent away, on the grounds 
that doing so would mean its method falling into redundancy directly 
afterwards, thus jeopardizing philosophy’s scientific status. Philosophy 
must never with absolute success send the contingent away, is what we 
mean. Rather it must maintain the contingent in its power of recurrence, 
only playing at its despatch. That is what contingency is, a kind of 
ontological flicker.
6
    
   
Philosophy exists only insofar as it remains haunted by the ghost of chance, insofar as 
the possibility that there be chance persists in its absence. Chance would be then 
philosophy’s ruination, philosophy’s ‘destitution’ as much as, because, it is 
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philosophy’s chance. More accurately still, chance is philosophy’s impossible condition 
of possibility.  
Reason can neither eliminate nor accept chance then; it can neither contain nor 
evade its effects. As this chapter will argue, deconstruction constitutes precisely the 
enactment of this double, contradictory directive. On the one hand, Derrida breaks away 
from the philosophical tradition he inherits by putting into question the a priori 
exclusion of chance that underlies philosophical propriety. In this sense, he embodies, 
indeed, the ‘new breed of philosophers’ that Nietzsche once envisioned, those ‘whose 
taste and inclination are somehow the reverse of those we have seen so far – 
philosophers of the dangerous Perhaps in every sense’.7 On the other hand, however, 
this is not to say that he simply lifts the veil on chance and embraces its consequences, 
even less so that he surrenders unconcerned to its force. No viewpoint on chance is to be 
found in Derrida’s texts; obviously so, since no such thing exists. In Smith’s rather 
perplexing, because too accurate, formulation: ‘Derrida’s is the impossible science of 
accommodating chance as an a priori, allowing for a principle of indeterminacy that 
removes any hope of allowing for it…’8 Deconstruction is an experience at odds with 
itself. Setting off from a close reading of Derrida’s lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, 
this chapter will show that the compositional exemplarity of his ‘impossible science’ 
consists in re-marking the fundamental, inevitable implication of chance with what 
every discourse, including his own, purports to argue or represent.  
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2.2. Pas de chance 
 
As a rule, Derrida refrains from speaking of ‘chance’ [hasard] in his work.9 
Instead, he usually opts for one of its various substitutes, such as the ‘unpredictable’, the 
‘unforeseeable’, the ‘incalculable’ or his neologism, ‘destinerrance’. Not by chance, the 
two most notable exceptions to this tendency to conceal ‘chance’ itself constitute 
simultaneously the most emphatic validations of its underlying rationale. The first one is 
none other than Derrida’s own frequent recourse to the idiomatic expression ‘not by 
chance’ [pas par hasard], by which he likes to mark the necessity of some of his 
findings, that is, precisely, the lack of ‘chance’ in deconstruction. The second, and more 
significant, is Derrida’s rather surprising decision to make ‘chance’ the explicit subject 
of his address on the occasion of a symposium about the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and literature that took place in 1981, a lecture later published under the 
title ‘My chances/Mes Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies’. 
Here too, however, rather than speaking of chance, presenting or defining chance, as we 
will see, Derrida proves still first and foremost concerned with tracing the consequences 
of its invisibility, with making its absence felt.   
The opening statements of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ are ‘revealing’; an 
incredible and incredibly dense passage, without a doubt, thrown at the very outset and 
left hanging, at once it releases and seals Derrida’s treatise on chance. 
 
Did I choose this theme haphazardly or by chance? Or, what is more 
likely, perhaps it was imposed upon me in that chance offered itself for 
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the choosing as if I had fallen upon it, thus leaving me with the illusion 
of a free will. All this involves a very old story, which, however, I shall 
not endeavour to recount.
10
  
 
‘Haphazardly or by chance?’ A peculiar tension kicks things off and sets the tone for 
what is to follow. Are ‘haphazardly’ and ‘by chance’ supposed to be contrasting 
alternatives here? Or, on second thoughts, what is more likely, proffered otherwise ‘or 
by chance’ serves actually as an explanatory parathesis, simply elaborating further on 
‘haphazardly’? And yet, just before it is completely dissolved, the tension is suddenly 
intensified. Derrida’s answer to his own question, introduced by yet another ‘or’, 
presumably in order to mark a second – or a third? – possibility, is that in fact he did not 
even ‘choose’ his subject to begin with. His choice was rather ‘imposed upon’ him, 
determined despite himself. By what? By whom? Yet again, by chance! And what’s 
more, by replacing or supplementing his free will, says Derrida, chance also ensured in 
fact its upholding, at least illusorily, allowing him to appropriate as his own a choice he 
was actually forced to make. How is all this possible? How is it even thinkable? So 
mysteriously and marvellously enticing, and yet, the passage ends by disavowing its 
own significance and even its pertinence. Derrida explicitly asks his reader to ignore it 
and quickly move on; as if having already said too much, he simply refuses to explain 
or elaborate. After all, he would rather stay clear from the age-long conflict between 
necessity and chance over the exclusive rights to free will – to his chances.11 What will 
follow henceforth are precisely the consequences of this primary speech act, which pulls 
down the curtain over ‘chance’, ending the discussion there at once.  
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of William James’s protest against determinism. 
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Instead of a thesis on chance then, Derrida’s thirty-page essay comprises very 
brief, at times one might say even rushed, and in any case very loosely connected, as if 
by chance, readings of a large number of texts by various authors. J. Hillis Miller’s 
summary outline of Derrida’s itinerary here is quite accurate: 
 
The essay-lecture itself wanders from a beginning with –guess who?–
Heidegger, to Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, to Heidegger again, 
to Lacan on Poe, to Derrida’s own essay on Lacan on Poe, to Epicurus 
again, as referred to by Poe, to Baudelaire’s translations and essays on 
Poe, and finally to Freud, who was presumably meant to be the centre of 
this lecture on psychoanalysis and literature.
12
 
 
On top of all that, one notes that along the way Derrida also has recourse to many of the 
fundamental motifs and themes of his own work, and again inevitably in a somewhat 
coded form – the encounter and the event, the proper name and numbers, systematicity 
and ‘the law of destabilization’, the ‘general structure of the mark’, the divisibility or 
‘internal difference’ of the letter vis-à-vis the ‘ideal iterability of the letter’ – to the 
effect that ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ reads at times almost as an outline of 
deconstruction, an impossible summary of ‘the experience of the impossible’. And even 
though, as one might rightly observe, each and every one of Derrida’s texts presupposes 
in some degree a good grasp of his thought, what clearly distinguishes ‘My 
Chances/Mes Chances’ is that while repeatedly referring to himself, and jumping from 
one text to the other, from one point to the next, its author has actually very little to say 
on the very topic of his address. One soon realizes in fact that Derrida is rather 
compelled to refer to himself and to jump from text to text, because he has so little to 
say on chance itself. ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ is subject-less.  
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In an effort to account for this admittedly peculiar strategy, Miller suggests that 
‘wandering’ constitutes actually a common feature of Derrida’s style of procedure, and 
that especially when it comes to chance, or more specifically destinerrance, Derrida’s 
essays tend to ‘mime the thing that they talk about.’13 In Miller’s view, then, ‘“Mes 
chances” is about the chances, good and bad, that befall the thinker or lecturer, Derrida 
in this case.’14 He concludes:  
 
Derrida, I conclude, does not just name destinerrance as an objective 
fact. Nor does he just exemplify it in the local style and overall structure 
of his essays. He is also himself the joyfully willing victim, as one might 
call it, of destinerrance. A playful exuberance, or joyful wisdom, a 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, is an evident feature of Derrida’s writings. 
However hard he tries to stick to the point, he is destined to wander. 
That is his chance or méchance, his good or bad luck.15  
 
 
Miller’s interpretation, if one can call it that, is hard to refute in view of the facts. 
Indeed, above all, Derrida here performs chance. Nevertheless, Miller also seems to 
simplify matters considerably and in this way to lend support, even if unintentionally, to 
the two most common misreadings of ‘chance’ in relation to Derrida’s work: that which 
reduces chance to a certain ‘playful’ style of writing, and that which associates chance 
with a ‘joyful’ randomness in his argumentation.16 As expected, things are far more 
serious than this: for ‘play’ entails rules, ‘joy’ entails a victory and ‘wandering’ itself 
entails a destination. Above all, what Miller’s reading seems to erase in its light-hearted 
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tone here is the ‘arduousness’ that Derrida’s text entails, or else the significance of 
chance. Yes, Derrida performs chance, but this is not quite the same as saying that he 
performs by chance. His text is dictated by chance, indeed, but for that reason it is all 
the more necessary, all the more determined. Unpredictability and necessity do not 
exclude one another; quite the contrary. After all, what is more surprising than the 
arrival of death or the fulfilment of a prophecy? ‘Pas de chance’, as Derrida notes, can 
mean both ‘no chance, no luck, and the step of luck’.17  
In his essay ‘From Dread to Language’, Maurice Blanchot attempts to 
distinguish between the different forms that writing – by, with, on or against chance, 
under the rule or in pursuit of chance – might take, between the different strategies that 
a writer might adopt in order to appropriate or at least approximate chance. He writes:  
 
It will always be harder for man to use his reason rigorously and adhere 
to it as to a coincidence of fortuitous events than to force it to imitate the 
effects of chance. It is relatively easy to elaborate a text with any letters 
at all taken at random. It is more difficult to compose that text while 
feeling the necessity of it. But it is extremely arduous [CD’s emphasis] 
to produce the most conscious and the most balanced sort of work while 
at each instant comparing the forces of reason that produce it to an actual 
game of caprice.
18
  
 
Although stemming from a wholly other context, Blanchot’s qualifications and the 
customary rigour of his prose are extremely helpful here, as he manages to illuminate 
with uncanny precision, that is, with the utmost thorough obscurity, the distinctiveness 
of Derrida’s ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’. Neither presumptuously necessary, as sober 
philosophical propriety would require, nor capriciously chancy, just for the sake of it, 
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and yet in a way both at once, ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ constitutes indeed ‘the most 
balanced sort of work’.  
 
2.3. Interface 
 
As Derrida will explicitly state, what is at stake here is a ‘certain interfacing of 
necessity and chance, of significant and insignificant chance’, or else a certain 
determinability in the structuration of chance, a certain order in the chaos, to put it in 
more familiar terms, or, what amounts to the same, a certain chanciness in the 
structuration of the determinable.  
As if anticipating Miller’s reading of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ as evidence 
that he is the ‘victim’ of chance, at once confirming and refuting his friend’s praise, 
which is also an accusation, Derrida cautions that 
 
[i]f I stress the multiplicity of languages, and if I play on it, you should 
not take this for a mere exercise or a gratuitous and fortuitous display. 
As I make my way from digression to deviation, I wish to demonstrate a 
certain interfacing of necessity and chance, of significant and 
insignificant chance: the marriage, as the Greek would have it, of 
Ananke, of Tukhe and Automatia.
19
 
 
Halfway through his wandering, Derrida returns here to the text’s onset and to his 
specific subject with yet another self-reflective comment on the text itself that the 
author is delivering at that very moment – on its haphazardness and on its chances. An 
interruption of the text, a pause rather than a step in the course of its development, this 
little passage does not strictly belong as such to the text of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ 
then, or else, it belongs to it without participating in it as such. Just like that initial 
question (‘did I choose this theme haphazardly or by chance?’) it could just as well fit 
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into any other of his texts. It goes without saying, therefore, that it demands our most 
concentrated attention, even more so in that its confessional, forthright tone seems to 
summon no less than the secret of Derrida’s text, unequivocally to disclose his strategy, 
to foresee the destiny of his chances: ‘I wish to demonstrate a certain interfacing of 
necessity and chance’, he declares. But then the question would be, just how does this 
labyrinthine, unruly text ultimately demonstrate that? How is this ‘interfacing of 
necessity and chance’ demonstrable to begin with? In fact, what does this ‘interfacing of 
necessity and chance’ even mean?  
In returning to the essay’s opening lines Derrida re-inscribes his commitment to 
silence ‘on’ chance. Here too, his words fend off any possible effort to grasp them; as 
soon as they offer themselves to reading, they withdraw immediately from view. So that 
analyzing them one would be really missing their primary implication. Attempting to 
understand what Derrida says here on the subject of chance, one would be turning a deaf 
ear to his resounding silence on it. To fool oneself that some sort of thesis on chance is 
there to be found, if only one looks closely enough, is to blind oneself to this passage’s 
place or out-of-placeness within the text; it is to overlook its enigmatic solitude which is 
also its universality, its irreducible independence, to take no notice of its shell-like 
nature that confines it in a non-dialectical secrecy. One can do little more than repeat or 
at best paraphrase Derrida’s ‘apotropocalypsis’, to borrow John Leavey’s neologism, 
‘the uneasy hymen of the apotropaic and the apocalyptic.’20 A serious rereading of 
Derrida’s avowal will ‘reveal’, indeed, that his secret is precisely that, an absolute and 
irreducible secret, and his chances, likewise, no more than a matter of chance, inevitably 
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indeterminable, necessarily unpredictable. ‘Defensive disclosure: reveal just a bit in 
order not to reveal, in other words reveal in order not to reveal’.21 
It remains, Derrida says nothing of chance – and in this way only says too much. 
His seemingly straightforward declaration simply serves to remind his addressees of – 
the theme that is – chance. Even if not strictly about chance, Derrida affirms, he has not 
been speaking by chance either. His lecture will have been with regard to chance from 
the start; everything said so far and everything to be said henceforth will have been in 
relation to chance. What would that relation be then? What would be its direction?  
Things start to clear up when a little later, in the same spirit and along the same 
lines, Derrida interrupts himself once more in order to reassure us again that, in fact,  
 
[i]t would be possible to demonstrate that there is nothing random in 
the concatenation of my findings. An implacable program takes 
shape through the contextual necessity that requires cutting solids 
into certain sequences (stereotomy), intersecting and adjusting 
subsets, mingling voices and proper names, and accelerating a 
rhythm that merely gives the feeling of randomness to those who do 
not know the prescription – which incidentally, is also my case.22 
 
Not only does he not perform by chance, Derrida asserts now, even more confidently, 
despite appearances his text has been unfolding according to a very specific, an 
‘implacable’ program. No doubt, he concedes, in its complexity it might give the 
‘feeling of randomness’ to some; this is nevertheless merely because they do not know 
the ‘prescription’ in advance and thus cannot determine its principles with certainty 
after the fact. Still, and in any case, this is just a ‘feeling’ and no more. The rigorous, 
meticulous philosopher that he is, Derrida confirms here unconditionally his allegiance 
to reason and rationality; after Socrates, after Hume, after Hegel, he affirms that 
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‘chance’ is only an effect of our ignorance. No, Derrida avows, in truth, everything is 
determinable; in truth nothing happens by chance; and especially not ‘My Chances/Mes 
Chances’.  
‘Incidentally’, though, he adds, and here is the twist, the deconstructive turn, or 
else the deconstructive ‘incision’ at the very heart of philosophy, the displacement of 
‘philosophy’ as such, ‘incidentally’, this happens to be ‘his case’ as well. ‘Incidentally’, 
that is, insignificantly, as if by coincidence, he also has this feeling of randomness; he 
also happens to ignore the ‘prescription’; he is also blind to the reason behind his text. 
But how is this possible? If Derrida himself is not aware of the program of his address, 
then who could ever claim to be? If the proprietor of speech cannot determine its intent, 
safely govern its despatch and guarantee its destination, then who can? Insofar as 
indeterminability inheres in one’s own discourse, insofar as it forms part of the very 
structure of logos, then philosophy as we know it goes out of the window; knowledge as 
we know it becomes impossible. Yes, Derrida avows, in truth everything happens by 
chance; for example ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’. 
Hence what we called a moment ago, for clarity’s sake, the ‘self-reflective’ 
character of these excerpts, which decidedly distinguishes them from the rest of the text, 
while they are also the ones most faithful to its theme. Chance only emerges shrouded 
in veils, on the text’s margins, as the residue of a failed endeavour to metalanguage, and 
chance stays obscured throughout ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, as Derrida ‘makes his 
way from digression to deviation’, an untold story, because chance will have always 
been there, a spectral omnipotence, within and without the text, its ‘phantasmatic 
author’, to recall Timothy Clark’s term for the sense of ‘psychic transformation 
51 
 
ascribed to artistic inspiration.’23 Indeed, one cannot help but read Derrida’s account 
here alongside those ‘variously bizarre and variously reliable accounts of the process of 
composition as a crisis in subjectivity’ that form the subject of Clark’s thorough 
analysis in his groundbreaking The Theory of Inspiration.
24
 Chance is never confronted 
as such, and never to be confronted, as a subject to be analyzed by the philosopher, 
because chance takes place with the text, despite the philosopher. A treatise in pursuit of 
chance as such would be an exemplary failure in that respect. Chance itself is not there, 
in the text supposedly about it, because chance is that which makes that text possible 
and dictates its unfolding. As E. M. Forster once put it: ‘How do I know what I think 
until I see what I say’.25 ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ is chance then, ‘chance in other 
words’, as the title of Ann Wordsworth’s reading of it has it.26 Derrida does not 
thematize chance, because chance thematizes deconstruction instead and calls upon its 
principles one by one. A fateful chance is that which summons all these texts that 
Derrida falls upon, one after the other; chance founds all of his findings. ‘My 
Chances/Mes Chances’ is subjectless because it is subjected to chance; which 
incidentally answers Derrida’s ‘first and preliminary’ question:  
 
The first and preliminary question, as if thrown on the threshold, 
raises the issue of the downward movement. When chance or luck 
are under consideration, why do the words and concepts in the first 
place impose the particular signification, sense, and direction (sens) 
of a downward movement regardless of whether we are dealing with 
a throw or a fall? Why does this sense enjoy a privileged relation to 
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the non-sense or insignificance which we find frequently associated 
with chance? What would such a movement of descent have to do 
with luck or chance? From what viewpoint can these be related (and 
we shall see how precisely, in this place, vision comes to be 
missing)? Is our attention engaged by the ground or the abyss?
27
 
 
As another Jacques would have replied to the philosopher: ‘Because it was written up 
above’.28 
 
2.4. Only chance 
 
Writing will have always been of chance. Derrida’s chances will have been 
prescribed by chance, right from the start: 
 
It was in 1966, during a symposium in the United States we were both 
participating in. After some friendly remarks about the talk I had just 
given, Jean Hippolyte added: “That said, I really don’t see where you are 
going.” I think I answered him more or less like this: “If I saw clearly 
and beforehand, where I was going, I really think I would not take even 
one more step to get there”.’29  
 
But just how literal or metaphorical are we being here? How serious and how 
playful is Derrida being here? How much chance is there after all in his ‘chances’, in the 
prescription named deconstruction? It is no doubt a valid question. The problem, 
however, which Derrida’s discourse as a whole confronts us with and which ‘My 
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Chances/Mes Chances’ epitomizes, is that chance is precisely unquantifiable; more than 
that, it is unquantifiability as such: incalculable. The problem, in other words, is that 
one cannot be half-serious about truth. As we saw earlier on in this chapter, in order to 
be itself philosophy cannot acknowledge a margin of error or a percent of uncertainty in 
its findings, and it cannot tolerate therefore any ambiguity in its proclamations; ‘the sole 
aim of philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the contingent’, to recall Hegel’s dictum, 
not to negotiate its force and pertinence. And this is not negotiable.
30
 A law that allows 
for a possibility of irregularity is not a law, strictly speaking. Insofar as there is chance, 
even the chance of chance, then nothing is safe. And Derrida is dead serious about truth. 
In truth, he affirms, nothing is safe. Stating that he ignores the ‘prescription’ and the 
destination of his address, Derrida acknowledges unconditionally that, as a matter of 
fact, indeterminability necessarily contaminates every discourse. Acknowledging that 
‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ is a text about chance in that it is because of chance, he 
suggests that every work is likewise, above all, a work of chance. Just like that moment 
in Naples, on the 25
th
 of May, 1994, when Maurizio Ferraris asks him ‘[w]hat, then, is 
the relation between the incalculable and calculation, chance and strategy’ and Derrida, 
recalling the question he asked himself in ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ (‘did I choose 
this theme haphazardly or by chance?’) happens upon these words:   
 
A decision has to be prepared by reflection and knowledge, but the 
moment of the decision, and thus the moment of responsibility, supposes 
a rupture with knowledge, and therefore an opening to the incalculable – 
a sort of ‘passive’ decision. One has to calculate as far as possible, but 
the incalculable happens [arrive]: it is the other, and singularity, and 
chance, without one’s being able to do one’s part; the parting between 
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reason and its other, the calculable and the incalculable, the necessary 
and the aleatory, is without example; it does not obey a logic of 
distinction, it is not a parting with two parts. If it is not a parting – a 
division into shares, or a distribution into parts – then the space of 
rationality can be totally invaded by or surrendered to what we call the 
incalculable, chance, the other, the event. Here is the enigma of this 
situation in which I get lost; but it is this enigma that erases the 
difference between calculative rationality and its other; and this enigma 
complicates and entangles all questions of decision and responsibility. 
[...] And I could, naturally, give a great many examples; it is the law of 
everything I write and of everything that happens to me [qui me 
arrive].
31
   
 
The ‘parting between reason and its other, the calculable and the incalculable’, is 
‘without example’. The ‘interfacing of necessity and chance’, which was supposed to be 
the theme of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, is not re-presentable; what Derrida ‘wished to 
demonstrate’ will have never been demonstrated, because it is not demonstrable. Insofar 
as chance, the other of reason, the limit of reason, part-icipates in the event, then reason 
is already outright dissolved. As soon as the space of rationality is ‘invaded by’ chance, 
presence loses itself and everything that is surrenders to the aleatory’s force. If chance 
cannot be eliminated, if it is necessary, then necessity is chance; if what happens is 
necessarily unpredictable, then the unpredictable is what happens, necessarily. Hence, 
Derrida affirms, and the apparent contradiction is the key to this passage, he could 
‘naturally, give a great many examples’ of what ‘is without example’; all too many, 
indeed. Because this, ‘this enigma’, this absolute secret, this un-re-presentability, is ‘the 
law of everything that happens to [him]’; indeterminability determines his fate. ‘This is 
why there are no examples while at the same time there are only examples’, as he says 
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in ‘Passions’.32 And this is why ‘the law of the law is what measurelessness will have 
always been’, as he puts it in ‘The Time is out of Joint’.33  
If anything, Derrida is too serious about truth. Yes, he refuses categorically to 
abide by the normative repression of chance that aims to safeguard the natural 
coherence and the sovereignty of reason and thus philosophy’s identity. That is not to 
say, however, that he seeks to establish some sort of ‘doctrine of indeterminacy’ in its 
place, in place of rational speculation; far from it. His ‘chance’ allows for none of the 
complacency of an instrumentalist scientism, to which it is frequently and clumsily 
compared, and the radicalness of his gesture is likewise incommensurable with the 
relativism of a liberal moralism that would like to appropriate his fame. If Derrida 
appears to question the self-regulating authority of reason and to resist philosophy’s 
primary law, he nevertheless does this through reason, with the utmost rigor and in the 
name of philosophy. His perpetual fascination with the giants of western thought, his 
compulsive attentiveness to their work, his unreserved respect and humility before their 
heritage, only serves to confirm this. The deconstructive break from the history of 
metaphysics – if such a thing exists, and it is one – cannot but re-inscribe itself in its 
movement; and while it resolutely contests both empiricist and transcendentalist 
presumptuousness, it does not denounce the adventure of truth as such. Rather, 
deconstruction takes its chances, even if taking a chance amounts to sacrificing its own 
integrity, effacing its own signature. That Derrida traces and exposes the limits of 
philosophical enquiry is really because the limits of philosophical enquiry constitute 
simultaneously its chance. An aporia, yes; but ‘[t]hese aporias are anything but 
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accidental impasses that one should try to force at all costs into received theoretical 
models. The putting to the test of these aporias is also the chance of thinking.’34 For 
there to be philosophy, reflection and knowledge, decisions and events, Derrida 
testifies, there must be chance. For philosophy to be possible, it must be impossible. 
Quoting Zarathustra quoting himself, Nietzsche countersigns: ‘Verily, a blessing it is 
and no blasphemy when I teach: “Above all things stand the heaven of Chance, the 
heaven of Innocence, the heaven of Coincidence, the heaven of Exuberance.”’35  
What remains then? What is the nature of this language that in and by itself 
affirms its blindness, its disjointedness from itself, its impropriety, the other as its origin 
and telos? What is the status of a discourse that ‘owns up’, as Robert Smith likes to put 
it,
36
 to the insurmountable impossibility of its promise, when it is precisely the 
‘ownness’ of this ‘owning up’ that this discourse puts into question, when, as Nicholas 
Royle observes, ‘[a]ll of Derrida’s work can be characterized by a concern to question 
and rethink the “ownness” of the “proper”’?37 Introducing the texts that comprise the 
collection entitled Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature, which 
includes Derrida’s lecture itself, Kerrigan and Smith write:  
 
What above all distinguishes the postmodernist analysis is the 
methodological necessity of including itself in the issue and the problem, 
accepting responsibility for its own reflexivity of error. Postmodernist 
discourse wants to field its rebound – to abandon a tradition of self-
certainty, to stand aside from the conditions of sense defined in this 
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tradition, without lapsing into mere unintelligibility. [...] In 
postmodernism the rebound of statement upon itself is not suffered 
passively or received in embarrassment, as somehow silencing, but 
actively embraced. Discourse has been reconstituted about precisely this 
instability.
38
 
 
That is reassuring; and utterly misleading. Deconstruction cannot and should not be 
confused with a ‘postmodernist analysis’, even in this particularly sophisticated version 
of it. And the reason is simply that deconstruction can bear no ‘methodological 
necessity’ in its name. Historicizing Derrida’s oeuvre in this manner and reducing its 
disruptive force to some sort of happy-go-lucky ‘affirmation of its own impossibility’ is 
quite tempting, and thus quite common. It is still a horrendous blunder, which of course 
can withstand no serious questioning. And one should question it, relentlessly. Just how, 
and by what, is this ‘rebound of statement upon itself’ ‘embraced’? What makes a 
discourse about its own ‘instability’ possible in the first place? How and where is 
discourse ‘reconstituted’, once it has accepted ‘its own reflexivity of error’? What 
discourse? Whose error? What reflects and what is reflected?  
What remains? The question remains. For what comes to pass is no more than 
the enforcement of an irreducible enigma’s law – from dread to language, to recall the 
title of Blanchot’s essay. ‘[O]ne cannot deny the destinerrant indirection as soon as 
there is a trace. Or, if you prefer, one can only deny it’,39 Derrida posits. Deconstruction 
is chance; surrendered to the other, unidentifiable, off course, adrift, out of reach. 
Necessarily. From his early essay ‘Force and Signification’, and in response to Merleau-
Ponty’s assertion that ‘[m]y own words take me by surprise and teach me what I think’, 
Derrida affirms: ‘It is because writing is inaugural, in the fresh sense of the word, that it 
is dangerous and anguishing. It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can keep 
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it from the essential precipitation toward the meaning that it constitutes and that is, 
primarily, its future.’40 
 
2.5. Déjà vu 
 
And yet, on the other hand, an ‘implacable program’ takes shape. From the same 
interview with Maurizio Ferraris, Derrida says:   
 
If anyone found it amusing to follow this game or this necessity, they 
would discover that there is not a single text of mine that was not 
precisely, literally and explicitly announced ten or twenty years 
beforehand. [...] [I]n everything I’ve published there are always 
touchstones announcing what I would like to write about later on – even 
twenty years later on [...]. I have a feeling not just of continuity but a 
sort of immobility, a movement sur place. [...] This motion sur place 
does not prevent me from being constantly surprised, from having a 
feeling of being always on the verge...
41
   
 
Indeed, anyone even mildly familiar with Derrida can testify to this ‘continuity’. While 
his published work is massive in size and covers pretty much the entire canon of 
western philosophy, while his language and style vary considerably from text to text 
and sometimes even within the same text, fluctuating with ease from confessional 
intimacy to scrupulous close readings and back, from erratic, capricious acrobatics to 
elegant, aphoristic exactness, from exuberant playfulness to painstaking meticulousness 
at once, what’s more, while his primary concern throughout, as we saw in the first 
chapter, is none other than a reckoning with the ineluctable discontinuity and 
incalculability in the ‘thing in itself’, with the irreducibility of an absolute 
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indeterminability in ‘what happens’, and while, finally, this absolute indeterminability 
cannot but determine his own chances too, his work itself being by his own admission 
ultimately blind to its own program, as we saw in this chapter, despite all that, a careful 
reading of Derrida will invariably reveal that there is not the slightest contradiction or 
misstep in his texts, no trace of uncertainty and no hint of hesitation in the 
deconstructive event. Nothing is ‘out of place’. Nicholas Royle confirms it:  
 
[Derrida] presents the rather awesome case of someone having 
everything sewn up from the start. His work seems, from the beginning, 
to be all of a piece, even if it is not a piece that we could characterize as 
unified, finished or finishable. There is something almost incredibly 
consistent, always already in place, about Derrida’s work.42  
 
And Marian Hobson proves it; her Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines
43
 is the most 
concentrated and most thorough account of this improbable, uncanny contiguity of 
deconstruction’s structure, the oneness of its multiplicity, the familiar unfamiliarity of 
its trace. As if the destination of destinerrance were predestined, as if the work of 
chance were fated, that which is not always returns to itself, incessantly retracing the 
effects of its absence; forever amiss – forever there; always the same – always anew. 
How is this possible?  
Derrida acknowledges that his experience of writing entails such a double and 
seemingly contradictory condition. On the one hand, he says, ‘[e]very time I write 
something, I have the impression of making a beginning [...] everything appears 
anew’.44 On the other, however, ‘I’m well aware of the fact that at bottom it all unfolds 
according to the same law’; in a way, he admits, ‘[I am] repeating the same thing all the 
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time.’45 Formulated in this way Derrida’s experience sounds like a perpetual déjà vu, ‘a 
certain “toujours déjà vu”’, to borrow a phrase of his from Specters of Marx,46 that 
would also be its opposite then, a jamais vu, whereby the same keeps repeating itself as 
if for the first time and every first time feels all too familiar indeed. And as a matter of 
fact, Derrida will attribute here the constitutive, programmatic ‘immobility’ of his work, 
his ‘motion sur place’ that nevertheless ‘does not prevent [him] from being constantly 
surprised, from having a feeling of being always on the verge’, precisely to a ‘certain 
amnesia’.47  
‘‘Déjà vu’ will have initiated the program’, as Nicholas Royle will affirm in 
conclusion to his thrilling discussion on the significance of this peculiar experience.
48
 
To start with, déjà vu is not ‘the illusory feeling that one has previously experienced a 
present situation’, as the OED’s skewed definition has it, thus erasing its uncanny 
specificity, but the concurrence of that ‘illusory’ feeling with a synchronous ‘correct’ 
feeling that one has not previously experienced that situation. One feels that one is 
experiencing something again, while one also and at the same time feels that this is 
actually the first time, that what appears as the same is in reality new. Déjà vu is 
precisely the disconcerting affect of this irreducible undecidability, the certainty, in 
other words, that one or the other feeling can’t be right, even though both are equally 
strong. It is a double experience at odds with itself, an experience of duplicity, the 
moment when one can’t decide whether something – and hence one’s self – is present or 
past, novel or timeworn, for it works both ways, it feels as if it is both – a moment in 
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suspense. As Royle puts it: ‘Déjà vu is the experience of the double par excellence: it is 
the experience of experience as double.’49  
Which is then to say that déjà vu is also its double, infinitely reversible, 
infinitely repeatable as other. Indeed, according to the OED again, déjà vu can also 
occasionally denote ‘the correct impression that something has been previously 
experienced’. In confirmation, Royle will show that this will have been precisely 
Freud’s ‘position’ on the phenomenon. In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud 
argues then that déjà vu is rather, ‘on the contrary’, the concurrence of a ‘correct’ 
feeling that one has previously experienced a present situation – as an unconscious 
phantasy – with an ‘illusory’ feeling that one has never previously experienced this 
situation. According to Freud, déjà vu is when one feels that one is experiencing 
something for the first time because one does not know that it is a repetition; what 
appears as new, he affirms, is in reality the same.
50
 So which one will it be? But most 
importantly, what would be the difference? What would be the difference between déjà 
vu and déjà vu, between déjà vu as ‘reality’ and déjà vu as ‘illusion’, when déjà vu is 
exactly the impossibility of telling the difference between them, the always possible 
possibility of substituting the one for the other, ‘the uncanny figure of that which is 
irreducible to the psychical or the real, an undecidable trembling that phantomizes the 
possibility of ‘belief’’, in Royle’s exacting definition?51 Affirming his ‘belief’ in déjà vu 
and claiming to explain it away, Freud can only re-inscribe its enigmatic, pervasive 
eeriness, that is also the limit of analysis. In the first place, déjà vu will have always 
also been its interpretation; already, it is its repetition as other than itself. 
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Deconstruction is déjà vu. And that is both an affirmation and a question. For 
what is in question here, to return to Derrida’s writing, is not a singular instance of déjà 
vu that happens to interrupt his experience of continuity, but a ‘toujours déjà vu’ which 
rather insures the continuity of his experience as interruption. ‘And interruption does 
not interrupt the relation of the other, it opens the relation to the other.’52 As we saw, 
Derrida always feels that he is making a new beginning, that everything is anew, while 
he also always feels that he is repeating the same thing; and so do his readers. How is 
this possible? The answer will have always been before us.  
 
2.6. Amnesiac 
 
 
It is also a certain amnesia [CD’s emphasis] that accounts for this taste 
of mine, which may be considered a strength or a weakness. I won’t say 
that I know how to forget, but I do know that I forget, and that this is not 
entirely a bad thing even if I suffer from it.
53
  
 
Derrida forgets. Not that he forgets sometimes or some things; it is not a certain ‘type’ 
of amnesia that he ‘suffers from’, but a ‘certain’ amnesia as such. He forgets in general 
then, that is, always. His forgetfulness is to thank and to blame for knowing neither 
where he is going nor, as a result, where he is, while also feeling as if he has already 
been there. This is why everything appears to him as if for the first time and every first 
time feels like a repetition of the same. It will have all begun with amnesia. Is this 
possible? Of course not. In the first place and above all, because amnesia can never be a 
permanent condition or a general trait; one can never have it. By reason of itself, 
amnesia is that which one precisely never has. Once it happens to one, and it only ever 
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happens once, one no longer has it, one is no longer oneself. Amnesia is always of the 
other; it is the coming of the other itself in oneself.   
When complete, a memory loss results in the loss of one’s pastness, and by the 
same token, in the loss of one’s sense of selfhood altogether, radically disconnecting 
oneself from oneself. This cut, this violent incision into one’s life, necessitates as a 
consequence an unconditional opening of oneself to chance, to the future, to the other’s 
determination. That is well understood. Medically it is defined as ‘retrograde amnesia’, 
in opposition to ‘anterograde amnesia’, which leads to an inability to recall merely the 
recent past, while long term memories remain intact. But what if amnesia was a 
permanent state, a perpetual predicament, as Derrida claims is his case? What if 
amnesia was at the origin? What if every moment, every mark, every text, was yet 
another amnesic incision into one’s life, one’s oeuvre, into the present state, into itself? 
Obviously, it would no longer be possible then to distinguish between retro- and 
anterograde amnesia. But more than that, it would actually be impossible to even 
distinguish amnesia as such, since now the ‘amnesiac’ would not forget anything, 
except for himself, that is, strictly speaking, nothing at all. Forgetting would be what 
happens to him, all that happens to him, but for that reason it would also never be his 
own. Not by chance, a combination of retro- and anterograde amnesia is medically 
defined as ‘transient global amnesia’; if it were not transient, it would not be a 
‘condition’ at all; one cannot have it. So if amnesia forces one to surrender unarmed to 
the mercy or to the whims of the other’s determination, to let the other decide one’s fate 
in order to become possible, in the present, a recurring, originary amnesia also and 
simultaneously prevents one from ever appropriating the other’s determination, thus 
making one impossible, non-present.  
64 
 
Now, what if everyone and everything suffered from such a chronic, recurring 
amnesia? This is precisely what Derrida’s entire oeuvre invites us to think, after 
Heidegger but without Heidegger’s nostalgia: that everything that is, everything that 
takes place, every mark as such, is constituted out of an essential and ineluctable 
forgetfulness of itself, of its being, or else, the lack of a secure and stable ‘bond’ to a 
past and a future, an origin and a destination, a meaning and a referent – in a word, the 
lack of a self, leaving thus nothing that forgets, nothing to forget, nothing but 
forgetfulness itself, as the residue of the impossible desire to forget it. In the Ear of the 
Other, Derrida writes: ‘It’s not that something has been forgotten; rather, one wants to 
forget that there is nothing to forget, that there has been nothing to forget [...], that there 
has never been an intact kernel.’54   
In the seminal essay ‘Signature Event Context’ (1977) and in response to speech 
act theory, Derrida elaborates on the seemingly paradoxical structure of this law, which 
is the law of everything that happens, under the name of ‘iterability’, which in its 
etymological particularity (from itera, meaning other in Sanskrit) serves to illustrate 
this co-implication of repetition and alterity. Unsurprisingly, he deems necessary to 
return to it in summary form in the context of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, as testament 
to the indemonstrable interfacing of necessity and chance: 
 
To be a mark and to mark its marking effect, a mark must be capable of 
being identified, recognized as the same, being precisely re-markable 
from one context to another.  [...] But [...] the identity of a mark is also 
its difference and its differential relation, varying each time according to 
context, to the network of other marks. The ideal iterability that forms 
the structure of all marks is that which undoubtedly allows them to be 
released from any context, to be freed from all determined bonds to its 
origin, its meaning, or its referent, to emigrate in order to play 
elsewhere, in whole or in part, another role. [..] This iterability is thus 
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that which allows a mark to be used more than once. It is more than one. 
It multiplies and divides itself internally. This imprints the capacity for 
diversion within its very movement. In the destination there is thus a 
principle of indetermination, chance, luck, or of destinerring.
55
  
 
What makes something possible in the first place, Derrida affirms, presentable in the 
present moment, identifiable as itself, is its re-markability, that is, the possibility that it 
is determined otherwise the next moment, transcribed as such elsewhere and by another 
– its perpetual amnesia in other words. This possibility dissolves in effect the limit that 
separates the ‘present moment’ from the ‘next moment’ and destabilizes thus the 
linearity of time altogether. A chronic amnesia, let’s not forget, is also the amnesia of 
chronicity as such. The possibility of contamination, dissemination, destinerrance is not 
reducible therefore to a future modality; rather, it forms an essential property of a 
mark’s coming-to-presence, right here and now.  
One should not rush to interpret this ‘principle’, this ‘condition’, as the warranty 
of a mark’s infinite purity or of a fundamental innocence before the other. Nor is it, at 
the other extreme, anything like the free pass to a self-indulgent linguisticism or some 
form of relativism, as the neo-pragmatic reading of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger 
would have it.
56
 Even if there is no remedy for it, as Heidegger would also come to 
realize, the forgetfulness that inevitably befalls oneself does not amount to a perpetual 
irresponsibility; one can neither appeal to it as a transcendental imperative nor 
empirically appropriate its effects.
57
 And the reason is, quite simply, that this radical 
forgetfulness proscribes the very possibility of a self-identical ‘forgetful’ subjectivity to 
                                                          
55
 Derrida, ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, p. 16. 
56
 This will be the focus of our discussion in the section entitled ‘Pragmatic Circumspection’ in Chapter 3.  
57
 Derrida’s thorough responses to the resistances that ‘iterability’ was met with and the misreadings it 
still gives rise to complement his original essay ‘Signature Event Context’ in the indispensable edition: 
Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
66 
 
begin with. A-mnesia is not the subject’s loss of memory but the subject’s lack of 
memory. In other words, a mark’s amnesiac remarkability is not an accidental property 
superimposed on an already unified and a priori identifiable entity; it is rather its 
structural presupposition, and as such it remains unverifiable, ‘quasi-transcendental’, as 
Derrida will say of ‘iterability’, as of his other organizing ‘lexemes’ (supplement, 
différance, hymen, trace, parergon, etc.), as unverifiable as a global amnesia that forgets 
even, or above all, amnesia, whose truth, and it is true, requires nonetheless that it 
annuls itself at the moment it is enforced and by reason of its enforcement, that it is not; 
from the platonic truth as anamnesis, to the deconstructive truth as unamnesis. Memory 
is not as the retrieval of what was once there, the reconstitution of a dislocated identity, 
but ‘a constitutive act’, in Timothy Clark’s words, ‘to the degree that it must destroy the 
very anteriority of the past in order to elaborate its figure in the present, and entrust it 
[…] to the iterability of a code whose projective nature is inherently one of repetition, 
the effacement of any possible immediacy.’58  
Iterability is what marks the presentness of presence, the subjectivity of the 
subject, the self-sameness of the self, with a constitutive, originary impurity, 
contaminating what comes to pass with an unpardonable guilt, an unpayable debt and 
hence with the always already of an infinite responsibility. Simply put, one can never 
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start ‘anew’. ‘For the other is not the new’.59 One will have never started; one will have 
always found oneself in suffering, and from precisely this.  
Paranamnesia.     
Prescribed by chance, and yet, an implacable program takes shape. How is this 
possible, we ask ourselves? What are the chances? In truth, however, we know already, 
an incredible coincidence always lies in the shadow of an ineluctable necessity. For 
what is the ‘work of chance’, that which happens to happen, despite our best 
calculations and deliberations, that which falls from above and catches us off guard, if 
not that which could not have happened otherwise? What is that which opposes our 
desire, our desire for knowledge, for truth, for oneness, limiting and giving rise to our 
desire at once, limiting it in order to give rise to it, what makes this text impossible in 
order to make it possible, what is this but necessity? It is because Derrida keeps on 
repeating the same thing, because he repeats ‘himself’, that he is always other, always 
indeterminable. And inversely: it is because Derrida submits unconditionally to the 
other, because his writing is determined by chance, that his entire oeuvre is marked with 
the incredible consistency of an unfailing program.  
 
2.7. Improvisation 
 
‘The experience of deconstruction, if such a thing were possible,’ Peggy Kamuf 
writes, ‘would be the singular experience of a repeating singularity, always someone’s. 
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But whose? Whose experience is it? To whom does it belong?’60 While Gianni Vattimo 
strives to force out of Derrida the confession of an ultimate origin and purpose in 
deconstruction, some kind of ethical justification for the deconstructive gesture, some 
reason, at least a subject in control, disarmingly Derrida admits his disarmament:   
 
It is not I who deconstruct; rather, something I call ‘deconstruction’ 
happens to the experience of a world, a culture, a philosophic tradition: 
‘it’ deconstructs, ça ne va pas, there is something that budges, that is in 
the process of being dislocated, disjointed, disadjoined, and of which I 
begin to be aware. Something is ‘deconstructing’ and it has to be 
answered for.
61
   
 
Prescribed by chance, determined by the other, it is not I, says Derrida, it is not I, says 
the other. Is deconstruction the automatic transcription of a possessed medium after all? 
Is Derrida a mad prophet, attuned to the ‘budging’ of a ‘world’, a ‘culture’, a 
‘philosophic tradition’? Of course not, would be the short answer. Nevertheless, 
deconstruction is certainly not foreign to an experience of automaticity (just as, and for 
the same reason that, it is not foreign to a certain experience of literature). Automatia is 
the surname of Tukhe as Plutarch tells us; and Derrida will unequivocally avow his 
incalculable debt and responsibility to it: ‘I am hovering around a hypothesis, a logic, an 
analysis, and suddenly a word appears as the right one to exploit, thanks to its 
formalizing economy… The feeling I have is not of having invented or of having been 
the active author of this thing, but of receiving it as a stroke of luck.’62 Taking 
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inspiration from comparable accounts of the process of composition, Timothy Clark 
affirms:  
 
The subject of enunciation is a multiply contaminated one: the source of 
the work is neither a commanding conscious intentionality, nor the 
impulses and drives of the somatic or the unconscious, nor the structures 
and constraints of the discourse at issue, but the temporary and 
incalculable co-working of all these factors in a non-linear space that, at 
its most extreme, may be experienced by the writer as a reversal of cause 
and effect.
63
  
 
To attempt a somewhat crude comparison, Derrida’s work might be seen as an 
inverse surrealism: rather than striving to achieve an unmediated expression of selfhood 
by turning fate into chance, Derrida waves goodbye to selfhood and allows chance to 
turn into his fate instead.
64
 Acquiescent to Mallarmé’s grave forewarning that a throw of 
the dice will never annul chance,
65
 Derrida decides to play along, to take the game 
seriously and to ‘raise the stakes’ as he likes to say. And it works; how could it not? 
‘The glue of chance makes sense.’66 
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As we have been quoting for a while now from Derrida’s interview with 
Maurizio Ferraris and Gianni Vattimo, published under the title ‘I Have a Taste for The 
Secret’, it is worth noting that Derrida’s interviews would seem to embody perfectly 
this peculiar interfacing of necessity and chance. As has been widely acknowledged, yet 
insufficiently scrutinized in its own right, Derrida’s interviews shine with an astonishing 
rigour and clarity, an uncanny coherence that makes them practically indistinguishable 
from his written, his ‘proper’ body of work. In fact, Derrida’s improvised and summary 
responses to the unpredictable questions posed to him often seem even more thorough 
and systematic than the texts they presumably ‘refer to’ or ‘originate from’. 
Paradoxically then, one might say, yet actually in perfect accordance with Derrida’s 
contention that the implacability of deconstruction is actually indissociable from its 
‘chanciness’, just when Derrida is most concretely and literally abandoned to chance, 
his discourse attains to the most programmatic. Improvisation will have been the most 
precise.  
 ‘Improvisation’ seems in fact to draw together all the intertwined threads that 
this chapter has been tracing, if not as a magic ‘key’ to its enigmas, then at least as a 
suitable subtitle to it. ‘“Improvisation” is appropriate’, Timothy Clark confirms, 
‘because the emergent text […] arises from an incalculable multiplicity of lines of 
intersection between all the vectors that play across the blank page.’67 From the Latin 
improvisus, meaning ‘unforeseen’, ‘unprepared’, ‘improvisation’ suddenly appears, 
indeed, as the right word to exploit, thanks to its formalizing economy. On the one 
hand, improvisation bears witness to a fundamental rupture of the rational subject, an 
improbable suspension of its cogito. On the other, however, ‘improvisation’ becomes 
significant, or better still, it acquires its significance, on account precisely of the 
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necessary unity and rationality of the subject that it thus also unquestionably 
presupposes, on account, in other words, of its impossibility. A mad person, to put it 
bluntly, a person ‘beside him’ as they say, or just ‘out of control’, in great anger for 
example, attacked by panic or under the influence of drugs,
68
 cannot be said to 
improvise, or else, and in what amounts to the same, he can only improvise. He 
‘himself’, in any case, even from a legal standpoint, will never be held fully accountable 
for the things he says and does. To ‘improvise’ as such, to let oneself be taken ‘beside 
oneself’, without program or calculation, as if dictated by another, one must, above all 
and more than ever, be with oneself. Impossible possible, in and by itself, 
‘improvisation’ simultaneously affirms and negates then, affirms by negating, all those 
fundamental values on which philosophy proper necessarily relies, namely the propriety 
of authorship, signature, full presence, reason, free-will, and so forth. With the germ of 
chance that is its limit, the ‘as if’ of an essential fictitiousness in the experience it 
attests, ‘improvisation’ destabilizes in effect the propriety of philosophy itself vis-à-vis 
its others: literariness, playfulness, lying, illusoriness, madness, falsehood, contingency.  
Naturally, a ‘philosophical improvisation’ would be no more than an 
oxymoronic, unthinkable monstrosity. Of course, how could a philosopher as such ever 
improvise? How could an interview, for that matter, ever form part of a philosophical 
corpus? And yet, on the other hand, how could a philosopher ever do anything but 
improvise? What would become of the philosopher himself or herself, and what would 
remain of philosophical enquiry, if everything was rather foreseen, predetermined in 
advance, only to be repeated and delivered as such (back) at its lawful destination? 
More succinctly, what would philosophical enquiry be, if it was provisional?  
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During an interview and in response to a question about ‘improvisation’ with 
reference to an older article of his on jazz music,
69
 David Wills, another prominent 
reader and writer after Derrida, notes:  
 
I have the impression that the more one pays attention to one’s own 
language, the more one is worked on by the signifier. The more one 
works on programming signifying effects at the level of the word, the 
more the words come to light out of obvious places that escape one, or 
from distant, buried or unknown places. That would be another 
hightechnological effect of language, or perhaps its viral-type mutation, 
or some sort of autoimmune effect: the more one tries to narrow down 
the choice of words in order to achieve precision, the more nuanced or 
poetic one’s language, the more words one mobilizes, puts in play.70 
 
In other words, it is when one pays no attention to one’s words, when one does not 
calculate the effects of what one writes and completely ‘lets go’ to the other, that words 
come out the most clearly, the least contaminated; to be precise, one must improvise. 
Not simply because ‘programming signifying effects’ has its limits, but more radically 
still because ‘programming signifying effects’ has the opposite effect: ‘the more one 
pays attention to one’s own language, the more one is worked on by the signifier.’ 
Immediately, one cannot help but wonder: Will this have been an improvisation? Is 
Wills paying attention to his own language here? This is not a marginal, parenthetical 
question, as we will see. Nor is it reducible to the fact that this is an interview 
‘conducted via email’ as its editors inform us, and an ‘edited transcript’ of it for that 
matter, a quasi-interview then, although this coincidence does enhance of course the 
question’s urgency.   
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In keeping with the context of his extremely interesting study on ‘dorsality’71 
that occasions this interview, Wills goes on to attribute his ‘impression’ to a 
‘hightechnological effect of language, or perhaps its viral-type mutation, or some sort of 
autoimmune effect’. It certainly sounds as if he is improvising here. In any case, Wills 
refrains from elaborating on this undoubtedly stimulating list of regulatory abstractions 
and instead allows its almost stuttering uncertainty to reverberate, in the echo or the 
rhythm of its irreducible, determinative ‘perhaps’. Having said that, however, rather 
than compromising, as one might have expected, the truthfulness or even the 
persuasiveness of his ‘impression’, Wills’s apparent inability or reluctance to anchor 
with confidence this ‘necessity to improvise’ in some kind of comprehensive, 
originating principle actually serves to validate it even further. Insofar as what he 
attempts to describe with precision here is the necessary failure that accrues to one’s 
attempt to describe with precision, his failure to do so constitutes simultaneously a 
success. What Wills’s account ends up verifying in consequence, albeit despite itself, is 
exactly that the more ‘one tries to narrow down the choice of words in order to achieve 
precision, the more nuanced or poetic one’s language, the more words one mobilizes, 
puts in play.’ His reflection on the other turns out to be a reflection of the other on itself, 
without a self then, without a point of origin, always already spectral: improvisatory. 
Improvisation does not belong; it is what does not belong; it is always of the other. 
What Wills’s ‘improvisation’ verifies is that, as Derrida says in another interview, ‘[s]o, 
one has to, one fails to improvise [Improviser il le faut, donc].’72 It is true; the more one 
tries to objectify or, inversely, to submit to improvisation, in a word, the more one tries 
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to represent improvisation, the more one is exposed to its effects. Every attempt to 
account for the fatefulness of chance, for the interfacing of the necessary with the 
contingent, cannot help but re-inscribe its enigmatic unaccountability in the moment 
itself – the unaccountability of the moment itself.  
One cannot help but wonder: Will this have been an improvisation? One will 
never know for sure. Improvisation will have always been unverifiable. Necessary, yes; 
impossible, absolutely; always never there. In an unpublished interview from 1982, 
Derrida, as quoted in the film Derrida, improvises the following: 
 
So I believe in improvisation and I fight for improvisation. But always 
with the belief that it’s impossible. And there where there is 
improvisation I am not able to see myself. I am blind to myself. And it’s 
what I will see, no, I won’t see it. It’s for others to see. The one who is 
improvised here, no I won't ever see him.
73
 
 
In reference to just this quotation, Gary Peters saves for ‘Derrida the Improvisor’ 
the last word of his recent monograph, The Philosophy of Improvisation.
74
 And as if to 
justify the purpose of his study itself, Peters reassures us there that in fact ‘Derrida has 
things the wrong way around.’75 Why? Well, because, as he explains, ‘to lose oneself – 
one’s self – in this incessant and dis-tracted movement where everything that is there 
[...] can be given again and afresh, this is not the death of improvisation but its true 
beginning.’76 A peculiar criticism indeed, since, to Peters’s surprise no doubt, Derrida 
might have actually subscribed to this, albeit with a little less enthusiasm, a little more 
alert to its implications. ‘A beginning’, Peters concludes jubilantly, ‘that the improvisor 
is, by placing him or herself outside of the moment, responsible for beginning again, 
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and again... eternally.’77 That is, exactly, never; in any case, never him or herself, never 
inside the moment. For an eternal beginning is also, of course, its telos; no improvisers 
anymore. ‘There always remains improvisation, and that is what counts here’, Derrida 
declares.
78
 Which, incidentally, brings us back to the start.   
 
2.8. Synchronicity 
 
To begin with: ‘No chance of nullifying chance – a priori’.79 This will have been 
Robert Smith’s point of departure, the ‘Incipit’ of his remarkable monograph Derrida 
and Autobiography. And what makes it remarkable is precisely this: that it does not stop 
there. While acknowledging, in acknowledging, that ‘‘by definition’ there can be no 
response [...] to the chancy eventuality that pre-empts, disarms and circumvents in 
advance rational response’, Smith persists.80 And to this exceeding that is the remains of 
his quest, its impossible condition of possibility, Smith will give the name 
‘autobiography’. A risky choice, no doubt, at odds with itself and threatening it from 
within, but for that reason all the more appropriate: in the first place, Derrida and 
Autobiography will have been the resistance to the constitutive danger it presents to 
itself. Indeed, what appears to be Smith’s primary concern, on the back of 
‘autobiography’ as it were, is that the inevitable contamination of philosophical 
propriety by the irrepressible, ‘always possible’ irruption of contingency does not 
reduce the unverifiable singularity of the trace to an empirical, unrepeatable facticity – 
the ‘subject proper’ of autobiography. On the contrary, he will argue, this contamination 
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or destinerrance puts into question the very onticness of facticity, and thus of the trace 
‘itself’, its ‘autobiographical’ remains. To put it more simply, the elusiveness of the 
‘thing in itself’ or of the present moment is not equivalent to its irretrievable 
immediacy; rather, ‘immediacy’ or ‘automaticity’ is merely how one is accustomed to 
think of and account for this elusiveness. If autobiography can never fulfil its promise 
then, to bridge the distance between oneself and oneself as other, this is because it is 
itself split, itself autobiographical, always already other than itself. If the 
autobiographical necessarily parasitizes the philosophical, as the contingent necessarily 
parasitizes the necessary, it is not as an unavoidable potentiality of its mark, but as this 
mark’s unavoidable actuality.  
To repeat: the ‘interfacing of necessity and chance’ is not simply the necessary 
possibility of accidents; it is also their inevitability. If chance is necessary, then chance 
is what was meant to be. As Smith notes, this ‘non-negotiability has something like the 
force of destiny or fate. Chance shuns the dimension of reason [...], yet repercussing 
there as if by godly caprice.’81 A coincidence is at the origin: the co-incidence of oneself 
with the absolute other in the moment itself, which effaces but does not annul, eradicate 
or reduce their essential difference, their disparity and their disjointedness in the 
moment itself, the discordance of the moment itself. Synchronicity is what happens: 
urgently, it demands vigilance. ‘Something is “deconstructing” and it has to be 
answered for.’82   
Derrida writes in conclusion to Ulysses Grammophone: ‘Only another event can 
sign, can countersign to bring it about that an event has already happened. This event, 
that we naively call the first event, can only affirm itself in the confirmation of the 
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other: a completely other event.’83 And the other cannot be anything but absolutely 
unpredictable and absolutely necessary. In this case, it takes the form of a car accident. 
As if to prove his point, that his point is not his own, it never is, Derrida continues: ‘I 
decided to stop here because I almost had an accident just as I was jotting down this last 
sentence, when, on leaving the airport, I was driving home after the trip to Tokyo.’84 
One might hastily assume that this little anecdote, which seals Derrida’s text, simply 
serves wittily to illustrate his preceding insight. But could it not be, perhaps, the other 
way around, namely, that his insight was born out, necessitated by, in response to this 
seemingly unrelated incident? What happened first? ‘Just as I was jotting down this last 
sentence...’  
A similar ‘autobiographical’ scene that immediately springs to mind occurs in 
the Post Card. Again, the issue here revolves around the questions of signature, 
propriety and authorship, the relation of the one who writes with the other, who dictates 
what is to be written. Specifically, in one of the letters that make up ‘Envois’, the 
nameless (not by chance, of course) author charges none other than Heidegger, along 
with Freud and Nietzsche, for never having ‘overturned’ metaphysics, insofar as they 
have never seriously questioned ‘that Socrates did not write, that he came before Plato 
who more or less wrote at his dictation’.85 And just then, at the very moment he makes 
this claim –‘the name of Heidegger had just been written, after “Freud”, in the letter I 
am in the process of transcribing in the machine’,86 by coincidence, his 
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telephone rings. The United States. The American operator asks me if I 
will accept a “collect call”... from Martin (she says Martine or martini) 
Heidegger. As is often the case in such situations, which I know only too 
well, since I must often call collect myself, I can hear vaguely familiar 
voices at the other end of the intercontinental line: someone is listening 
to me, awaiting my reaction. What is he going to do with the ghost or the 
Geist of Martin? I can hardly summarize the entire chemistry of the 
calculation that led me, very quickly, to refuse [...] Who, in short, pays: 
the addressee or the sender? Who ought to pay? The question is very 
difficult, but this morning I thought that I ought not to pay, apart from 
adding this note of thanks.
87
 
 
Synchronizing thus his ‘rejection’ of Heidegger’s work88 with the rejection of 
Heidegger’s actual call, merging the necessary, as a philosophical thesis is supposed to 
be, with the contingent, as a random telephone-call should be, Derrida (or is it the 
other?) blurs once more the borders that separate them, puts into question the hierarchy 
that organizes them and destabilizes in effect all our commonsensical certainties about 
the relation of the demonstration to the demonstrated, the interpretation to the 
interpreted, the example to the exemplified, the constative to the performative, the 
theoretical to the actual, the philosophical to the autobiographical, the pure to the 
impure. And this, incidentally, this destabilization will have been his (whose?) intention 
right from the start: it is just this enigma, this peculiar structure of synchronicity, the 
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polyphony within the voice itself or else the essential divisibility of the mark as such, 
chance, this, this is indeed just what is at stake and what Derrida strives to 
‘demonstrate’ throughout the monumental, seismic event that is ‘Envois’. Whose entire 
program, it should be noted, is actually necessitated, dictated by Derrida’s chance 
finding of an 18
th
 century carte-postale, which happens to depict Socrates writing at 
Plato’s dictation instead of the other way around. 
Finally, and most characteristically, Derrida concludes his response to Ferraris 
on the ‘relationship between the calculable and the incalculable’ by remarking the 
coincidence of a coincidence that by coincidence remarks another – for the first time, 
there and then, an improvisation of an impossible synchronization comes to him from 
the other, as if to save his life:  
 
Right now, since you and I are talking together in a hotel room in Naples 
there is a point in the text that I am writing – it’s there on the table 
behind you – where, though I am speaking of psychoanalysis, archives, 
Freud, religion etc., in a discussion of Freud’s Gradiva I remark that I 
am writing this in sight of Pompeii, at this moment, etc. I have the 
impression that if I were to efface these traces, these archives of the 
occasion, I would lose my life, I would make it even more ephemeral 
and neutralized. I want, if possible, to mark even the most speculative of 
thoughts with a language and with a date: this came to me, at exactly 
that moment.
89
 
 
Robert Smith writes: ‘[I]n Derrida’s work the realm of chance, in its 
unconditioned essential necessity, is the case before it becomes the case for him or her. 
Or perhaps not before, but simultaneously.’90 ‘Perhaps’? Surely, one will think, the 
difference here is not small; indeed, everything depends on this. Nevertheless, Smith’s 
evident uncertainty is not an accidental mishap; or else, if it is, it is essential and 
programmatic. The tension that this uncertainty attests in any case is irresolvable: it 
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must remain. As we saw in the course of this chapter, every mark bears witness to just 
this undecidable oscillation between chance ‘before’ oneself and chance 
‘simultaneously’ with oneself, between chance as external contingency and chance as 
determinative ineluctability. Every mark takes place as the interfacing of significant and 
insignificant chance, Ananke and Automatia; it is in deconstruction. Derrida’s work is 
precisely the experience of the unknowability of chance’s provenance, the re-marking of 
the always possible possibility that it is otherwise, elsewhere – of the necessity of 
chance. Fortunately, one will never know for sure whether chance is ‘before’ or 
‘simultaneously’; one will never reduce the difference, that is difference as such, 
between the one and the other, between identity and difference, repetition and alterity, 
necessity and chance. Which is also to say: one will never know whether there will have 
ever been a difference to begin with. One can only keep faith. As we will verify in the 
next chapter through a discussion of ‘belief in chance’, all that remains is the impossible 
desire to annul difference, to bridge the distance that it opens up, to be one, at the 
origin; impossible because its fulfilment would also be its annulment, because its 
impossibility is also its condition of possibility. It is destinerrance. It remains. The 
trembling of this dangerous ‘perhaps’ is the case. 
81 
 
3. BELIEF IN CHANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
If I might be permitted to put this forward, some sensitivity to superstition is perhaps 
not a useless stimulation for the deconstructive desire.
1
 
 
3.1. A coincidence 
 
Early on in his lecture ‘My Chances/Mes chances: A Rendezvous with Some 
Epicurean Stereophonies’, Jacques Derrida notes as if in passing that ‘to believe in 
chance can just as well indicate that one believes in the existence of chance, as that one 
does not, above all, believe in chance, since one looks for and finds a hidden meaning at 
all costs.’2 It is true, the phrase ‘to believe in chance’ can carry two meanings: it can 
indicate that one believes that accidents, fortunate and unfortunate, can and do occur 
irrespective of our best calculations, sometimes even in spite of our best calculations, 
that ‘mere’ chance can and hence does have an effect on the course of things. Or, and 
‘just as well’, as Derrida points out, ‘to believe in chance’ can actually indicate the 
opposite, namely that one believes that any apparent accidents in life do not just happen 
to happen, but instead always happen for a reason, in accordance with a logic which 
may be invisible to us but remains nonetheless purposeful and as such interpretable.  
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The chance of winning the national lottery, to take this obvious example, is no 
doubt infinitesimal. Now, oddly enough, belief in chance would constitute both the 
reason one nevertheless decides to give it a go, to take a chance, and the reason that 
another opts to pass. The reckless gambler and the prudent rationalist share this much: 
both believe in chance. What separates them is their perception of chance, or else, their 
respective ‘believing attitude’.3 Hence, in the first case the believer would be prone, for 
instance, to choose the numbers he bets on with great deliberation and to double-check 
the results. Similarly, if he lost, he would surely consider himself a little unlucky, 
whereas if he actually happened to win, he would rather feel rewarded for his faith. 
While the other, again because he believes in chance, would argue that it is so unlikely 
to win that there’s no point even bothering. Even if he were somehow forced to take 
part, he would most likely pick a few random numbers in haste and perhaps even forget 
to check the results on the same day. And if he were the one who ended up winning, he 
would feel so absurdly lucky, that he might even be converted; that is, he might stop 
believing in chance and start believing in chance.  
In short, ‘belief in chance’ constitutes simultaneously a testament to rationalist 
sobriety and to superstitious credulity. It is impossible to determine whether in 
‘believing in chance’ one actually believes in chance or one does not, in fact, believe in 
chance. Both the rationalist and the superstitious would agree that accidents can happen, 
that certain events do come about unpredictably. Both would readily acknowledge that 
even the extremely improbable is possible. But whereas the one believes that chance is 
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insignificant, a matter of chance and no more, the other believes that on the contrary, 
chance is significant and therefore anything but chancy.  
As it turns out, Derrida’s ostensibly insignificant, fleeting observation itself will 
have been extremely significant for the purposes of his demonstration. Soon after, he 
will proceed to show that it is precisely the effects of this co-implication of rationalism 
and superstition that Freud has a hard time evading when in the Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life he affirms that, presumably in contrast to the superstitious person, he 
actually ‘believes in chance’. Opposing, as Derrida notes, ‘one belief to another, a belief 
to a credulity’4 with the aim of legitimizing psychoanalysis’s scientific status, Freud 
ends up putting its very rationality and rigor into question.  
We will return to this in more detail in due course. What this chapter will 
demonstrate, however, is that the problem at hand is not restricted to psychoanalysis, 
even if, to be sure, psychoanalysis constitutes in a way the very confrontation with its 
exigency. Every rational discourse, that is, every discourse abiding by the normative 
values of truth, knowledge, reality and so forth, entails an affirmation of faith in chance, 
just like that of Freud. Reasoning becomes possible only insofar as it acknowledges a 
priori a margin of indeterminacy, conceived of in its broadest generality as the ‘always 
possibly otherwise’ within the event’s structuration. Indeed, one cannot but ‘believe in 
chance’. A reappraisal of the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and 
the propagators of the ‘pragmatic’ tradition in general will confirm this. The essential 
unpredictability of what is to come is that which makes room for reason’s mark. At the 
same time, however, in accepting chance unconditionally, in good faith as they say, 
every rational discourse also compromises its teleological constitution, what 
distinguishes it precisely from superstition and fiction. Hence, as we will establish 
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through an analysis of Richard Rorty’s reading of Derrida, rather than a ‘pragmatic’, a-
philosophical acknowledgment of the necessity of chance, what deconstruction 
exemplifies and calls for is the uncompromising face-off with its consequences. 
Allowing for the chance of chance, reason’s trace relinquishes the right to determine 
with certainty what is, to distinguish truth from untruth, to defend the lawful coherence 
of its findings, of its subject – of itself. Believing in chance, it forsakes its chance.  
This is the problem then: one cannot but believe in chance, indeed, but only 
insofar as one also, and above all, does not believe in it. If reason is constituted out of 
the possibility of inexplicable, unforeseeable divergence, it remains the regulative 
restraint of that possibility. To recall Robert Smith’s succinct formulation, ‘any 
philosophy worth its salt will be obliged to take it, the always possible chanciness of 
contingency, on board. But paradoxically, doing so brings on the destitution of 
philosophy: chance, which is necessarily a-philosophical, the limit of reason, is where 
philosophy runs out; a non-philosophical a priori.’5 In other words, the duplicity of 
‘belief in chance’ is no accident; it is actually necessary. To paraphrase Derrida: to 
believe in chance must indicate that one believes in the existence of chance, as well as 
that one does not, above all, believe in chance. Constrained by this double imperative 
that threatens its sanity and the stability of its limits, philosophy finds itself forced to 
qualify ‘chance’, to circumscribe its indispensable, constitutive, explicit or implicit, 
‘belief in chance’ within specific contexts and under specific conditions, to certain 
extents and in certain degrees. In order to preserve its right mind, the possibility of 
itself, it strives to maintain both senses of ‘belief in chance’ without the one 
contaminating the other at the moment of its enunciation; so that, more simply, one can 
say ‘I believe in chance’ and ‘I do not believe in chance’ without contradicting oneself; 
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so that the rationalist, as in the example above, can say ‘I believe in chance, but only in 
a sense; in another, I don’t believe in it’, and so dissociate rationality from superstition, 
truth from fiction, reason from madness. Through a series of close readings of texts by 
Aristotle, Freud and William James, this chapter will show that philosophy will have 
always been the impossible attempt to appropriate chance and to delimit its significance. 
Impossible because, as Derrida argues in ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’,  
 
the limits cannot be actual and static or solid but rather only the effects 
of contextual circumscription. Neither linear nor indivisible, they would 
arise instead from an analysis that I will call (with some circumspection) 
pragrammatological, at the intersection of a pragmatics and a 
grammatology. Open to a different sense of the dispatch (envoi) and of 
dispatches (envois), pragrammatology should always take the situation 
of the marks into account; in particular that of utterances, the place of 
senders and addressees, of framing and of the sociohistorical 
circumscription, and so forth. It should therefore take account of the 
problematics of randomness in all fields where it evolves.
6
   
 
That is to say, regardless how one perceives chance, what one means and what one 
believes one means when one ‘believes in chance’, it remains: ‘To believe in chance can 
just as well indicate that one believes in the existence of chance, as that one does not, 
above all, believe in chance.’ To believe in chance is as necessary as it is impossible.  
 
3.2. In context 
 
At first glance, Derrida’s remark might seem rather tedious and inconsequential. 
As one might object, the tension between the two oppositional meanings of the phrase 
‘to believe in chance’ is no more than a rectifiable linguistic infelicity, an unfortunate 
accident. Even if ‘to believe in chance’ is necessarily double, as Derrida suggests, then 
it simply calls for a supplementary, explanatory confirmation of its intended, proper 
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meaning. ‘If I stress the multiplicity of languages’, he reassures us, ‘and if I play on it, 
you should not take this for a mere exercise or a gratuitous and fortuitous display. [...] I 
wish to demonstrate a certain interfacing of significant and insignificant chance’.7 But 
the question is: what makes this demonstration significant in the first place? At the end 
of the day, what one believes in when one believes in chance is a matter of context, and 
that is all.  
‘This depends, as they say, on the context’, Derrida himself will not hesitate to 
admit.
8
 And of course, how could one deny it? ‘They’ would be indeed everyone, or else 
common sense. ‘But’, Derrida will add immediately, as if arguing against common 
sense, in spite of what ‘they say’, ‘a context is never determined enough to prohibit all 
possible random deviation.’9 As if in confirmation of his critics, who view 
deconstruction as some sort of relativistic linguisticism, instituted on the impossible 
grounds of a stubborn defiance of reason, it would seem that Derrida is acknowledging 
here, presupposing even, the obscurity of his address, and accordingly, the exclusivity 
of a certain, self-aggrandizing ‘deconstructive’ audience as its sole and rightful 
recipient. He lets on the same impression again a little later, when he states that 
‘[i]ndeed there are those of us who are inclined to think that unexpectability conditions 
the very structure of the event.’10 And once more, as counter-intuitively: ‘for some of us 
the principle of indeterminism is what makes the conscious freedom of man 
fathomable.’11 Provocatively enough, Derrida seems to affirm thus the exceptionality of 
his own, of a select few determinable through their common espousal of 
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indeterminability, the unsustainability of the limits that, incidentally, sustain their 
distinctiveness. With the presumptuousness of a calculated absurdity, it appears, he 
assigns to ‘us’ and only ‘us’, the truth of the impossibility of truth.  
Absolutely. Derrida’s critics will be surprised to hear that he would gladly 
subscribe to their criticism, even if not in exactly those terms; quite possibly, he would 
rejoice even in their perceptiveness. For the ‘absurdity’ they detect is the ‘absurdity’ 
that he has been trying to call attention to; it is exactly what his discourse sets out to 
investigate. It is true; ‘we’ are determinable on account of ‘our’ indeterminability, by 
reason of the instability of the limit that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’, ‘our’ sense from 
‘theirs’. But how is this possible? It is true; it is not.12 
In challenging common sense, the sense of common sense so to speak, or in his 
words ‘the culture of common sense that is marked by a powerful scientifico-
philosophic tradition’,13 Derrida does not simply seek to disprove or to qualify its 
assumptions; most certainly, he does not seek to replace common sense with something 
else. If yet again he remarks its limit, that is the irreducible, ineradicable and infinitely 
re-markable possibility of ‘random deviation’, if he insistently puts into question its 
naturalness, the security of its borders, this is not in the name of a sterile playfulness. 
Obviously, there will have always been reasonableness and its other: insanity, stupidity, 
fiction, etc.; that is not the issue here. What remains in question, indeterminable, in 
deconstruction, he affirms, is what authorizes and regulates the distinction itself. 
Contrary to popular belief, Derrida is not on some kind of mission to ‘blur the limits’, as 
it is often unwittingly posited. Simply, he asks: who sets those limits and according to 
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what? What renders reason to reason itself? Is it unreasonable to ask? Perhaps: ‘Are we 
obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this principle which is itself 
a principle of grounding? We are not – which does not mean that we are disobeying it, 
either.’14 As Derrida argues in this spellbinding passage from a little essay entitled ‘The 
Principle of Reason’, the deconstructive desire and responsibility has to be oblique, 
misapprehensible, in order to be itself: 
 
Is it rational to worry about reason and its principle? Not simply; but it 
would be overhasty to seek to disqualify this concern and to refer those 
who experience it back to their own irrationalism, their obscurantism, 
their nihilism. Who is more faithful to reason's call, who hears it with a 
keener ear, who better sees the difference, the one who offers questions 
in return and tries to think through the possibility of that summons, or 
the one who does not want to hear any question about the reason of 
reason?
15
 
 
 
‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ takes place precisely in the space opened up by this 
question. As he often likes to do, Derrida turns to the text he is delivering in the moment 
itself, before the Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities of the Washington School of 
Psychiatry, in October 1982. Already in the very first page he avows: ‘[L]et me tell you 
this much at once: I do not know to whom I am speaking. Whom is this discourse or 
lecture addressing here and now? I am delivering it to you, of course, but that doesn’t 
change the situation much.’16 Saying that, of course, Derrida is not disputing the 
distinctiveness of his potential addressees; on the contrary, as we just saw, he will not 
miss any opportunity to remark the unquestionable differences that separate the one 
from the other. By the same token, however, he does not presume to know what those 
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differences are either. Of course, there will have always been ‘us’ and ‘them’, the 
enlightened or plain mad ‘Derrideans’, for example, and the rest. The limit, however, he 
attests, which demarcates their identity and renders them cognizable as such, the limit 
within his lecture’s destination which insures its singularity and imparts its significance, 
remains nonetheless incalculable; it remains, it is the incalculable. That which makes it 
possible to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the first place, as between the 
commonsensical and the obscure, normality and abnormality, truth and untruth, is 
precisely the ‘possibility of random deviation’, that is, the impossibility of doing so with 
absolute certainty. It is to this impossibility, to the necessity of chance, that every 
demonstration owes its chances, be it reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong, 
entertaining or boring: one will never know which; it will always be decided – always 
by the other. 
Therein lies accordingly the performance of ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’: ‘You 
will understand why I say this’, Derrida continues from above. ‘And once you find this 
intelligible, it becomes at least possible to demonstrate that [...] my lecture has not 
simply and purely missed its destination.’17 The very condition of his lecture’s 
unconditional readability, of its ‘intelligibility’, is none other than the unpredictability 
of its destination. Its unavoidable susceptibility to the possibility of naïve 
misinterpretations and violent misappropriations is that which safeguards its 
incommensurability to the specific context which gives rise to it, its incommensurability 
to a ‘deconstructive audience’ as much as to ‘deconstruction’ in general, to the corpus 
of which it forms part, its incommensurability, in a word, to its proper name. It is true, 
‘the principle of indeterminism is’ what makes ‘us’ possible, ‘what makes the conscious 
freedom of man fathomable’; at least ‘for some of us’. As for those, who say, ‘it 
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depends on the context’, ‘they’ would be, indeed, all those that Derrida’s lecture will 
have never had the chance to reach, never been given the chance to reach, ‘to touch’, 
but that only because ‘they’ don’t acknowledge the always possible possibility, the 
chance, that this lecture is in fact addressed to them, that ‘they’ could be ‘you’, that ‘we’ 
could be ‘us’, in other words, that the context is never one, ‘never determined enough to 
prohibit all possible random deviation’. 
 
[T]he majority among you belong to the “world” of psychiatry [...], to 
the “worlds” of psychoanalysis, [...] or to the “worlds” of science, 
literature, the arts, or the humanities. It is not certain that such “worlds” 
exist. Their frontiers are those of “contexts” and justificatory procedures 
currently undergoing rapid transformation. Even if I had at my 
disposition some information that might clarify this subject, it would still 
remain overly vague and general; I would have to make rough 
calculations [...] How indeed could I aim my argument at some singular 
destination, at one or another among you whose proper name I might for 
example know? And then, is knowing a proper name tantamount to 
knowing someone?
18
  
 
And Derrida will never cease to repeat this, always in another context. Just as 
‘knowing a proper name’ is not ‘tantamount to knowing someone’, so each and every 
mark, ‘all traits in general, phonic or not, linguistic or not’,19 every trace, remains 
irreducible to a knowable intention, to an identifiable, proper meaning, to a self. ‘That 
which they have in common, I will claim, is their insignificance in marking 
(insignifiance marquante). This insignificance marks. It belongs to the mark. It is 
marked but above all remarkable. This re-markable insignificance destines them’.20 
Derrida will use here as an example the French proper name ‘Pierre’, which not only 
bears no meaning in itself, like every other proper name, referring to no one unless in a 
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specific context – ‘it stands for only one person each time’21– but also happens to be the 
homonym of the French common noun pierre, meaning stone: ‘and the multiplicity of 
Pierres in the world bears no relation to the multiplicity of stones’.22 Insofar as every 
mark is in principle and by reason of its very condition of possibility repeatable within 
other contexts, it remains necessarily incommensurable to any one context. This is how 
he puts it in Limited Inc:  
 
If one admits that writing (and the mark in general) must be able to 
function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of 
production, etc., that implies that this power, this being able, this 
possibility is always inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility 
in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark [...] [T]his 
possibility is a necessary part of its structure.
23
  
 
In other words, there is no ‘right’ context for the mark, for what comes to pass, no 
context ‘determined enough’, because ‘there is nothing but context’,24 or else, because 
‘there is nothing outside context’,25 or else, in what amounts to the same, because there 
is no such thing as an event as such. In the interview with Derek Attridge, ‘“This 
Strange Institution Called Literature”’, Derrida says: ‘What happens is always some 
contamination. The event comes about, or promises itself initially, only by thus 
compromising itself by the singular contamination of the singular and what shares it. It 
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comes about as impurity – and impurity here is chance.’26 Everything that takes place 
takes part; every linguistic and non-linguistic mark bears within itself the necessary 
chance that it is determined otherwise (than what?). That is, every mark exceeds its 
context by reason of its re-markability within other contexts; it exceeds itself by reason 
of itself. Already, its propositional truth, or else its constative content, to borrow the 
terminology of ‘speech act theory’, performatively substantiates that there be chance. 
Every mark affirms in the first place (its) chance. ‘Belief in chance’ is what happens.  
And this is so even if one does not believe in it. The undecidability that pertains 
to the affirmation of chance itself would constitute therefore yet another symptom of 
this essential structure which delimits every mark, circumscribing its identity and 
sacrificing its singularity at once, making something possible in its impossibility, 
necessary in its contingency, itself in its multiplicity, present in its spectrality, 
comprehensible in its irreducible openness to differing interpretations; in short, an 
example of the necessity of chance. As such, however, it would also constitute an 
exemplary example; an instance of the law that is also the law itself. Like every event, 
‘belief in chance’ attests to a possibility that exceeds itself, the possibility or the chance 
that it is determined otherwise, ‘depending on the context’. It attests to the very 
possibility, that is, which it verifies in itself: ‘Being at once of sufficient determination 
and indetermination to leave enough room for the chances to which it speaks in its 
course’, as Derrida says,27 ‘belief in chance’ divides itself interminably and yet, at the 
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same time, it keeps on falling on itself; it keeps on falling on itself, because it divides 
itself interminably. Giving itself over to chance it so happens to return to itself. Thus, it 
becomes possible in its impossibility and as the impossibility of itself; its structure is 
quasi-transcendental. Just as Derrida’s most prominent neologisms, such as ‘différance’, 
‘iterability’, ‘parergon’ and of course, most notably in this context, ‘destinerrance’, so 
‘belief in chance’ happens to be a symptom of its own trajectory, acquiring its 
significance on account of its insignificance and as that insignificance itself; it is the 
remainder of itself insofar as it remains other than itself in itself, deferred in its 
presence, determinable by reason of, and as, the indeterminability it at once refers to 
and embodies. ‘Like that of “différance” and several others’, as Derrida says of 
‘iterability’, ‘it is an aconceptual concept or another kind of concept, heterogeneous to 
the philosophical concept of the concept, a “concept” that marks both the possibility and 
the limit of all idealization and hence of all conceptualization.’28 Even more precisely: 
‘“concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to the 
nonconcept’.29  
What does one believe in when one ‘believes in chance’? ‘This depends on the 
context, as they say, but a context is never determined enough to prohibit all possible 
random deviation’, says Derrida. Indeed, no context can safeguard the fate of one’s 
affirmation, because its destination will have always been the other. ‘To believe in 
chance’ will have always been subject to the other’s determination, up to the other. 
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Simply put, one can never know for sure what the other believes in when the other 
believes in chance. And likewise, as soon as one declares one’s own faith in chance, one 
instantly gives up any authority over its meaning and loses the right to determine its 
course. Chance belongs to the other or to oneself as other, necessarily; it belongs to 
chance. And the other here is not simply another person, whom we can simply ask for 
clarification, nor is it a potential addressee that might or might not get what we mean or 
how we mean it. To put it in its simplest generality, the other is not the unreachable, 
singular interiority from which the words originate or to which the words are destined in 
its difference from the repeatable and thus misinterpretable words themselves; it is 
rather the unverifiability of that interiority, or else, the incalculability of the difference. 
The possibility of ‘random deviation’ is likewise and as a consequence not equivalent to 
the uncertainty of an unknowable future; it is the absolute, unnegotiable lack of an 
identifiable present. The possibility of accident, the trembling of the ‘perhaps’, is not 
the potentiality of alternative outcomes, effects, destinations; it is the actuality of the 
envois, of the dispatch as such, in the moment itself. The multiplicity is inscribed in the 
mark; always already, it partakes in its structuration dividing it from within. To believe 
in chance ‘can just as well indicate that one believes in the existence of chance, as that 
one does not, above all, believe in chance’; either way, and in the first place, one will 
have always, necessarily, affirmed chance. Whether one is rational or superstitious, as 
we demonstrated above, one still ‘believes in chance’. That is, whether ‘one believes in 
the existence of chance’ or ‘one does not, above all, believe in chance’, one does. 
Whether one wants to or not, whether one knows it or not, one happens to abide by 
chance. The accident, the indeterminability, is what happens to happen now, what is 
bound to happen now. ‘This insignificance destines’. Chance is necessary. Right here 
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and now, there is destinerrance. In his essay ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, Derrida 
writes: 
 
The destinerrance of the envois, (sendings, missives, so to speak), is 
connected with a structure in which randomness and incalculability are 
essential. I am not speaking here of factors of undecidability or 
incalculability that function as reservations in a calculable decision. I am 
not speaking of the margin of indeterminacy that is still homogeneous to 
the order of the decidable and the calculable. […] [I]t is a question here 
of an aleatory element that appears in a heterogeneous relation to every 
possible calculation and every possible decision.
30
 
 
 
3.3. Pragmatic circumspection 
 
Uncomfortable with Derrida’s conclusions, as one should be, but hard-pressed to 
get around his analytical rigor, the earnestness with which he seems to put into question 
reason’s most fundamental assumptions, one could always resort to another type of 
criticism. Unable to dispute Derrida’s claims, once one has actually read Derrida, one 
could still evade their disconcerting consequences by arguing that in reality they are 
relatively insignificant in themselves. Indeed, employing this rather common rhetorical 
ruse, Derrida’s critics will often contend that even though he is admittedly right in what 
he says, he is just making too much out of it, he is being just too serious about it all. 
More specifically, they object, even if Derrida is not wrong in saying that no context 
can fully determine the significance of an event, no language reveal perfectly one’s 
intention, no pure, ideal meaning can be accorded to a signifying process, no knowledge 
assumed with certainty and no truth held a priori, even so, all that does not change the 
fact that one can still estimate; one can take one’s chances. After all, one is constantly 
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called upon to form judgments and make decisions. If a risk is always necessarily 
involved, as Derrida suggests, then so be it. One would be wise in any case to make use 
of the information and the tools in his disposal in the best way possible and the rest is 
history, so to speak. And speaking of history, in fact, has mankind not evolved through 
the centuries precisely thanks to successfully determining this indeterminable world? 
‘For’, as J. Fisher Solomon puts it: 
 
there is a difference between “destinerrance,” which eludes restrictive 
calculation, and probabilistic potentiality, which can admit the 
hierarchical ranking of possibilities. A post card, after all, stands a better 
chance, under ordinary circumstances, of being successfully delivered 
than not.
31
   
 
Perhaps, one cannot but believe in chance. Perhaps, Derrida is not wrong. Either way, 
one also, and above all, needs to be pragmatic.  
Not by chance, this sort of quasi-criticism of deconstruction, which in declaring 
its readiness to subscribe to Derrida’s claims seeks to undermine their import and to 
contain their force, which tolerates deconstruction so as to more effectively marginalise 
its impact,
32
 finds its fullest and most rigorous articulation in the writings of Richard 
Rorty, the most vocal exponent of the pragmatic legacy in recent years. This is not to 
suggest, of course, that it simply stems from some determinable set of theoretical, 
‘pragmatic’ presuppositions; quite the contrary. ‘Pragmatism’ proper, let us not forget, 
is constituted in the name of a determinative, programmatic pluralism. William James, 
who introduced and popularized the word in American university departments of 
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philosophy in the early twentieth century, made it clear right from the start that it is no 
more than ‘a new name for some old ways of thinking’.33 Which is to say, in effect, 
‘pragmatism’ will have always also carried within itself the chance of becoming the 
opposite; in a way, it will have always already also been ‘an old name for some new 
ways of thinking’.34 Its ubiquitous deployment nowadays across the entire field of 
humanities and beyond only serves to confirm this, as do the various points of dispute 
among ‘pragmatists’ down the years.  
Now, chief among those ‘new ways of thinking’ that pragmatism anticipates and 
thus incorporates in advance, according to Rorty at least, would be none other than 
deconstruction. As a matter of fact, then, deconstruction’s pragmatic appropriation 
would rather stem from the constitutive lack of a determinable set of theoretical, 
‘pragmatic’ presuppositions. Inassimilable to itself, in and out of context at once, 
‘pragmatism’ exceeds, in principle and by definition, the context of its deployment, 
James’s founding act as much as the work of his academic heirs, its proper name as 
much as all of its variants. It constitutes ‘a way of thinking’ rather than a system of 
thought, and what it stands for is precisely this, the primacy of ways of thinking over 
philosophical systematicity, the irreducibility of the one to the other. Instituted by 
reason of its re-markability, the ever re-contextualizable, re-definable meaning of its 
trace, or else the insignificance of itself, what ‘pragmatism’ denotes and epitomizes at 
once is an essential mistrust towards proper names, towards any claims to propriety – 
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philosophical, political, epistemological, ethical or otherwise. It remains a response to 
and on account of reason’s essential lack of sovereignty. Can the same not be said about 
‘deconstruction’? Inevitably, the question arises: do these two philosophical traditions 
not represent the same logic, the same desire? Do they not share the same philosophical 
grounding, insofar as they both refute precisely the very possibility of philosophical 
grounding?  
The numerous studies exploring their relationship and specifically the 
relationship between the works of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty would all confirm 
indeed a certain kinship between the two, an agreement of sorts, along the lines of ‘their 
common rejection of a foundationalist conception of philosophy’, as Chantal Mouffe 
succinctly puts it;
35
 and in Simon Critchley’s words: ‘The deconstructive claim that the 
ideality of meaning is an effect of the differential constitution of language […], can be 
assimilated to a pragmatist conception of meaning as a function of context.’36 It is 
certainly unsurprising, then, that Richard Rorty and others would be inclined to treat the 
indisputable affinities between deconstruction and pragmatism as evidence of their 
essential correspondence.
37
 For some, however, including Derrida, these affinities 
would be on the contrary just where one has to draw the line. In Rorty’s view, 
‘Pragmatists and Derrideans are, indeed, natural allies. Their strategies supplement each 
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other admirably.’38 And yet for Derrida, on the other hand, they are clearly not: ‘I am, in 
fact, not at all, truly not at all in agreement with Rorty, especially where he takes his 
inspiration from my work.’39 Still, Rorty will disagree with Derrida; that is, he will 
disagree with Derrida’s insistence to disagree with his agreement with him; he will 
insist on resisting Derrida’s resistance to deconstruction’s pragmatic appropriation.      
A quite unique, no doubt, in philosophical quarters at least, love-hate-hate 
relationship, and what makes it especially stimulating, as we will see, is that, actually, 
neither side is wrong, strictly speaking. The tension is in fact irreducible; it is necessary, 
and any attempt to dissolve its unnerving effects and one way or another settle the score 
is bound to fall short. This is the case, for example, with Simon Critchley’s essay 
‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism – Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?’. 
Critchley would like to think that the whole issue simply comes down to a terrible 
misunderstanding on Rorty’s part. In his view, Derrida is absolutely justified in 
rejecting the identification of deconstruction with pragmatism, because Rorty, 
conversely, is outright mistaken in blurring their limits. Rorty only thinks that he agrees 
with Derrida, that is, he thinks that deconstruction and pragmatism are one, because in 
reality he just does not understand Derrida. ‘I would like to disrupt this identification of 
deconstruction with pragmatism from the perspective of Derrida’s work’, Critchley 
writes, ‘and raise some critical questions about Rorty’s understanding of 
deconstruction.’40 And ‘the question’, he affirms, ‘is whether deconstruction is 
pragmatist all the way down’, as Rorty apparently presumes. ‘That is to say, is 
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deconstruction consistently anti-foundationalist?’41 ‘Well, clearly’, Rorty would reply; 
and he would be right, of course. ‘Or is there a foundationalist claim in deconstruction’, 
Critchley continues undeterred, ‘which cannot be pragmatized: justice, for example, or 
responsibility to another’s suffering?’42 Clearly not; and how could ‘justice’ ever be an 
example to begin with? All too eager to stand up for Derrida, to defend deconstruction 
from the threat of its ‘pragmatization’ on his behalf, Critchley ends up blatantly 
misconstruing deconstruction instead. Unable to find just what it is that Rorty 
misunderstands, to spot the difference between deconstruction and pragmatism, he 
decides to make Derrida say something other than what he actually does. In truth, 
however, despite Critchley’s allegations, and contrary to Critchley, Rorty happens to 
understand Derrida perfectly well. And as Critchley’s rhetoric inadvertently confirms, 
Rorty is absolutely right: there is no difference between deconstruction and pragmatism; 
first of all, because there is no such thing as ‘deconstruction’ or ‘pragmatism’.  
That is not to say, however, Derrida would contest in turn, that they are the one 
and the same either. As paradoxical as it may sound, while Rorty is not unjustified in 
identifying pragmatism with deconstruction, pragmatism in deconstruction, Derrida is 
also and for exactly the same reasons not unjustified in staunchly refusing to abide by 
this identification. In fact, it is because deconstruction is ‘pragmatist’, and ‘all the way 
down’ for that matter, that it remains inappropriable, first and foremost to ‘pragmatism’. 
Taking sides has never been further from the point. What is at stake here is not the 
intellectual clash between two thinkers, even less so between two ‘schools of thought’, 
between the ‘pragmatic’ and the ‘deconstructive’ point of view – after all, both are blind 
to themselves. In question is not deconstruction’s proper meaning vis-à-vis its 
                                                          
41
 Ibid, pp. 19-20. [original emphasis] 
42
 Ibid, p. 20. 
101 
 
pragmatic rendering; rather, it is deconstruction’s significance vis-à-vis its pragmatic 
appraisal. As we will verify immediately, rather than a thesis or an argument, it is in fact 
an attitude, or else a way of dealing with blindness, that constitutes the justificatory 
ground of both Rorty’s persistent effort to appropriate Derrida despite Derrida as one of 
his own, that is, as ‘a poor existing individual, somebody who thinks about certain 
things in certain ways because of certain weird, private contingencies’,43 and Derrida’s 
respective refusal to comply: ‘I take extremely seriously the issue of philosophical 
responsibility. I maintain that I am a philosopher and I want to remain a philosopher.’44    
Lorenzo Fabbri’s summary of Rorty’s stance on deconstruction is illuminating. 
According to Rorty, Fabbri writes,  
 
Derrida has to dismiss the belief that there exists a hidden logical space 
from where to anticipate the structure of any possible utterance. Instead 
of foreclosing what might be, of offering transcendental insights on the 
conditions for the possibility of Being as such, Derrida should be content 
[CD’s emphasis] in playing with the vocabularies he finds on his way in 
order to keep the future coming – the only ‘beyond’ he should take care 
of. […] Rorty concludes that Derrida should be satisfied [CD’s 
emphasis] with having given a response to the tradition that is influential 
to the present of philosophy. A response and not the response because, 
since the legacy itself is irreducibly plural, there cannot be a sole 
authentic way of engaging it.
45
  
 
If Derrida is right then, as Rorty clearly thinks he is, if ‘there is nothing but context’, as 
he affirms, then certainly, he can no longer claim to be doing ‘serious philosophy’. 
Surely, Rorty protests, the deconstruction of the ontological presuppositions that have 
shaped western metaphysics cannot maintain those same metaphysical aspirations. All 
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one can do, what Rorty claims he is doing himself, and what he believes Derrida 
‘should be satisfied’ he is doing as well, is offer yet another response to the history of 
philosophical speculation, a response which, of course, does not profess to be the ‘sole 
authentic’ response. The best one can hope for, in other words, is to come up with a 
language that sticks with one’s audience, and ‘with luck’, as Rorty puts it in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, ‘– the sort of luck which makes the difference 
between genius and eccentricity – that language will also strike the next generation as 
inevitable’.46  
‘Pragmatists’, Rorty proclaims, ‘are supposed to treat everything as a matter of a 
choice of context and nothing as a matter of intrinsic properties. They dissolve objects 
into functions, essences into momentary foci of attention, and knowing into success at 
reweaving a web of beliefs and desires into more supple and elegant folds.’47 Is this not 
just what Derrida has been doing all along? ‘Content’ with his ‘success’, he should 
leave it at that then.  He simply ‘cannot have it both ways’, Rorty says. ‘You cannot see 
these leaps in the dark as the magnificent poetic acts that they are and still talk about 
“philosophical rigour”. Rigour just does not come into it.’48 It is exactly as a means of 
‘having it both ways’ that Rorty interprets Derrida’s frequent recourse to the notion of 
‘quasi-transcendental’ structures, for instance. Reviewing Geoffrey Bennington’s 
‘Derridabase’, Rorty confesses: ‘I do not know how to use the notion of “quasi 
transcendentality” except as a name for the advantage that Bennington claims for 
Derrida over all the other philosophers […]. But I am not clear what that advantage is 
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supposed to be, nor that it exists.’49 It is for the same reason and along the same lines, 
that Rorty takes issue with Gasché’s attempt to systematize Derrida’s thought by 
reducing its key concepts into a set of conceptual ‘infrastructures’.50 Lorenzo Fabbri 
too, incidentally, and in response to Rorty’s concerns, resorts to the notion of 
‘infrastructure’ as evidence of an ‘unpragmatizable’ semi-foundationalism that 
supposedly safeguards deconstruction’s specificity and philosophical aptness. Coming 
to deconstruction’s rescue from its pragmatic ‘domestication’, as the title of his 
monograph has it, convinced that it is in danger, Fabbri construes thus deconstruction as 
some kind of obscure, self-righteous, metaphorical idealism: ‘Yet, in a certain sense’, he 
writes, ‘it is not wrong to understand Derrida’s metaphors as infrastructures. For sure, 
they are the conditions of the possibility of deconstruction, the devices that allowed its 
discourses to be produced. Without them, Derrida would not be who he is.’51 Contrary 
to precisely this sort of tautological claptrap, Rorty thinks then in all seriousness that he 
is taking deconstruction more seriously than deconstruction is taking itself. His essay ‘Is 
Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?’ delineates explicitly the contrast, as he 
perceives it, between his, the pragmatic, version of Derrida’s work and the 
‘deconstructive’ one:   
 
On the one side there are the people who admire Derrida for having 
invented a new, splendidly ironic way of writing about the philosophical 
tradition. On the other side are those who admire him for having given 
us rigorous arguments for surprising philosophical conclusions. The 
former emphasize the playful, distancing, oblique way in which Derrida 
handles traditional philosophical figures and topics. The second 
emphasize what they take to be his results, his philosophical discoveries. 
Roughly speaking, the first are content to admire his manner [CD’s 
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emphasis], whereas the second want to say that the important thing is his 
matter –the truths which he has set forth.52   
 
Contrary to his puffed-up disciples, Rorty asserts, contrary to a certain Derrida even, 
who seems to be making ‘noises of both sorts’,53 as Rorty admits in conclusion to the 
same essay, pragmatists are in fact the ones following Derrida to the letter. And truth is 
that they are; Rorty is right. What he overlooks, and what Fabbri, Critchley and the 
defenders of deconstruction’s rigor in general also have a tough time getting their heads 
around, is that this is the problem. What they, as much as Rorty, fail to understand is 
that it is in doing so, in following Derrida to the letter, that one also betrays Derrida. In 
reality, there will have never been a dilemma to begin with, because there will have 
never been a ‘correct’ way of reading Derrida: ‘Now, I claim this right to make noises 
of both sorts in an absolutely unconditional manner. I absolutely refuse a discourse that 
would assign me a single code, a single language game, a single context, a single 
situation’.54 
Rorty ‘cannot understand why Derrida wants to sound transcendental, why he 
persists in taking the project of finding conditions of possibility seriously.’55 Like all 
philosophy, he believes, deconstruction is no more than a private, a-political narrative, 
destined to absolute chance. But what is more important, unlike ‘all philosophy’, any 
arguments to the contrary, any arguments that deconstruction is something else, 
something more, determinable as such, happen to go against deconstruction’s own and 
most fundamental presuppositions. In a word, ‘deconstruction’ is impossible, and by 
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reason of itself. And, of course, Rorty is absolutely spot-on; any attempt to prove him 
wrong will have been in vain. And just as one cannot blame him for misunderstanding 
Derrida, one can also not really blame him for remaining dissatisfied if all that Derrida 
would suggest in response – always in another context – is that this, the impossible, the 
absolutely impossible, is what happens, what happens to happen, that the irreducible 
singularity of the mark is in fact the necessary condition of politicization. One cannot, 
one should not, expect Rorty to ever be satisfied; on the contrary, that is the whole 
point: he is not supposed to be satisfied. This is why we said it will have been a matter 
of attitude right from the start; therein lies the difference. In the face of impossibility, 
before the inevitable failure of philosophy’s ‘project’, what Rorty is striving for is the 
terms of an honourable surrender. Inflicted by an essential blindness, what Rorty yearns 
for is contentment. This is the pragmatic horizon of his work, the horizon of pragmatism 
in general. Whereas for Derrida, whom ironically enough Rorty likes to portray as more 
reticent, less radical than himself, this same impossibility, the constitutive, 
insurmountable aporia of rational thought, amounts to the radical absence of any ethico-
political horizon whatsoever. What stimulates the deconstructive desire is distress; all 
that remains in Derrida is the remainder of dread. And the hyper-tolerant Rorty will not 
tolerate this; why, of course, he doesn’t have to.  
In the course of a very interesting interview on the concept of responsibility, 
Derrida outlines the aporetic structure of ‘invention’, and in conclusion he resorts to a 
familiar, ‘deconstructive’ formulation: ‘Invention is impossible, and has to remain 
impossible in order to be what it is.’56 But this time, he also has something to add:  
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I am unhappy with this answer, but it cannot be any other way. 
Nevertheless, when I say “I cannot think otherwise”, and I acquiesce or 
consent to a law, to an imperative, this has to be the case even if it’s 
aporetic, paradoxical, or unbearable. I would not want to think otherwise 
merely to be happy or reconciled, and this is perhaps the rigour or the 
inflexibility of deconstruction; even if I am not happy with the necessity 
of what I have to say, I have to say it, and I owe this to the other.
57
      
 
‘Grammatology has always been a sort of pragmatics’, Derrida concedes 
summarily on a footnote in the ‘Afterword’ to Limited Inc, ‘but the discipline which 
bears this name today involves too many presuppositions requiring deconstruction […] 
to be simply homogeneous with that which is announced in De la grammatologie.’58 
More specifically, as J. Claude Evans insightfully adds, ‘pragmatics is committed to the 
in principle decidability of meaning, to the ideal of control and self-regulation’.59 Even 
more specifically, we would add here, pragmatics believes in ‘belief in chance’; that is, 
it believes that it is possible to believe in chance, to know what it is that one believes in 
when one ‘believes in chance’, that one can control and regulate one’s belief.  
Charles Peirce, the logician, philosopher and mathematician, whom William 
James credited with instituting ‘pragmatism’, and to whose work, incidentally, Derrida 
turns his attention already in Of Grammatology, writes:  
 
Chance pours in at every avenue of sense; it is of all things the most 
obtrusive. That it is absolute is the most manifest of all intellectual 
perceptions. That it is a being, living and conscious, is what all the 
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dullness that belongs to ratiocination’s self can scarce muster the 
hardihood to deny.
60
 
 
In a way, ‘pragmatism’ will have been the consequences of just this affirmation, of this 
unconditional ‘belief in chance’ –‘the will to believe’ in chance, as James would put it. 
Since chance is ‘absolute’, as Peirce declares, one can never fully control the course of 
the universe; one can neither capture nor amend its laws. What this means for Peirce 
and for the ‘pragmatists’ in his wake is that instead of trying to eliminate the contingent, 
as the positivists and the metaphysicians, the proper ‘scientists’ and the proper 
‘philosophers’, have been doing for centuries, one should rather be realistic;61 instead of 
going after the impossible, one should now resign oneself to what is within reach. In a 
word, one has to make do with uncertainty. ‘Although certainly an early forerunner of 
deconstruction,’ Samuel Weber writes, Peirce ‘was from the very start concerned with 
its other side: the fact that despite the tendency of semiotic processes to be open-ended 
and relatively indeterminate, determination takes place all the time, has always taken 
place and will always take place, over and above the efforts of individual thinkers.’62  
Because chance is absolute and it is everywhere, all one can do and, in fact, all one will 
have been doing all along, even without realizing it, is to try and tame the effects of 
chance. As Ian Hacking comments in the concluding chapter of his extremely rich and 
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informative monograph on the scientific groundings and the philosophical implications 
of probabilism: ‘Peirce’s history of the universe, in which blind Chance stabilizes into 
approximate Law, is nothing other than the taming of chance.’63 Chance is to be 
stabilized then. In the absence of truth, there remains the approximation of truth: 
philosophy in regulation.  
‘Randomness and incalculability are essential’, Derrida asserts, to Rorty’s 
approval. But in Rorty’s eyes, Derrida is also clearly overplaying his cards; he is 
investing with significance what is essentially insignificant, insignificance per se; that 
is, above all, ‘deconstruction’ itself. Pragmatism is in accord with deconstruction, 
indeed, but on condition that deconstruction renounces its own significance. Since 
‘deconstruction is chance’, Rorty reasonably presumes, then it must follow that it is 
insignificant; which is to say, that ‘randomness and incalculability are essential’ doesn’t 
really matter all that much. What the undeniable ‘obtrusiveness’ of chance signals, as he 
will never stop arguing, is that one can no longer claim for either philosophy or science 
the right and the possibility to convey and watch over truth as such, to capture reality in 
its essence. Other than that, however – this is the pragmatic injunction – there is no 
particular cause for concern. For even if one can never know for sure, one can always 
hypothesize; even if one cannot determine what is with certainty, one can always make 
assumptions, to be assessed by their effectiveness, or else their ‘cash value’, as James 
would say.  
In effect, deconstruction’s pragmatic appropriation will have always been 
contingent upon, coextensive with, the probabilistic appropriation of chance. Consider 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
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conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’64 No doubt, our 
conception of the effects that constitute meaning is modifiable, in light of new 
information, new ‘practical bearings’. No doubt, every ‘theory’ is fallible or 
‘deconstructible’, if you will, and hence should invariably remain enclosed within 
quotation marks. Nevertheless, that should not prevent us from forming theories until 
they are proven wrong, that is, inapplicable, in accordance with Karl Popper’s 
epistemological tenet. Popper, it should be noted, was another great admirer of Peirce. 
In Objective Knowledge he hails him as ‘one of the greatest philosophers of all times’.65 
And what makes him great, Popper suggests, is the fact that while he shared the belief 
of his fellow physicists ‘that the world was a clock that worked according to Newtonian 
laws’, he also  
 
rejected the belief that this clock, or any other, was perfect, down to the 
smallest detail. He pointed out that at any rate we could not possibly 
claim to know, from experience, of anything like a perfect clock, or of 
anything even faintly approaching that absolute perfection which 
physical determinism assumed. […] Peirce concluded that we were free 
to conjecture that there was a certain looseness or imperfection in all 
clocks, and that this allowed an element of chance to enter. Thus Peirce 
conjectured that the world was not only ruled by the strict Newtonian 
laws, but that it was also at the same time ruled by laws of chance, or of 
randomness, or of disorder: by laws of statistical probability.
66
  
 
At the end of the day, one can always find a middle ground between necessity 
and chance. Before and against uncertainty, one can draw inferences, establish 
frequencies, weigh up the pertinence and the usefulness of different propositions and 
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make one’s choices accordingly. ‘A post card, after all, stands a better chance, under 
ordinary circumstances, of being successfully delivered than not.’ For what it’s worth, 
one can even put forth a thing called ‘normal accident theory’ if necessary, and be done 
with it all.
67
   
This is all absolutely reasonable, of course; indisputable even. The only 
problem, however, is that, in truth, as we will shortly confirm, there is no such thing as 
an ‘accident’; as it happens, nothing happens by chance. What Rorty and the pragmatic 
logic in general omits, by definition, is that if chance is necessary, this is also to say that 
it is significant. Because chance is all there is, in fact, ‘this insignificance destines’, as 
Derrida says.
68
 The problem, in other words, and in what amounts to the same, is that to 
believe in chance also means that one does not, above all, believe in chance.  
‘The minute I open my mouth, I am in the promise’, Derrida repeats;69 as soon 
as one speaks, one affirms the chance that what one says is not what one means; ‘the 
minute I open my mouth there is a “believe me” at work.’70 This is what both 
deconstruction and pragmatism, breaking away from the transcendental questioning of 
traditional philosophical discourses, give us to think: one cannot but ‘believe in chance’, 
believe in the absolute other, without guarantees. But what deconstruction is rigorous 
enough, indeed, to not let pass, is that, as it happens, chance is unbelievable. What 
Rorty and the pragmatists refuse to accept, what they choose to ignore rather, in the 
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manner of a supposedly uncompromising forthrightness, when really in the name of 
order and the law, is that, fortunately, it is impossible to ‘believe in chance’, for chance 
is necessary, and fatefully so. 
 
3.4. Freudian slip 
 
Freud believes in chance: ‘I believe in external (real) chance, it is true’.71 But, of 
course, as Derrida will respond, Freud does not believe ‘in actual chance’.72 And yet, 
Freud’s avowal is not a mere slip of the pen; it is actually necessary, it remains 
analysable. In specific, as we will see, it attests to the very possibility of psychoanalysis.   
A large part of Derrida’s lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’ is devoted to the 
close, meticulous analysis of the last chapter of Freud’s The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, which goes by the title ‘Determinism, Belief in Chance and 
Superstition’. And what draws Derrida’s attention there is precisely Freud’s assured 
declaration of faith in chance, in ‘external’ chance to be precise. It is not just that ‘one 
could find a thousand declarations by Freud’, as Derrida observes, ‘attesting a 
completely determinist conviction of the positivistic type prevalent in his day’;73 what 
makes Freud’s avowal especially intriguing and hence all the more remarkable is that it 
actually comes in conclusion to the work that more explicitly and more zealously than 
any other, perhaps, delineates the psychoanalytic task as the unconditional elimination 
of contingency, in perfect conformity with the positive sciences and traditional 
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philosophical discourses. Immediately succeeding The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life constitutes in point of fact Freud’s arduous 
endeavour to rationalize and thus to explain away what would appear as the most trivial, 
the chanciest, effects of chance in one’s waking life. Surely then, one would presume, 
Freud does not, above all, believe in chance; it is impossible that he believes in chance. 
If serious, his confession to the contrary is simultaneously contradicting the essential 
premise of psychoanalytic theory, that is, the interpretability of human conduct in its 
entirety; tempering the solidity of psychoanalysis’s very foundation, Freud is inevitably 
also giving up on its claims to thoroughness.  
Not quite, Freud will affirm with his customary candour. One only needs to read 
his declaration, his ‘belief in chance’, in its right context, he reassures us; any suspicions 
of inconsistency will be dispelled as soon as one realizes what he really means, what he 
really ‘believes in’. Of course, there can be no doubt that psychoanalysis is founded on 
the grounds of a psychic determinism that leaves no room for chance. It is true; for the 
analyst, every psychological affect is significant, or else, there is nothing but symptoms; 
this is the principal psychoanalytic maxim. In Derrida’s succinct transcription: ‘There is 
no chance in the unconscious. The apparent randomness must be placed in the service of 
an unavoidable necessity that in fact is never contradicted.’74 Nevertheless, Freud warns 
us, one needs to be careful. ‘One must not confuse the domains, he tells us, nor their 
proper causalities’, as Derrida puts it.75 If psychoanalysis excludes chance, indeed, if it 
is the exclusion of chance as such, this is exclusively with regard to the internal, 
psychical ‘domain’ – its subject proper. When it comes to external things, Freud 
maintains, psychoanalysis is reasonable enough, pragmatic enough, to accept chance, to 
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acknowledge the possibility of random deviation. And so he clarifies: ‘I believe in 
external (real) chance, it is true, but not in internal (psychical) accidental events.’76  
 As always, Freud’s rhetoric is mesmerizingly clear-cut and so extremely 
convincing; and as in so many other occasions,
77
 it will take Derrida’s insightful, 
painstaking reading to expose its limit, the limit of the ‘contextual circumscription’78 
that will have made it possible in the first place, that will have always been (its) chance: 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, between ‘chance’ and ‘chance’, ‘significant’ and 
‘insignificant’, between ‘belief’ and ‘belief’, in truth and in fiction.  
Derrida writes:   
 
We [...] know that in other passages, in other problematic contexts, 
Freud carefully avoids ontologizing or substantializing the limit between 
outside and inside, between the biophysical and the psychic. But in the 
Psychopathology and elsewhere he requires this limit not only to protect 
this fragile, enigmatic, threatened defensive state that one calls 
“normality” but also to circumscribe a solid context […], the unity of a 
field of coherent and determinist interpretation, that which we so calmly 
call psychoanalysis itself.
79
 
 
Having just demonstrated that supposed ‘accidents’ such as ‘slips of the tongue’ and 
‘slips of the pen’, ‘misrememberings’ and ‘misreadings’, ‘errors’ and ‘combined 
parapraxes’, to quote but a few of the phenomena that The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life deals with, are in fact attributable to retraceable, psychological processes, 
and hence remain necessary effects of underlying, determinist causes, Freud is now 
concerned that one might mistake psychoanalysis for a superstitious desire to just not let 
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anything pass as ‘mere chance’, for a pathological compulsion to interpret everything 
that happens to happen, to treat even the insignificant as significant. To pre-empt this 
threat, Freud needs to establish a safe and secure limit then, a ‘solid context’, in the 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life more than ever, separating ‘normality’ from 
‘abnormality’. Yes, he will concede, he does share a certain ‘compulsion to interpret’ 
with the superstitious person, ‘an urge not to see chance as solely accidental but to place 
some kind of interpretation on it.’80 Yes, just like the superstitious person, he looks for 
and finds a hidden meaning at all costs; indeed, he does not, above all, believe in 
chance. But this is only in internal matters, while  
 
a superstitious man will see it the other way around: he knows nothing 
of the motivation of his fortuitous actions and slips, he believes 
fortuitous psychic factors exist, and he is inclined to ascribe a 
significance to outside fortuitous events that will make itself felt in 
reality, and to see chance as a means of expression for something that is 
outside him.
81
  
 
The superstitious person, like the religious and the metaphysician, Freud claims, 
irrationally accords significance to pure, insignificant coincidences in the external 
world; he pathologically emulates the rational analyst. Freud hence sharply dissociates 
psychoanalysis from superstition by finding a hidden meaning in superstition itself; it is 
‘nothing but psychology projected into the external world’.82 
But can one draw the limits so easily? Can one ever positively ‘distinguish 
between these two hermeneutic compulsions’, between rationality and superstition? Can 
one positively dissociate ‘belief in chance’ from ‘belief in chance’? Can one ever 
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believe in chance without at the same time, with the same movement, denying chance? 
That is, can one ever believe in actual chance, in chance as such? 
Claiming that something happened by chance, or else that an outcome to be 
determined in the future is ‘a matter of chance’, indicates that the conditions which will 
have determined an event are essentially unpredictable, either because too unlikely or 
too complex, as rationality would dictate, or because governed by a capricious, higher 
will, as superstition would have it. In either case, however, regardless how one 
interprets chance and whether one thinks it is significant or not, intended or not, to 
claim that an event happened by chance is not to dispute that it had a specific, 
determining cause; it is merely to suggest that this cause was incalculable in advance, in 
other words, that we, from our limited perspective, were unable to anticipate and to 
foresee its coming. In its classical conception and ever since Aristotle, an ‘accident’ 
attests to our inability to predict it, not the event’s own unpredictable nature. Of course, 
it is ‘by chance’ that one happens to find a treasure while digging a hole, or that a ship 
gets carried to Aegina by a storm, to use a couple of Aristotle’s own examples.83 But 
that does not mean that these ‘accidents’ are not both caused and necessary.  
Even more so, then, to claim that something happened by chance is actually to 
imply the opposite, to intimate something like the ‘hand of destiny’, and thus to fortify 
the rigidity of the determinist principle. As an unpredictable incident consists in the 
interruption of the ordinary, foreseeable causal chain, its unaccountability bears witness 
but to a certain, momentary suspension of reason. Its remarkability is therefore only an 
effect of its apparent automaticity, of the invisibility of its cause. That which happens 
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by chance, that which one could have never seen coming, is precisely that which one 
could have never prevented from coming. Insofar as something just happened to 
happen, as it is often said, it should follow that it couldn’t but have happened, precisely 
the way it did. Arriving without warning, uninvited, and totally unexpected, a chance 
event presents itself as a fateful event. 
Strictly speaking, nothing happens by ‘chance’. As Hume’s dictum has it, 
‘chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real 
power which has anywhere a being in nature.’84 Everything, even the most improbable 
of coincidences, happens for a reason. Whether that reason amounts to the correlation of 
some complex chain of immeasurable variables that are only retraceable after the fact, 
or to the enforcement of an unverifiable, unaccountable mystical imperative, still, the 
accident itself, any unexpected turn of events whatsoever, could never have been 
avoided. What happened was meant to happen.  
To come back to Freud then, would psychoanalysis contest any of this? Does 
Freud actually believe in ‘external’ chance, as he claims? Derrida’s verdict is 
categorical, even if not entirely unequivocal: ‘I do not believe that Freud believes in 
actual chance in external things.’85 Of course he doesn’t. Rather than challenging the 
determinist principle, the truth of determinism and the determinability of truth, 
psychoanalysis constitutes in fact an attempt to universalize its universality, so to speak, 
to validate its axiomaticity. Rather than allowing for some chance in the external world, 
as Freud feigns here, psychoanalysis ventures instead to verify its absolute impossibility 
all the way down to the innermost provinces of the inner self, and so to completely erase 
the limit between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, between physical and psychical reality, to 
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decontextualize the mark, uniting thus ‘the science of the psyche […], in a certain way, 
with the biophysical sciences’, as Derrida writes.86 (‘Remember that in 1897’, he 
reminds us, ‘he confided to Fliess his conviction that no “index of reality” of any sort 
exists in the unconscious and that it is impossible to distinguish between truth and a 
fiction “invested with affect”’.87) The problem, however, is that in so doing 
psychoanalysis compromises at the same time its scientificity, if not the very possibility 
of ‘science’; it sacrifices the distinctiveness of its identity. Not believing in chance, 
psychoanalysis is left without a chance. Its very condition of possibility renders it 
impossible as such. ‘The question that thereby imposes itself’ as Samuel Weber 
formulates it, ‘is: Must not psychoanalytical thinking itself partake of – repeat – the 
dislocations it seeks to describe?’88 In excluding the possibility of random deviation and 
turning everything into a significant, necessary symptom, psychoanalysis is bereft of its 
authority; its own prescriptive charts destabilize its theoretical sovereignty. The new 
science that Freud envisions is not to be. This is why he finds himself forced, here and 
elsewhere, on the back of psychoanalysis as it were, to call upon the limit between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ once again, between pathology and normality, real and 
imaginary, truth and fiction. He has no other choice; he has ‘to provisionally suspend all 
epistemological relations to the sciences’;89 that is, he has to betray psychoanalysis, in 
order to protect ‘psychoanalysis itself’, ‘the unity of a field of coherent and determinist 
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interpretation’. The only chance for psychoanalysis is its inexorable catastrophe, its 
annihilation.  
As much as he would like to think he does, or at least to convince us that he 
does, the truth is that in avowing his faith exclusively in ‘external’ chance ‘[t]he implicit 
question to which Freud is responding’, as Derrida points out, ‘is thus not the larger one 
of chance (objective or subjective, in things or in us, mathematical or empirical). It is 
not this question in its modern or classical form. It is only that of the believing attitude 
before the effects of chance, given the two series of causality: psychic/physical, 
internal/external.
90
 As much as Freud would like to distinguish psychoanalysis from 
superstition, his ‘belief in chance’ from the superstitious ‘belief in chance’, ‘internal’ 
from ‘external’, it remains that neither he nor the superstitious person believes in actual 
chance, in chance as such, in either ‘series of causality’. ‘What this means is that they 
both believe in chance if to believe in chance means that one believes that all chance 
means something and therefore that there is no chance.’91 What separates him indeed 
from the superstitious is neither their ‘belief’, nor its ‘context’; it is rather their 
‘believing attitude’: whereas Freud, ‘this Freud here’ at least, for strategic reasons only 
treats the ‘internal’ as significant, the superstitious person, without a science in his name 
to defend, rejects altogether, as Derrida says,  
 
the contextualizing and framing but not actual limits between the 
psychic and the physical, the inside and the outside, not to mention all of 
the other connected oppositions. More so than Freud, more so than this 
Freud here, the superstitious person is sensitive to the precariousness of 
the contextual circumscriptions of the epistemological frames, the 
constructs and the artifacts that enable us, for life’s convenience and for 
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the mastery of limited networks of knowledge and technics, to separate 
the psychic from the physical or the inside from the outside.
92
  
 
No doubt, accidents can happen and occasionally do. Whether one is rational or 
superstitious, one still ‘believes in chance’. No matter how one happens to perceive 
‘chance’, one cannot but accept ‘a margin of chance or probability that it would not be 
normal or serious to want to reduce or exclude’, as Derrida puts it;93 it is impossible not 
to believe in chance: there is insignificance (pragmatics). Obviously though, as we have 
demonstrated here, there is no such thing as a ‘pure’, ‘proper’ accident. No matter how 
one happens to perceive chance, whether one is rational or superstitious, one cannot 
possibly believe in chance as such; it is impossible to believe in chance: for this 
insignificance destines (grammatology).  
One has to believe in chance; and yet it is impossible to believe in chance. ‘At 
the intersection of a pragmatics and a grammatology’, one finds oneself confronted with 
a paradox: one has to believe in the unbelievable. But is it really a paradox? Can one 
ever believe in anything but the unbelievable? In Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, 
Derrida notes in parentheses: 
 
Any testimony testifies in essence to the miraculous and the 
extraordinary from the moment it must, by definition, appeal to an act of 
faith beyond any proof. When one testifies, even on the subject of the 
most ordinary and the most “normal” event, one asks the other to believe 
one at one’s word as if it were a matter of a miracle. Where it shares its 
condition with literary fiction, testimoniality belongs a priori to the 
order of the miraculous.
94
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In the first place, Derrida’s remark of the double significance of ‘belief in 
chance’ serves as a reminder that chance constitutes a matter of faith. One can neither 
see nor grasp chance for oneself, neither appropriate nor identify chance, say ‘this is 
chance’ and leave it at that. Inaccessible in itself and un-presentable as such, chance 
rests necessarily on the other; it is an experience of the wholly other. That is to say, 
chance requires in essence one’s belief in its existence, because chance does not exist as 
such. An act of faith in place and on behalf of what is not there in itself is what makes 
chance possible in the first place. Essentially invisible, inaccessible, chance exceeds the 
order of knowledge. More simply, had it been possible to prove the existence of chance, 
to comprehend and appropriate its effects, one would cease to believe in it. And 
inversely, had it been possible to disprove chance, once and for all eliminate its 
possibility, there would no longer be any reason to disbelieve in it. It is because one 
cannot see chance, know, present, make and even less verify chance, it is because one 
knows there is no chance, nothing happens by chance, that one believes in chance. It is 
because one does not, above all, believe in chance, that one does. And from the 
Monolingualism of the Other, in other words: 
 
For one can testify only to the unbelievable. To what can, at any rate, 
only be believed; to what appeals only to belief and hence to the given 
word, since it lies beyond the limits of proof, indication, certified 
acknowledgement [le constant], and knowledge. Whether we like it or 
not, and whether we know it or not, when we ask others to take our word 
for it, we are already in the order of what is merely believable. It is 
always a matter of what is offered to faith and of appealing to faith, a 
matter of what is only “believable” and hence as unbelievable as a 
miracle. Unbelievable because merely “credible.” The order of 
attestation itself testifies to the miraculous, to the unbelievable 
believable: to what must be believed all the same, whether believable or 
not.
95
   
 
                                                          
95
 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Patrick Mensah 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 20.  
121 
 
The declaration of faith in chance attests to the existence and to the inexistence of 
chance simultaneously; it affirms and denies chance at once; which is to say, one can 
only affirm chance on condition that one also denies chance. By the same token, one 
accepts, admits, welcomes chance and refuses, renounces, excludes chance. With the 
same movement, hospitable and hostile, one resigns oneself to chance, makes room for 
chance and annuls, dissolves chance. As a consequence, the two meanings of the phrase 
‘belief in chance’ cannot be really considered as interchangeable alternatives. Strictly 
speaking, they are not even oppositional. Rather, as their simultaneity indicates, the one 
is essentially and inextricably embedded in the other. As soon as one thinks the one, one 
thinks the other; as soon as one chooses the one, one is chosen by the other. From the 
moment one believes in the existence of chance, one no longer believes in it.  
No, Freud does not believe in chance. Contrary to the superstitious person, he 
has faith in the psychoanalytic theory, in the necessity of the psychoanalytic 
explanation, in a truth beyond psychoanalysis, resistant even to psychoanalysis, of 
chance. Yes, Freud believes in chance. Affirming the possibility of an ultimate 
psychoanalytic interpretation, Freud will have had accept from the start that 
psychoanalysis is interpretable, that is, impossible, and by reason of itself. Its 
constitution will have always been its destitution. A slip is at the origin.   
 
3.5. Aristotle and the end of reason 
 
- Aristotle believes in chance. As a matter of fact, in Book VIII of the Eudemian 
Ethics he saves for tykhe a place among the virtues that can lead one to prosperity. ‘But 
wisdom’, he writes, ‘is not the only thing which acting in accordance with goodness 
causes welfare, but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that 
122 
 
good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does. […] For that 
some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which 
luck is paramount’.96 And so he maintains explicitly: ‘[chance] must both exist and be a 
cause [ἀ νάγκη καὶ  εἶ ναι καὶ  αἰ τίαν εἶ ναι]’.97 Chance is necessary.  
- Aristotle does not believe in chance. As he affirms in Book VIII of the 
Eudemian Ethics; every event, no matter how unlikely or unpredictable it might seem, 
still constitutes only a secondary, necessary consequence of a determinable cause. As 
for those who seem to regularly have luck on their side, as they say, Aristotle is 
positive: ‘the success of the lucky must necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or 
some guardianship [ἀ νάγκη ἢ  φύσει ἢ  νόῳ ἢ  ἐ πιτροπίᾳ  τινὶ  κατορθοῦ ν]. […] The 
people we call fortunate are so not by reason of chance; therefore they are not 
fortunate.’98 Chance is necessarily not.  
What does Aristotle believe? What does Aristotle believe that he believes? Is it 
by chance that his overall verdict on chance remains to this day the subject of a heated 
debate? Indeed, Aristotelian scholars have always been divided over this; whereas some 
are convinced that he believes in chance, others deem that on the contrary he most 
certainly does not. It would be, of course, practically impossible to even attempt to sum 
up here the countless arguments that have been brought forward and reiterated over time 
by one or the other side, even more so to assess their respective merits. As it happens, 
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anyway, Richard Sorabji has done just that on our behalf. In Necessity, Cause and 
Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (1980) he patiently examines Aristotle’s 
plentiful and often ambiguous references to necessity and contingency in light of the 
various interpretations that have been proposed by his commentators in response. On 
top of that, he also reflects with admirable rigor on the significance and the implications 
of Aristotle’s thought with regard to a wide array of philosophical discourses that 
revolve around the related problematics of natural purposefulness and human freedom 
and culpability.
99
  
Sorabji tentatively sides with the ‘indeterminists’ in the end, but this is not what 
is important here; as he acknowledges himself in the book’s introduction, ‘people mean 
such different things by ascribing determinism or indeterminism to Aristotle, or qualify 
their ascription in such different ways.’100 Ultimately, what Sorabji’s labyrinthine book 
testifies to in the first place is precisely the need to interrogate the form of the debate in 
which it partakes, to up the stakes, as Derrida would say, to question the question itself 
on account of which it unfolds. His own endless, painstaking qualifications, the 
successive contextual circumscriptions of Aristotle’s ‘belief in chance’ in terms of a 
whole host of interwoven concepts, such as ‘necessitation’, ‘causality’, ‘essence’, 
‘purpose’, ‘explicability’, ‘involuntariness’ and so forth, as stimulating as they might 
be, verify above all that the dilemma between ‘determinism’ and ‘indeterminism’, the 
question whether Aristotle ‘believes in chance’ or ‘believes in chance’, is not exactly 
clear-cut. Instead of, or alongside, an investigation of his ‘true’ or ‘conscious’ 
intentions, his ‘real’ beliefs, what Aristotle’s ambivalence, the irreducible inconsistency 
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between his various statements, calls for is the utmost attentiveness to its very source, 
the trembling of chance itself, as well as the indissociable constitutive, structural aporias 
that condition ‘belief’, ‘truth’ and ‘intentionality’ as such. That is to say, more simply, 
perhaps Aristotle’s ambivalence is not an accident; perhaps, his real ‘belief on chance’ 
is not a mystery to be solved; perhaps, it is necessary. Because, as Aristotle will marvel 
himself in Book VIII of the Eudemian Ethics – one of the few works, incidentally, 
missing from Sorabji’s account – perhaps ‘chance is twofold’ [τύχη διττή].101  
Of course Aristotle ‘believes in chance’; how could he not? The possibility of 
random deviation constitutes precisely the subject of his analysis in Eudemian Ethics; it 
is what his analysis sets out to regulate; as such it constitutes therefore no less than the 
very possibility of itself. If he did not believe in chance, if he thought that on the 
contrary everything is predetermined, he would have no reason to begin; that is, it 
would have been impossible to begin. And of course, Aristotle, above all, ‘does not 
believe in chance’; how could he? What would safeguard the authority, the 
reasonableness even, of his analysis, the stability of his regulatory intervention, had he 
acknowledged a priori the possibility of random deviation? If he did believe in chance, 
it would have been impossible to go on. That there is chance can only be the premise of 
a philosophical thesis, insofar as it is also the conclusion that covers up its trace.  
So, in order for his analysis to become possible in the first place, Aristotle has to 
assume that, as reason dictates, what seems to happen by chance is nonetheless, just as 
everything else, contingent upon a superseding, determinable origin, that good chance is 
therefore simply an effect of ‘either nature or intellect or some guardianship’. Thereon, 
in search of the hidden meaning behind seemingly chance effects, he proceeds putting to 
the test one by one each of those three possibilities. What he happens to find, however, 
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as we will see in a moment, is that none of them is actually tenable; categorically, he 
ends up rejecting all of them. Good chance, he affirms, can be attributed neither to 
‘nature’ nor to ‘intellect’ nor to ‘some guardianship’; it remains unaccountable. Left 
with no other choice, then, Aristotle is ultimately forced to conclude, as if himself 
flabbergasted before the logical impasse, that chance must constitute in fact a distinct 
cause – causa sui – operating under its own principle; which, as we will be reminded, 
has been what he believed all along; as he had to, of course, in order for his analysis to 
become possible in the first place.  
Chance cannot be a natural effect, Aristotle argues, because it is irregular: ‘But 
since we see that some people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not 
succeed a second time too owing to the same cause? And a third time? And a fourth? 
For the same cause produces the same effect.’102 Just as flatly and unreservedly 
Aristotle rejects also the Socratic dictum that chance is merely an effect of the intellect, 
whereby wisdom would lead to fortune and ignorance to misfortune: ‘For it is clear that 
they [the fortunate] do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not 
irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they could not say why 
they succeed –for that would be science; and moreover it is manifest that they succeed 
in spite of being unwise’.103 Finally, Aristotle considers the possibility that fortune is 
ultimately the effect of God’s will, the result of a divine, irregular intervention, ‘as for 
instance a badly built ship often gets through a voyage better, though not owing to itself, 
but because it has a good man at the helm.’104 But he immediately discards this 
                                                          
102
 Ibid., p. 462. 
103
 Ibid. p. 457. 
104
 Ibid. p. 459. 
126 
 
possibility all the same: ‘But it is strange that a god or deity should love a man of this 
sort, and not the best and most prudent.’105  
Whilst supposed to evince their ‘real’, underlying cause, as it turns out, chance 
effects seem to forbid rather their subjection to any conceivable cause whatsoever; it 
remains, they remain random. But is it not obvious? If chance was attributable to some 
specific cause, it would not be chance to begin with. Aristotle still wants to understand; 
he struggles to comprehend chance, to somehow incorporate within reason the very 
limit of reason; in reality, however, he is only tightening the knot that he is trying to 
disentangle, he is only lengthening the labyrinth from which he is trying to escape. 
Notably impatient, he notes down all the evidence in his disposal and carefully pursues 
their implications, repeating the same arguments over and over again and still arriving 
nowhere. At long last, he pauses and gives in to the inevitable conclusion, which will 
have been the point of his departure: that he never should have begun. In the space of 
just a few lines Aristotle rewinds his entire argumentation; taking no more than one step 
backwards, he starts over. In a summary that only summons itself, overwriting and thus 
dispensing with all that precedes it, he writes:  
 
But since we see some people being fortunate contrary to all the 
teachings of science and correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of 
good fortune must be something different [δῆ λον ὅ τι ἕ τερον ἄ ν τι εἴ η 
τὸ  αἴ τιον τῆ ς εὐ τυχίας].106  
 
Aristotle, above all, does not believe in chance. Chance does not exist in itself; ‘good 
fortune’ remains an insignificant derivative. And if its source is neither nature nor 
intellect nor divine will, then it ‘must be something different’. What could that be?  
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Another invisible pause, and then another ‘but’, disjointed conjunction, swaying 
undecidedly back and forth.  
 
But is it or is it not good fortune [ἐ κείνη δὲ  πότερον ἔ στιν εὐ τυχία ἢ  
οὐ κ ἔ στιν], whereby a man formed a desire for the right thing and at the 
right time when in his case human reasoning could not make this 
calculation?
107
 
 
A subtle syntactical twist here paves the way for the reversal to come. The question of 
the real ‘cause of good fortune’, which Aristotle’s text has been pursuing all along, and 
which has just now been posed once more (‘it must be something different’), is abruptly 
set aside. Aristotle interrupts his text and, as if talking to himself, he affirms that his 
question is in fact unanswerable, that his inability to discover the real ‘cause of good 
fortune’ is therefore necessary. Because good fortune, as he just happened to recall, is of 
course caused by nothing; it constitutes a cause in itself: ‘But is it or is it not?’ It is; and 
is definable as such: ‘forming a desire for the right thing at the right time’. The futility 
of his effort to discover what produces chance effects, and thus to verify that they are 
not really chancy, that nothing really happens by chance (‘the people we call fortunate 
are so not by reason of chance; therefore they are not fortunate’), has now almost 
imperceptibly turned into an affirmation of chance’s ipseity, above and beyond the Law, 
natural, human or divine. Rather than simply giving up and admitting defeat, so to 
speak, Aristotle turns his text against itself, rendering his entire analysis thus far a 
fictive supplement to the true philosophical work for demonstrative purposes. The true 
philosophical work begins now. Chance exists; Aristotle believes in it: ‘chance must 
both exist and be a cause’.  
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A third and final ‘but’ seals his ‘conversion’, in quotation marks, since it is only 
a conversion to be reconverted, already reconverted, a conversion to convertibility, if 
you will, or else, to chance’s irreducible duality: 
 
But someone may raise the question whether chance is the cause of 
precisely this [ἆ ρ᾽  αὐ τοῦ  τούτου τύχη αἰ τία] –forming a desire for the 
right thing at the right time.
108
 
 
Chance is a cause in itself then, and it causes ‘precisely this’: what? Chance: ‘forming a 
desire for the right thing at the right time’. Insofar as it is absolutely unaccountable 
within reason, then chance can only be an effect of itself. The dazzling oscillation 
between chance as a primary cause and chance as a secondary effect, between belief and 
disbelief in the existence of chance, is now suspended. The border separating the two 
seemingly oppositional positions collapses. Chance occupies henceforth both and thus 
merges with itself, with itself as other than itself, inevitably annulling itself in effect and 
disappearing altogether from view. Chance is necessary; that is, its effects are 
inevitable; what happens by chance is random and predetermined at once, random as 
predetermined, predetermined because random. The necessity of chance, or else ‘a 
certain interfacing of necessity and chance, of significant and insignificant chance: the 
marriage, as the Greek would have it, of Ananke, of Tukhe and Automatia’, as Derrida 
would have it, at the intersection of determinism and indeterminism, destiny and 
random deviation, merges effectively fortune with misfortune, good chance with 
mischance. There is destinerrance. Aristotle cannot but confirm it: 
 
Or, on that showing, will not chance be the cause of everything –even of 
thought and deliberation? Since it is not the case, that one only 
deliberates when one has deliberated even previously to that 
deliberation, nor does one only think when one has previously thought 
before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some starting-point; 
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therefore thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor deliberation of 
deliberating. Then what else is, save chance? It will follow that 
everything originates from chance [ὥστ᾽  ἀ πὸ  τύχης ἅ παντα ἔ σται].109 
 
Simply put, insofar as fortune is a matter of chance, then misfortune must be a matter of 
chance as well, and in effect everything must be a matter of chance. ‘[U]nexpectability 
conditions the very structure of the event’,110 as we saw Derrida declare, in ‘My 
Chances/Mes Chances’ and elsewhere, only to be met with outcries of relativism and 
nihilism. ‘Would an event’, he asks, ‘that can be anticipated and therefore apprehended 
or comprehended, or one without an element of absolute encounter, actually be an event 
in the full sense of the word?’111 Absolute chance – absolute necessity; that is, neither 
complete chaos, nor complete order, and yet both at once; an unconditional 
indeterminism, which ‘could be called, by anachronism, the determinism of the 
universe.’112 Everything is predetermined – by chance.  
Even this, even the reason why:  
 
[T]he starting-point of reason is not reason but something superior to 
reason [λόγου δ᾽  ἀ ρχὴ  οὐ  λόγος, ἀ λλά τι κρεῖ ττον]. 113 
 
Aristotle surrenders, his analysis collapses. Philosophy as we know it ends right there 
and then. And Aristotle is prepared to take the fall. In his finest insight he gives in to the 
inevitable, to the impossible: ‘something superior to reason’, and hence superior to his 
analytical skills; it is what he will thenceforth rather call by the name of God: ‘What, 
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then, could be superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God?’114 
Unreservedly, Aristotle admits his own essential blindness, the insuperable limit of 
reason: its very condition of possibility – chance. One cannot but believe in it, even if it 
renders one impossible. Chance gives rise to and prescribes reason; it prompts this very 
analysis and dictates its destiny; allowing for the possibility of reasoning, chance 
renders reasoning a mere effect of its unconditionally irreducible law. ‘[T]he principle 
of indeterminism is what makes the conscious freedom of man fathomable’,115 as 
Derrida verifies, and the whole paradox is played out in the nuances of his careful 
wording: ‘fathomable’ – not possible; fathomable because impossible. Aristotle thinks 
of chance, but chance is why he thinks, chance is what makes him think what he thinks, 
chance precedes and triggers every single thought of his, fooling him into thinking that 
he thinks. In truth, this text will have never been his. All of his choices will have always 
been ‘imposed upon [him], in that chance offered itself for the choosing as if [he] had 
fallen upon it, thus leaving [him] with the illusion of a free will’,116 to borrow Derrida’s 
avowal of defencelessness that sets off ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’.  
‘This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true’, Aristotle will not 
hesitate to add, pushing the paradox to its extreme, beyond reason, yet on reason’s 
behalf, ‘for it seems that when reason is fundamentally disengaged it has more 
strength’.117 It is because everything is predetermined by chance, he maintains, because 
everything is necessarily, irreducibly unforeseeable, that some can actually predict and 
foresee the future; those without reason specifically: ‘For although irrational they 
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swiftly attain what belongs to the prudent and wise – prophetic skills.’118 The gravity of 
Aristotle’s argument is almost unbearable, calling for the utmost earnestness; we have 
to take him at his word. To repeat: first of all, insofar as everything is predetermined, 
the prudent and wise philosopher reasons, then it must be possible to predict the future. 
And indeed, the prophetic ‘dreams’ of the ‘melancholic’ spirits in the Delphic oracle 
confirm just that. But why is it only they who have this ability? Because, secondly, 
insofar as everything is predetermined by chance, then in order to do so, to ‘discern 
aright the future as well as the present’, as he says, one must be able to reason with 
chance, with what exceeds reason: its starting point. One must be unreasonable: ‘For 
this quality discerns aright the future as well as the present, and these are the men whose 
reason is disengaged [καὶ  ὧν ἀ πολύεται ὁ  λόγος οὗ τοι]’.119 In order to comprehend 
existence in its totality, one must ‘disengage’ oneself from reason; which is to say, one 
must, above all, not be a philosopher. And indeed, the very failure of his discourse, his 
failure to account through reason for the ‘success of the lucky’, for ‘the cause of good 
fortune’, confirms just that. In order to know truth, and to know it for sure, to arrest the 
Law and make it one’s own, in order to fulfil, in other words, the ideal of three 
millennia of metaphysical speculation, transcendental questioning and positivist 
empiricism, Aristotle concludes, one must forsake reason. To attain reason’s end, ‘what 
belongs to the prudent and wise’, one must, above all, give up reason.  
Derrida writes: ‘Plenitude is the end (the goal), but were it attained, it would be 
the end (death).’120 And Geoffrey Bennington begins his essay ‘RIP’ with these 
prophetic words:  
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Philosophy is a discourse that knows all about the future, or at least 
about its future. It knows, and has always known, that it has no future. 
Philosophy knows that the future is death. Philosophy is always going to 
die. Always has been going to die. Always will have been going to die. 
From the beginning, its future will have been its end: and from this end, 
its future will have been always to begin its ending again. Philosophy 
happens in this archeo-teleo-necrological solidarity. The end of 
philosophy is the end of philosophy.
121
  
 
And so on to infinity. Which is to say, if philosophy survives, if it is not dead yet, still 
on its way to death, if it keeps on beginning its end, this is because its very trace defies 
its teleo-logical orientation, as Aristotle’s discourse exemplarily demonstrates; it is 
because it renounces reason’s end by reason of itself, remarking its limit with its every 
step. It is because reason owes to the other what belongs to itself. If philosophy remains 
possible, this is because, ‘it knows’, it will have always been impossible. If it still has a 
chance, this is because it still has none. And if one still believes in it, this is because, 
fortunately, it remains unbelievable.  
 
3.6. William James: starting over 
 
It is impossible to believe in chance. That nothing happens by chance, that 
everything happens within the limits of reason, or else, in the superstitious person’s 
words, that everything happens for a reason, constitutes the very condition of 
rationality, indeed, reason per se. ‘Nothing is without reason, no effect is without 
cause’, as Leibniz’s fundamental principle of reason states.122 That is, as Derrida 
comments in his essay ‘The Principle of Reason’, ‘for any truth – for any true 
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proposition, that is – a reasoned account is possible. “Omnis veritatis reddi ratio potest.” 
Or, to translate more literally, for any true proposition, reason can be rendered.’123 And 
yet, that very condition, does it not also render reason impossible – other than itself? 
Does it not reduce rationality into yet another superstition, deferring its principle into a 
prior, superior source? ‘[W]hat does “render” mean with respect to reason? Could 
reason be something that gives rise to exchange, circulation, borrowing, debt, donation, 
restitution? But in that case, who would be responsible for that debt or duty, and to 
whom?’124 Insofar as everything is attributable to a calculable cause, then reason itself 
must be likewise bound to a source that exceeds itself; insofar as existence in its entirety 
conforms to natural law, then human beings too must be mere spectres, living dead in a 
predetermined world; insofar as nothing can alter the shape and the course of this world, 
then free will is an illusion and one’s every act and deliberation is futile after all. An 
insoluble aporia: the determinist foundation of reason is incompatible with reason itself; 
the very condition of reason’s possibility is its impossibility.125  
The prevalent view among commentators, as Richard Sorabji notes, is that the 
problem never occurred to Aristotle, ‘[r]egrettably, but inevitably’, since it ‘was not 
discovered until Hellenistic times, perhaps by Epicurus, who was over forty years junior 
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to Aristotle’.126 ‘This account’, Sorabji maintains, ‘misrepresents the situation’;127 and 
he is right of course. Not just because Aristotle was unfailingly preoccupied with 
reason’s ends, as we just had occasion to verify through a close reading of Eudemian 
Ethics, and as Sorabji will also go on to demonstrate in his way with reference to a 
number of other excerpts from Aristotle’s body of work, but more importantly, because 
the problem in question, the problem of the very possibility of philosophical 
questioning, will have never had to wait for its ‘discovery’ of course. To contextualize it 
in this manner under the pretence of historicist objectivity only serves to repress its 
irreducible primacy. Epicurus did not ‘discover’ the ‘necessity of chance’, any more 
than Aristotle was unaware of it. Epicurus was nonetheless, indeed, the first who 
unequivocally admitted its urgency and systematically pursued its implications; he was, 
in other words, the first who addressed the rational coherence of the universe as a 
problem, acknowledging that even if it is impossible to believe in chance, it is also 
impossible not to believe in it, that ‘a principle of indeterminism is’, indeed, it must be, 
‘what makes the conscious freedom of man fathomable’, to recall Derrida’s 
aphorism,
128
 even if ‘a principle of indeterminism’ happens to challenge the basic 
principle of reason. A disciple of Democritus, the father of atomism, Epicurus 
introduced thus the idea of the clinamen as the ‘supplementary deviation’ of the world’s 
atomic constitution, which ‘alone can change the course of an imperturbable destination 
and an inflexible order’, as Derrida’s reading has it.129 Propagating the Epicurean 
legacy, Lucretius will affirm: 
 
                                                          
126
 Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, p. 243. 
127
 Ibid. 
128
 Derrida, My Chances/Mes Chances, p. 8.    
129
 Ibid., p. 7.    
135 
 
Moreover, if all movements are invariably interlinked, if new movement 
arises from the old in unalterable succession, if there is no atomic swerve 
to initiate movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent 
the existence of an endless chain of causation, what is the source of this 
free will possessed by living creatures all over the earth?
130
  
 
In the origin, there is chance; because so it must. ‘Such erring (elsewhere I call it 
“destinerring”)’, Derrida will add, is alone what ‘can contravene in the laws of destiny, 
in conventions or contracts, in agreements of fatum.’131 In the originary clinamen of the 
atomic elements that make up existence in its totality, in the ‘atomic swerve’ 
(systrophé) of the littera (letters), as Lucretius defines them, Derrida finds thus an 
antecedent of destinerrance, explicitly aligning deconstruction’s deviant course with the 
tradition of classical atomism. What is more, calling attention a little later to Plato’s 
sharp rejection of Democritus, he subtly suggests that one could actually read the 
history of philosophy, that is, everything that ‘philosophy’ appropriates in its Greek 
name, as an attempt to repress precisely that tradition, and with it the disconcerting 
consequences of its ‘discovery’. Our ‘common sense’, he proposes, is perhaps a 
symptom (from the Greek ‘symptoma’ meaning, as Derrida does not fail to note, 
coincidence –‘that which is prone to fall (well or badly) with something else, that is, at 
the same time or in the same place as something else’132) of just this repression, a 
symptom of the repression of reason’s ‘supplementary deviation’; a ‘very large 
symptom’ indeed:  
 
It is for us, in the Occident, the culture of common sense that is marked 
by a powerful scientifico-philosophic tradition, metaphysics, technics, 
the opposition of subject/object, and precisely a certain organization of 
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the throw. Through several differentiated relays, this culture goes back at 
least to Plato, where the repression of Democritus perhaps leaves the 
trace of a very large symptom.
133
  
 
One must believe in chance. But to believe in chance is to forgo reason’s 
sovereignty and promise, its arche and telos; it is to surrender the remainder of one’s 
declaration to the other. That is, one cannot, above all, believe in chance. To ‘believe in 
chance’ is necessary and impossible at once; what are we to do? As we said at the outset 
and demonstrated in the course of this chapter, philosophy has always had to assume as 
a consequence that it is possible both to believe in chance and to not believe in chance, 
to circumscribe ‘belief in chance’ appropriately so that its two possible meanings 
remain distinguishable, intact. Haunted by the irreducible tension between the origin 
vis-à-vis the autonomy of reason, the determinability of the universe vis-à-vis individual 
self-determination, philosophy has always been the attempt to surpass reason’s principal 
impasse by arguing against it, if not outright ignoring it, avoiding rather than facing up 
to its dreadful aspect.  
It is ‘a quagmire of evasion’ in William James’s less subtle ruling, ‘under which 
the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered’.134 In one of his early lectures, 
delivered in 1884 and entitled ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’, the father of 
‘pragmatism’ casts off thus all philosophical enquiry on the issue of determinism as a 
hollow wordplay which covers up or completely misses what is at stake. Philosophy, in 
James’s eyes, wants to have it both ways. In accordance with a logic which he labels as 
‘soft-determinist’, what is nowadays also called ‘compatibilism’, philosophy wants to 
maintain the indeterminability of human conduct, on the one hand, and the 
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determinability of the universe, on the other, the unpredictability of experience and the 
predictability of what is experienced. It wants to believe in chance in one sense, and not 
believe in it in another. In reality, however, James will argue, ‘the issue […] is a 
perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The 
truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other 
false.’135 Driven by a characteristically American aspiration to talk straight and restore 
the purity of an overanalyzed subject and a misguided debate, James wipes the slate 
clean and starts over, offering us a summary outline of the problem’s essential 
parameters and constraints. One must either believe in chance or not. One must be either 
a determinist or an indeterminist. Either there is chance or there is no chance; simple as 
that. 
 
What does determinism profess? It professes that those parts of the 
universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other 
parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities bidden in its 
womb; the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. 
Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is 
impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the 
rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no 
equivocation or shadow of turning.
136
 
 
‘There can be no equivocation or shadow of turning’: determinism excludes the 
possibility of a sovereign human consciousness, absolutely and unqualifiedly –it renders 
reason obsolete; there is no way one can amend its unambiguous ‘decree’. The claim to 
human self-determination within a predetermined universe is insubstantial; more than 
that, it is irrational. The privilege that reason accords to itself is arbitrary through and 
through; no matter how flimsy its foundational stone might be, it does not hold. An 
objective and impartial existence which sees without being seen, which explains the 
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other without being subject to explanation itself, which causes the other without having 
been caused by the other first, is simply impossible. To profess ‘freedom’ while holding 
on to determinism, James says, is mere ‘quibbling, and lets us, after the fashion of the 
soft determinists, make a pretense of restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, 
while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg to make sure it does not get 
beyond our sight.’137 There is only one determinism, that is, one way of understanding 
determinism, good old-fashioned ‘hard determinism’, and to adhere to its law is to yield 
to its unnerving implications. As James will subsequently go to great lengths to 
demonstrate, to admit to the ‘iron block’ that is existence is to lay down one’s arms 
unconditionally and submit oneself to a world of ‘ethical indifference’.138 For an 
essential and inescapable pessimism defines determinism. Regardless of the name it 
assumes, the claims it makes and the shape it eventually takes –‘gnosticism’, 
‘subjectivism’, ‘sensualism’, ‘sentimentalism’, ‘scientifism’, ‘idealism’– ‘everywhere it 
fosters the fatalistic mood of mind.’139 To believe in determinism is to give up on 
oneself.  
But then again, is it not necessary to believe in determinism? What does the 
presumption of the universe’s orderliness, of its construction in accordance with a set of 
unbending principles, indicate, but the very point of departure of the pursuit of 
knowledge? What does the exclusion of chance safeguard but man’s capacity to unravel 
nature’s determinate structure and to uncover its laws? Is chance not precisely that, 
unbelievable? Indeed, as James admits, 
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[t]he stronghold of the deterministic sentiment is the antipathy to the 
idea of chance. As soon as we begin to talk indeterminism to our friends, 
we find a number of them shaking their heads. This notion of alternative 
possibilities, they say, this admission that any one of several things may 
come to pass, is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance; and 
chance is something the notion of which no sane mind can for an instant 
tolerate in the world. What is it, they ask, but barefaced crazy unreason, 
the negation of intelligibility and law? And if the slightest particle of it 
exists anywhere, what is to prevent the whole fabric from falling 
together, the stars from going out, and chaos from recommencing her 
topsy-turvy reign?
140
  
 
One must believe in chance; but to believe in chance is impossible. As the prevalent 
positivist spirit in James’s day dictated, one has to accept determinism, even if 
‘determinism denies the ambiguity of future volitions, because it affirms that nothing 
future can be ambiguous.’141 Under the pressure of this fatal necessity of necessity, 
James was suffocating: ‘When I have felt like taking a free initiative’, he avows in his 
diary, ‘like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the 
external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my 
daring into.’142 Until one day, upon reading an essay by the French philosopher Charles 
Renouvier, it dawned on him: one must believe in chance – even if it is impossible. His 
long diary entry on the 30
th
 of April, 1870, which Robert D. Richardson so vividly 
reconstructs in a separate chapter of his William James: In the Maelstrom of American 
Modernism, reads indeed as the inauguration of that remarkable intellectual journey 
undertaken by one of the most innovative and influential thinkers in American history; 
as the invention of pragmatism – that is, the reinvention of Epicureanism, or else, the 
return of the repressed necessity of chance:  
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I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of 
Renouvier’s 2nd Essay and saw no reason why his definition of free will 
– the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have 
other thoughts – need be the definition of an illusion. […] My first act of 
free will shall be to believe in free will. […] Not in maxims, not in 
Anschaungen, but in accumulated acts of thought lies salvation.
143
 
 
James’s commitment to the primacy of individual experience over objective 
knowledge, of faith over absolute truth, is evident throughout his oeuvre. However, it 
was in ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’ that his fundamental intellectual breakthrough 
eventually found its most faithful expression. So what if chance is impossible? So what 
if every discourse is inevitably prisoner to the implications of a fundamental 
deterministic assumption? And so what if its entrapment is the very premise of its 
existence? James sees no reason to hesitate. Once the threatening predicament of 
determinism is brought to light, what is one left with but the will to defy it? What hope 
is there, unless determinism is thrust aside, once and for all? ‘Indeterminate future 
volitions do mean chance. Let us not fear to shout it from the house-tops if need be’, he 
shouts out.
144
 And what remains? There is chance.  
 
That ‘chance’ whose very notion I am exhorted and conjured to banish 
from my view of the future as the suicide of reason [CD’s emphasis] 
concerning it, that ‘chance’ is – what? Just this, – the chance that in 
moral respects the future may be other and better than the past has been. 
This is the only chance we have any motive for supposing to exist. 
Shame, rather, on its repudiation and its denial! For its presence is the 
vital air which lets the world live, the salt which keeps it sweet.
145
 
  
To believe in reason is to believe in chance; this will be James’s final verdict. To 
believe in the possibility of human consciousness, is to concede chance. One must 
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contain that which lies beyond reason, to embrace that which contradicts reason’s very 
own foundation, reason’s end. To believe in reason is to denounce reason. In order to 
survive, one must commit to the ‘suicide of reason’ in return. One cannot do otherwise: 
to believe in oneself, in the possibility of oneself as the one who says ‘I believe’ and 
thus appropriates the trace of one’s faith, is to admit oneself as other. In the words of the 
poet: ‘Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath’; which James in fact 
accidentally misquotes, substituting ‘hazard’ for ‘forfeit’, as if to illuminate thus the 
‘impotence’ he speaks of, the impotence that a ‘square’ and ‘resolute’ surrender of 
reason to ‘chance’ brings about. To believe in reason is to allow even that, even 
‘chance’ to ‘hazard’, even ‘chance’ as such to be taken over by chance, slip from one’s 
firm grasp and be led astray. Even literature. 
 
Whoever uses [‘chance’] instead of ‘freedom,’ squarely and resolutely 
gives up all pretence to control the things he says are free. For him, he 
confesses that they are no better than mere chance would be. It is a word 
of impotence, and is therefore the only sincere word we can use, if, in 
granting freedom to certain things, we grant it honestly, and really risk 
the game. “Who chooses me must give and forfeit all he hath.”146  
 
James’s misquotation, it is important to note here, stems from Shakespeare’s The 
Merchant of Venice, where it figures as the inscription on the third of the three caskets 
out of which Portia’s suitors are asked to choose one. The reward for whoever makes 
the right choice will be to become the husband of Portia:   
 
This first of gold, who this inscription bears, 
‘Who chooseth me, shall gain what many men desire.’ 
The second silver, which this promise carries, 
‘Who chooseth me, shall get as much as he deserves.’ 
This third dull lead, with warning all as blunt,  
‘Who chooseth me, must give and hazard all he hath.’ 
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(Act 2, Scene 7, 4-9)
147
 
 
In his paper ‘The Theme of the Three Caskets’ Freud explores the significance 
of this little scene and proposes that the three caskets here represent three women.
148
 In 
this light, he then goes on to argue, the suitors’ choice is actually analogous to King 
Lear’s choice on how to divide his kingdom between his three daughters.149 Now, Freud 
observes, similar scenes that involve ‘a man’s choice between three women’150 recur 
throughout a wide range of myths and fairy tales, and in all of them, as in both of 
Shakespeare’s plays, the right choice is always the third one. And this third one, as 
Freud notes, happens to be consistently defined by her humility and her 
inconspicuousness; in The Merchant of Venice the right casket is, indeed, the casket of 
‘dull lead’, while in King Lear it is the unassuming Cordelia who proves the most 
deserving daughter. From this characteristic, Freud will conclude that the third 
casket/woman represents ‘Death itself, the Goddess of Death’. And he adds: ‘But if the 
third of the sisters is the Goddess of Death, the sisters are known to us. They are the 
Fates, the Moerae, the Parcae or the Norns, the third of whom is called Atropos, the 
inexorable.’151   
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In keeping with Freud’s interpretation then – who curiously enough makes no 
mention of the writing inscribed on the casket of death – to choose ‘chance’ instead of 
‘freedom’, as William James invites us, is precisely to choose absolute ‘necessity’, to 
submit to the scripture of the inexorable Atropos. Opting to ‘hazard all he hath’ James 
will indeed ‘forfeit all he hath’; ‘chance’ is the choice of death, of no chance. ‘No 
greater triumph of wish-fulfilment is conceivable’, as Freud will observe. ‘A choice is 
made where in reality there is obedience to a compulsion.’152 As if there was a choice, 
then, against philosophical portentousness, in defiance of humanistic presumptuousness, 
James ‘freely’ decides to surrender his ‘freedom’ instead. Everything happens on 
account of chance, he affirms, necessarily; ‘we’ are, by reason of the other, the other’s 
envois, emissaries of our unsurpassable limits, consigned to our finitude – to come. The 
future is the promise of our inevitable end in the moment itself – already there.  
The implications of this dramatic, exemplary gesture will have been cataclysmic, 
to say the least. And as it turns out, they will have also been graver than James would 
ever manage to bear. Gobsmacked by his own conclusions, it seems, horrified before 
the abyss, it will not be long, indeed, before he hastily retreats back into the safe, 
comfortable refuge of ‘our ordinary unsophisticated view of things’. James is an 
indeterminist, indeed; but, for all his passion, only a ‘soft’ one after all.  
 
Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount 
of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them 
does not necessarily determine what the others shall be. […] 
Indeterminism thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact. It 
says there is a certain ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it 
corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things.
153
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James believes in chance, yes, but not in ‘actual chance’, as it turns out, not in chance as 
such, of course not, only in ‘a certain amount’ of it, just in one specific aspect of it. 
Which one? Human consciousness; because, as he adds, ‘future human volitions are as a 
matter of fact the only ambiguous things we are tempted to believe in’.154 Truth is, he is 
not mistaken. Indeed, it would take a few more decades before philosophy tempted us to 
believe in the ambiguity of anything other than ‘future human volitions’, specifically in 
the ambiguity of everything that ‘exists’; at its most rigorous, it would take Derrida’s 
deconstruction of presence. But for the moment, one cannot help but wonder, how is 
James’s self-assured adherence to this partial indeterminism, his ‘belief in chance’ 
exclusively reserved for human reason, which can thereon freely appropriate it and turn 
it into its calculable fate, remaining thus master of itself in an otherwise predetermined 
universe, how is that then distinguishable from the compatibilist ‘soft determinism’ he 
has just denounced? Has ‘soft determinism’ not merely been transformed into ‘soft 
indeterminism’? What would be the difference between the two?155  
Not only does ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’ fail to propose a solution to the 
dilemma of determinism then, it does not even get to pose that dilemma in the first 
place, to delineate alternatives between which one could decide. Not only does James 
fail to rewrite the beginning, he does not even manage to take a single step ahead. The 
issue is not as ‘sharp’ as it seemed to be at first. Albeit necessary, chance happens to be, 
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fortunately enough, impossible. And ‘truth’, together with our absolute ‘impotence’, 
will therefore have to remain in suspense.  
 
But although, in discussing the word ‘chance,’ I may at moments have 
seemed to be arguing for its real existence, I have not meant to do so yet. 
We have not yet ascertained whether this be a world of chance or no; at 
most, we have agreed that it seems so. […] [F]rom any strict theoretical 
point of view, the question is insoluble.
156
 
 
It is true; what all philosophical enquiries on determinism/indeterminism 
veil/unveil is precisely the impossibility to resolve the question of the beginning. It is 
impossible to believe in chance – it is impossible not to believe in chance. James is 
absolutely right, and the deconstructive nerve of his discourse, before an audience, let us 
not forget, imbued with reassuring appeals to ‘objectivity’ and the promise of limitless 
scientific progress, is deserving of infinite praise. Reason is groundless, James reminds 
us, its condition is aporetic. And what the impending failure to decide one way or 
another, once and for all to resolve ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’, calls for is not the 
means to escape its urgency but the acknowledgement of its constitutive inevitability 
and hence the assumption of one’s responsibility before this, reason’s essential 
limitation.  
Now, the only question is, what would this responsibility consist in? What is the 
horizon of a discourse like James’s or like this one was supposed to have been? For 
some of us, as this chapter sought to argue, our responsibility would consist in making 
sure that the question remains precisely suspended at all cost, in unconditionally 
allowing for the abyssal effects of this interface of necessity and chance, while pursuing 
their implications with the utmost thoroughness. As difficult and disconcerting as it 
might be to accept a paradoxical law, it is imperative that we follow through its 
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consequences. This is the philosophical call, the call to philosophy. We cannot think 
otherwise ‘merely to be happy or reconciled’. We owe this to the other.  
For William James, however, accepting that the problem at hand is insoluble and 
the question unanswerable means that we should rather learn to ignore it. Our 
responsibility, as he perceives it, not unlike the philosophic tradition he professes to 
oppose, is to act in spite of the problem, to pretend there has never been a problem to 
begin with; to be content that we can still speak, that we are still here, albeit blind and 
alone, futureless: ‘I consequently find myself, at the end of this long talk, obliged to 
state my conclusions in an altogether personal way’, James avows. ‘This personal 
method of appeal seems to be among the very conditions of the problem; and the most 
anyone can do is to confess as candidly as he can the grounds for the faith that is in him, 
and leave his example to work on others as it may.’157 As we saw earlier, Richard Rorty 
and the pragmatic tradition will follow James on that to the letter. Since the ‘Dilemma 
of Determinism’ is irresolvable, namely since both determinism and indeterminism are 
equally unbelievable – one must believe in chance; one cannot believe in chance – then 
what one believes in remains ultimately insignificant. Since to believe in chance is no 
more unreasonable than to not believe in chance, since ‘to believe in chance’ is 
irreducibly double, unsustainable, unverifiable, that is, since ‘to believe in chance can 
just as well indicate that one believes in the existence of chance, as that one does not, 
above all, believe in chance’, then one might as well ‘believe in chance’ and leave it at 
that. Since one cannot get it right either way, then one might as well have it both ways; 
no one will ever know the difference anyway. These are the last words of James’s essay: 
‘It is fortunate for the winding up of this controversy that in every discussion with 
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determinism this argumentum ad hominem can be its adversary's last word.’158 James 
‘believes in chance’.  
But if one’s belief is necessarily unverifiable, if it is actually legitimized by 
reason of its unverifiability, what distinguishes it from the belief in pure fiction, from 
any belief in anything whatsoever, from the mad belief in the absolutely unreasonable, 
for example? What separates in this case James’s ‘belief in chance’ from the ‘belief in 
chance’ of some ‘patent superstition’? Well, James will disagree, his is certainly more 
believable though, is it not? In conclusion to his famous essay ‘The Will to Believe’, 
James misquotes Mark Twain writes:  
 
The freedom to “believe what we will” you apply to the case of some 
patent superstition; and the faith you think of is the faith defined by the 
schoolboy when he said: “Faith is when you believe something that you 
know ain’t true”. I can only repeat that this is misapprehension. In 
concreto, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the 
intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options 
never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider.
159
  
 
The aphorism James misquotes, in order to quickly dismiss as untruthful, stems from 
Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar, one of Mark Twain’s fictive creations. Entries 
from Pudd’nhead Wilson’s Calendar are used as epigraphs in each chapter of Twain’s 
novel Pudd’nhead Wilson, where Wilson figures as a minor character.160 Surviving that 
novel, Wilson returns, however, and entries from his New Calendar introduce now the 
chapters of Twain’s non-fictional Following the Equator. Chapter XII’s epigraph reads: 
‘There are those who scoff at the schoolboy, calling him frivolous and shallow: Yet it 
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 Mark Twain, Pudd’nhead Wilson, with Those Extraordinary Twins (Hartford: American Publishing, 
1894). 
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was the schoolboy who said “Faith is believing what you know ain't so.”’161 No, no, 
James protests in disbelief, that ‘ain’t true’; that is just fiction. And the schoolboy, of 
course, is glad they agree.  
Indeed, every discourse entails an affirmation of faith in chance that disrupts its 
identity and undermines its authority: the irreducible, ineradicable chance that it is 
meant otherwise, that it is understood otherwise – as superstition, as we saw in this 
chapter, or as fiction, as we will validate in the next one. Every discourse entails within 
itself, as a necessary part of its structure, the chance that it is literary, or else, in what 
amounts to the same – as Mark Twain’s aphorism so brilliantly demonstrates – the 
chance that literature is not merely, entirely literary. 
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 Mark Twain, Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World (Hartford and New York: 
American Publishing, 1897), p. 132. 
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4. LITERARY CHANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps all I wanted to do was to confide or confirm my taste (probably unconditional) 
for literature, more precisely for literary writing.
1
 
 
4.1. Definition 
 
In Book V of Metaphysics Aristotle defines an ‘accident’ as follows: ‘Accident 
[συμβεβηκὸ ς] means that which applies to something and can be truly asserted, but 
neither of necessity nor usually, as if, for example, while digging a hole for a plant one 
found treasure.’2 That sure seems straightforward enough at first glance not to warrant 
any further enquiry. But what if, we might ask, not to complicate matters for 
complexity’s sake but to up the stakes, what if that someone who discovers treasure 
while digging a hole for a plant happens to be a fictional character? What if the event 
itself, the discovery of the treasure, happens to form part of a fictional narrative? Shall 
we still call it an ‘accident’ then? And what if, to add a further twist to this hypothetical 
question, what if that fictional narrative was actually written by a philosopher, for 
example Aristotle, as a supplement to his philosophical discourse, with the intention of 
demonstrating precisely what an accident really is, of defining ‘accident’ in its truth? 
                                                          
1
 Jacques Derrida, ‘Passions: “An Oblique Offering”’ in On the Name, trans. David Wood, ed. Thomas 
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 28.  
2
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I-IX [The Loeb Classical Library], trans. Hugh Tredenick (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 289. ‘Coincidence’ would have been a better 
translation perhaps for Aristotle’s ‘συμβεβηκὸ ς’, but I have retained ‘accident’ in keeping with the 
overwhelming consensus among translators.  
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Surely, the narrative that represents an ‘accident’ cannot be accidental. The man had to 
discover a treasure, at least something he was not expecting to find, or else the event 
would not count as an accident to begin with. In order to be faithful to what it stands 
for, in other words, the purpose and the significance of Aristotle’s narrative must be 
consistent, of necessity – unlike what it stands for (‘neither of necessity nor usually’). 
Like the designation of a lie or of a secret, the narrative that displays and so exemplifies 
an accident must betray itself, in order to be itself; its truthfulness (‘it can be truly 
asserted’) hangs on its untruthfulness. And what is consistently, of necessity, untruthful, 
Aristotle conjectures, save fiction? ‘As if, for example, while digging a hole for a plant 
one found treasure.’ 
As we had occasion to argue in more detail in the course of the previous chapter, 
for Aristotle – and ever since Aristotle – an event is considered an ‘accident’ insofar as 
its cause happens to be unknown at the moment of its occurrence; not that it lacks a 
cause, however, a determinable and retraceable source. ‘Accident’ is merely the name 
we give to what we, from our perspective, on account of our ignorance or ineptitude, 
will have failed to anticipate. ‘This – the finding of treasure –’, Aristotle goes on to 
clarify, ‘is an accident to the man who dug the hole’.3 That is to say, the accident only 
happens to him, in his eyes; it is not devoid of reason in itself. He does not know that a 
treasure is really buried there, waiting for him, that he is in fact destined to discover that 
treasure, as soon as he gets to digging that hole. ‘Therefore, there is no definite cause 
for an accident, but a chance cause, that is, an indefinite one.’4 And Aristotle adds now 
another example, another imaginary set-up:  
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4
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Going to Aegina was an accident for a man, if he went not in order to get 
there, but because he was carried out of his way by a storm or captured 
by pirates. The accident has happened or exists, not in virtue of the 
subject's nature, however, but of something else; for the storm was the 
cause of his coming to a place for which he was not sailing, in this case 
Aegina.
5
 
 
Again, the accident only exists from the subject’s perspective; it does not lack a 
perfectly reasonable, perfectly measurable cause; it just so happens that its cause is 
beyond the subject’s control. Strictly speaking, then, there is no such thing as an 
accident per se. In truth, everything comes about of necessity. ‘Accident’ is a fiction, 
Aristotle proposes, an illusion, untruth; henceforth it is definable only in and as fiction, 
re-presentable exclusively by fictional narratives. For example, by the story of a man 
who thinks that discovering a treasure while digging a hole for a plant was a matter of 
chance, because he did not know in advance that a treasure was already buried where he 
dug, or that of another, who thinks that going to Aegina was a matter of chance, because 
he did not anticipate the impending storm.  
In order to verify the ‘accident’ in its truth, to ascertain namely that it is untrue, 
that what appears to happen in and of itself, still has, as much as everything else, a 
determinable cause, Aristotle calls upon fiction. Not the most reliable witness, one 
would think, but Aristotle is not particularly bothered about that; because fiction does 
not have to answer to any questions or undergo any sort of scrutiny. Since its purpose is 
simply to exemplify the fictitious nature of the accident, then it only has to present 
itself, to exhibit its fictitiousness, and its job is done, the case is sealed. Provided of 
course that everyone understands what fiction is, that its significance is agreed upon in 
advance; provided, that is, that fiction truly, of necessity, consistently, represents the 
untruthful, the illusory as such.  
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As with every definition, the definability of the one, of the text defined, entails 
the transparency of the other, of the text that defines. And so, Aristotle’s definition of 
the accident in and as fiction entails accordingly the transparency, the interpretative 
determinability, of the fictional narratives that represent it. In order to exemplify the 
other, an example must first of all be exemplary of itself. And indeed, so Aristotle 
presumes, his little stories speak for themselves; they attest to fiction as such. 
Presupposing, that is, that we all know what fiction stands for, that it stands for that 
which appears to happen in and of itself, for an event we could never have seen coming 
(Aristotle’s narrative, discovering a treasure, going to Aegina), one that remains 
nonetheless attributable to a reasonable cause, to what has made it possible in the first 
place (Aristotle’s intention to represent an accident, the presence of the treasure just 
where it is found, the storm or pirates). Aristotle’s conception of an accident, in short, as 
something with an indefinite yet post facto determinable cause, relies on his 
preconception of fiction, as something with an indefinite yet post facto determinable 
cause. The distinction between chance and necessity is contingent upon the presumed 
lucidity of the distinction between truth and fiction, reality and illusion. As a 
consequence, the definition of the accident can be seen as the definition par excellence. 
It attests to the very condition of definability in general, to the very possibility of logos: 
accidents are fiction; in truth, there are no accidents; in truth, nothing happens by 
chance; and especially not fiction. 
To put in question the commonsensical conception of chance, as this thesis has 
been trying to do, is therefore, in the first place and above all, to put in question our 
conception of fiction, the stability of the limit that separates truth from fiction. Perhaps, 
this chapter will suggest, fiction means something else. Perhaps it is not a necessary 
‘accident’. Perhaps it is irreducible to a preceding cause, to an identifiable meaning or 
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an intention beyond itself. Which is to say, what happens in fiction does not happen of 
necessity; despite appearances, the man of Aristotle’s imagination was not supposed to 
find a treasure. Because an ‘accident’ is not definable; rather, it is bound to remain un-
representable – accidental. 
To facilitate this discussion we will turn to a fictional text, one that incidentally, 
and appropriately enough, happens to tell the story of a man who discovered treasure 
while digging a hole. His name is William Legrand, the title of the story is ‘The Gold-
Bug’ and its author is Edgar Allan Poe. What is most intriguing about this story is that 
Legrand himself, as he confides to the story’s narrator, is convinced that the series of 
events that led him to the discovery of the treasure were anything but accidental. Like 
Aristotle in fact, Legrand believes that the narrative itself in which he partakes is 
necessary, an ‘accident’ only to the untrained eye of the credulous reader. The fictitious 
counterpart of the Greek philosopher, as it turns out, is a superstitious zany old recluse. 
A thorough examination of his conviction, alongside an in-depth analysis of Derrida’s 
many writings on the singularity of the literary text, will eventually bring into question 
its presumed truthfulness, and with it the presumably self-evident truthfulness of 
Aristotle’s definition of the accident. In the end, and by way of confirmation of our 
conclusions, we will turn to another story by Edgar Allan Poe, entitled ‘The Mystery of 
Marie Rogêt’, which likewise affirms and thereby casts doubt on the necessity of the 
events it recites.  
 
4.2. Presentiment 
 
‘The Gold-Bug’ recounts the events of two days, a month apart. They coincide 
with the two separate visits of the story’s narrator to his friend, William Legrand, a 
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rather eccentric fellow residing in a secluded little hut on Sullivan’s Island, in South 
Carolina, ever since, as the narrator deems necessary to inform us, ‘I first, by mere 
accident, made his acquaintance.’6 The events of the first day appear relatively 
insignificant on the surface. Legrand welcomes his friend to his abode and tells him of a 
particularly rare beetle, a scarabaeus, golden in colour, that he and his loyal servant, 
Jupiter, discovered just a few hours earlier. Dismayed that he cannot show it to him 
straight away, since he has already lent it to someone else, Legrand draws a sketch of it 
instead, which, as the narrator observes, bears a great resemblance to the outline of a 
human skull.  
A month later the narrator receives a letter from his friend requesting that he 
hurries back to his hut as a matter of urgency. As soon as he gets there, Legrand invites 
him and Jupiter to follow him in the middle of the forest and then asks them to assist 
him in digging a hole underneath a large tree. The narrator and Jupiter begrudgingly 
comply, convinced at this point that Legrand has simply gone mad. To their 
astonishment, however, their labours will bring into surface a huge treasure trove, 
buried there by the notorious pirate Captain Kidd a few hundred years ago and lying 
undiscovered ever since. After helping him to transfer the treasure back to the hut, the 
utterly befuddled narrator now presses Legrand to explain how he knew of the 
                                                          
6
 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Gold-Bug’ [1843] in Tales and Sketches; vol. 2: 1843-1849, ed. Thomas Ollive 
Mabbott (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 807.  It is worth noting that the 
narrator of Poe’s Dupin trilogy also met the stories’ protagonist by accident, as he conveys in ‘The 
Murder in the Rue Morgue’: ‘Our first meeting was at an obscure library in the Rue Montmartre, where 
the accident of our both being in search of the same very rare and very remarkable volume brought us into 
closer communion’. This forms only the first of a list of coincidences that connect ‘The Gold-Bug’ with 
Poe’s Dupin trilogy, as we will verify in due course. See Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue’ [1841] in Tales and Sketches; vol. 1: 1831-1842, pp. 531-2.  
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treasure’s presence just where it was found. And in response, Legrand proceeds to 
narrate to him the events of the first day once more, this time in more detail, thereby 
revealing to him, and to the reader, their real, previously unnoticed significance. ‘The 
Gold-Bug’ is thereby structured as a detective story. Considering, moreover, the 
indubitable similarities between the characters of William Legrand and Monsieur 
Dupin, it is therefore not unjustifiably classed as one of Poe’s ‘tales of ratiocination’, 
although in this case, as we will see, it is chance that does most of the ratiocinating.    
So it all began with the gold-bug. It was during one of his frequent excursions 
along the coast of Sullivan’s Island that Legrand, with Jupiter as always at his side, 
came across this unique scarabaeus. ‘Upon my taking hold of it’, he says,  
 
it gave me a sharp bite, which caused me to let it drop. Jupiter, with his 
accustomed caution, before seizing the insect which had flown towards 
him, looked about him for a leaf or something of that nature, by which to 
take hold of it. It was at this moment that his eyes, and mine also, fell 
upon [a] scrap of parchment, which I then supposed to be paper. It was 
lying half buried in the sand, a corner sticking up.
7
 
 
On their way home, with the scarabaeus now securely wrapped in this parchment, 
Legrand and Jupiter happen to come across Lieutenant G–., who begs Legrand to lend 
him the beetle so he can examine it more closely. ‘On my consenting he thrust it 
forthwith into his waistcoat pocket, without the parchment in which it had been 
wrapped, and which I had continued to hold in my hand during his inspection. […] 
[W]ithout being conscious of it, I must have deposited the parchment in my own 
pocket.’8 It is on the evening of that same day, ‘a day of remarkable chilliness’,9 that the 
story’s narrator happened to pay him a visit in his hut. Legrand excitedly tells his friend 
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of his discovery, but since the scarabaeus is with Lieutenant G–, he decides to draw a 
sketch of its unusual shape. He looks for some piece of paper on his desk and in his 
drawers, but curiously enough, he finds none. Reaching now into his waistcoat pocket 
‘hoping to find an old letter’10 his hand falls upon the parchment. As soon as he is done 
with the drawing, he hands the parchment over to his friend; at that very moment, 
though, his dog happens to enter the room, quickly leaping upon the narrator’s 
shoulders. While caressing the dog with his left hand, his right, ‘holding the parchment, 
was permitted to fall listlessly between [his] knees and in close proximity to the fire’,11 
which Legrand had happened to light ‘on the sole day of all the year in which it has 
been, or may be, sufficiently cool for fire’.12 Now, the heat from the fire happens to 
reveal the outline of a skull inscribed as it were on the back of the parchment by human 
hand and with a particular substance that renders it invisible while the material is cool, 
‘but again become[s] apparent upon the reapplication of heat’.13 The narrator sees the 
painted skull but does not realize its significance; holding the parchment upside down 
he presumes that it is his friend’s drawing of the scarabaeus. Legrand, who knows 
better of course, opts to let him think that and resolves to examine the parchment in 
more detail after his friend departs. As he explains:  
 
The fact is, I felt irresistibly impressed with a presentiment of some vast 
good fortune impending. I can scarcely say why. Perhaps, after all, it 
was rather a desire than an actual belief; –but do you know that Jupiter’s 
silly words, about the bug being of solid gold, had a remarkable effect 
on my fancy? And then the series of accidents and coincidences –these 
were so very extraordinary.
14
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Recalling thus the long ‘series of accidents and coincidences’ that have brought 
this mysterious parchment into his possession and its secret to light, Legrand is 
overtaken by an irrational ‘presentiment’. What are the chances, he marvels? From the 
lucky discovery of this unique scarabaeus, to the chance encounter with Lieutenant G–, 
to the narrator’s visit to his hut, to the lack of paper from his desk space, to the 
unusually chilly weather, to the perfectly timed entry of the dog into the room, so many 
disparate factors had to conspire in order for him to find, hold on to and eventually 
‘read’ this parchment, that it just seems impossible to attribute them all to mere chance. 
The actual likelihood of everything turning out the way it did is just so infinitesimal that 
Legrand cannot help but feel it has to be significant, necessary; as if he was meant to, in 
other words, as if there was a reason, a purpose behind it all, as if this were his destiny.  
Which, of course, it is. As one will observe, Legrand happens to be absolutely 
right, his superstitious hunch spot-on. He may not be able to realize this, but as we 
know, the series of accidents and coincidences on which he muses were anything but 
accidental; indeed, they were ‘meant to’ happen, forming as it were the necessary 
correlative of none other than (let us refrain from saying the author’s intentions – the 
one who writes) the text entitled ‘The Gold-Bug’ – the writing as such, which causes 
them one by one by reciting them, which necessitates them by making them possible in 
the first place, for the first time; the text, that will have been their only chance; 
obviously so.  
As it happens to happen, upon closer inspection and with the reapplication of 
heat, the parchment will reveal a few lines of peculiar symbols and characters inscribed 
on one of its corners, which Legrand presumes to form a cipher. And since he happens 
to be an expert in solving the most abstruse cryptographs, it is not long before he works 
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out this one. As it happens, it contains Captain Kidd’s precise instructions regarding the 
burial place of his enormous treasure. Legrand’s presentiment is thus vindicated; as it 
had to be, of course. Indeed, as one will confirm, he was supposed to find that treasure. 
Just as with every other incident that ‘The Gold-Bug’ recounts, so the fortunate 
outcome of its protagonist’s adventure is but a necessary accident, meant to happen the 
way it is narrated, since it happened only insofar as it is narrated in this way. Legrand is 
right; nothing happened by chance; nothing just happened to happen; it was written this 
way.  
Including, of course, Legrand’s remarkable insight itself; including the truth. As 
one might further point out, insofar as all of the events in ‘The Gold-Bug’ are necessary, 
in that they are fabricated, insofar as they are indeed predetermined, then so is 
Legrand’s ‘pre-sentiment’ that they are; by the same token, this too must have come 
about of necessity. In a way then, in granting significance to his ‘chances’, Legrand is 
also acknowledging his own insignificance, relinquishing the right to his own belief. 
What he affirms, ultimately, what he believes in, is that what he believes in is 
inevitable, dictated by the other, fateful; a compulsory belief in its compulsoriness, so to 
speak, ‘irresistibly’ impressed upon his fancy, as he himself admits. And naturally so, 
for it so happens that this presentiment is inexorably impressed upon his fancy, on 
himself from beyond himself, through the writing which institutes himself as much as, 
at the same time and with the same movement, it substitutes his sentiment, through the 
fancy out of which his fancy is constituted. I could not help myself, says Legrand; I 
could not think otherwise. That is, of course, the truth; for as we know, it had to happen 
this way; this is what he was meant to say. What? That it had to happen this way; that 
this is what he was meant to say. The effect of the truth is the effect of the truth: 
incontestable.  
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But to whom does the truth belong then? Where does it stem from and where 
does it come to rest? I could not be otherwise, says the text; it is necessary, it is said –
necessarily. Indeed; but whose testimony is this? Who signs it? Obviously not Edgar 
Allan Poe, who speaks on behalf of the other and in the other’s name, in this case 
Legrand; nor Legrand, of course, who readily perceives he owes himself to the other’s 
voice, in this case that of Edgar Allan Poe. It would appear effectively that the truth 
belongs rather to the text itself, to a self-reflexive text then, which owns up evidently to 
its unconditional, absolute subjection to the other’s determination, its only chance, to 
the necessity of what it unveils. The truth, it would appear, is founded upon and to be 
found in Poe’s story. Legrand’s statement itself facilitates it.  
And yet, just as we are about to consign all this to a textual irony, at best to a 
metafictional effect (we will come back to this) and move on, a question impresses itself 
irresistibly upon our fancy: is it possible that a text which by its own admission and by 
all accounts is artificial, fictional, could ever constitute at the same time the locus and 
the purveyor of truth? What safeguards the truthfulness of the truth if it has to go by 
way of literature in order to present itself, if it has to remain in hiding in order to unveil 
itself, if it can only unveil itself, in fact, insofar as it remains in hiding? 
 
4.3. The truth of the lure 
 
‘That would be the summit of the illusionist’s art: through one of his fictive creations to 
truly delude us’, Jacques Lacan will posit in response. Just like Freud, who frequently 
referred his findings to the authority of the poets, Lacan’s influential ‘Seminar on the 
“Purloined Letter”’ also finds truth itself, the truth of psychoanalytic theory of course, 
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portrayed within the elaborate contours of another of Poe’s famous short stories.15 The 
‘secret to which truth has always initiated her lovers’, Lacan maintains reassuringly, 
crediting Heidegger’s meditations on ‘aletheia’ for its disclosure, is that ‘it is in hiding 
that she offers herself to them most truly’.16 That is to say, the fact that a text alone, and 
a fictional one for that matter, safeguards the truthfulness of the truth should not be a 
cause for concern; on the contrary. Truth is made adequate to itself, identical to that of 
which it speaks, causa sui (cause and effect of itself), only through the symbolic 
exchange that secures its proper course, its singular destination back to itself. More 
simply, in order to reveal itself, to speak of itself, truth must veil itself in language. 
Come to think of it, it cannot be otherwise. Truth must assume the form of a narrative; it 
cannot but ‘declare itself in a structure of fiction’.17 
‘I, the truth, speak: I am a text; I am the necessary effect of the other’s intent’, 
Legrand avers. To which the analyst responds: ‘I, the truth, speak: this is the truth’.18 
Hence ‘there is so little opposition between this Dichtung and Wahrheit in its nudity’, as 
Lacan states elsewhere – after Freud, after Heidegger.19 This essential correspondence 
between truth and fiction does not, however, render the distinction between the two 
unverifiable. In fact, it does not even question the necessity and the stability of the limit 
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that sustains the distinction’s operability. What it does, undoubtedly, is destroy the 
dream of its objectifiability. Insofar as the truthfulness of the truth is not predicated 
upon its conformity with an external ‘reality’, with something beyond itself, beyond the 
signifier, it must be predicated upon its conformity with itself. Lacan writes: ‘Thus it is 
from elsewhere than the Reality with which it is concerned that the Truth takes its 
guarantee: it is from Speech (la parole). Just as it is from Speech that it receives the 
mark which institutes it in a structure of fiction.’20 And in Derrida’s faithful rendering 
of Lacan’s speech: ‘The truth, which is what must be refound [retrouvé], therefore is not 
an object beyond the subject, is not the adequation of speech to an object but the 
adequation of full speech to itself, its proper authenticity, the conformity of its act to its 
original essence.’21 This is then why the truth is bound to remain hidden from the 
subject’s consciousness, even at the moment, especially then, that he pronounces it – 
just as Legrand is bound to remain blind to the truthfulness of his presentiment. The 
truth, in its truth, that is the difference between Dichtung and Wahrheit, can only be 
authenticated by the other, by the reader or the analyst, who is thus ‘the master of 
truth’,22 as long as, of course, he ‘knows how to read it’.23 ‘I, the truth, speak: I am a 
fiction’, Legrand avers.  To which the analyst responds: ‘I, the truth, speak: this is the 
truth’. 
Such would be the fundamental logic behind the Lacanian ‘system of speech, or 
the system of truth’,24 as Derrida calls it, which justifies, as Lacan writes in all apparent 
seriousness, ‘our referring, without malice, to a number of imaginary heroes as real 
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characters’.25 Unsurprisingly enough, Derrida will remain unconvinced. His seminal 
essay ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’ painstakingly analyses the ‘Seminar on the “Purloined 
Letter”’ with reference to the entire Lacanian oeuvre and casts doubt precisely on the 
presumed ‘transparency of intersubjective dialectics’, as he shrewdly sums up Lacan’s 
thesis.
26
 ‘The double, repetition, recording, and the mimeme in general’, Derrida points 
out, ‘are excluded from this system, along with the entire graphematic structure they 
imply’.27 Like every system, not to mention every truth, Lacan’s discourse is inevitably 
haunted by the possibility, the ‘uncontrollable threat and anxiety [of] all double 
simulacra’.28 And this is so even when, especially when, it turns to fiction in order to 
verify its truthfulness, when it finds itself confirmed and exemplified by a fictional text.  
 
The final word is that, when all is said and done, there is, at the origin or 
the end (proper course, circular destination), a word which is not feigned, 
a meaning which, through all imaginable fictional complications, does not 
trick, or which at that point tricks truly, again teaching us the truth of the 
lure. At this point, the truth permits the analyst to treat fictional characters 
as real, and to resolve, at the depth of the Heideggerian meditation on 
truth, the problem of the literary text which sometimes led Freud (more 
naively, but more surely than Heidegger and Lacan) to confess his 
confusion.
29
 
 
‘When all is said and done’, Derrida argues, what safeguards the truthfulness of 
the truth and so the possibility of its systematization, is the idealization of the signifier, 
the identifiability and indivisibility of the letter (phone), that puts truth on stage and thus 
‘ensures its proper course toward the proper place’.30 In other words, what ensures the 
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adequation of the truth to its narrative form, to the text that veils/unveils it, is the 
assumption that this form is necessary and authentic, and that its meaning is therefore 
dependable. ‘Formalism and hermeneutic semanticism always support one another’, 
Derrida notes insightfully.
31
 It is not by chance, as he will show, that Lacan forcefully 
disregards the significance of ‘The Purloined Letter’s’ narrator, the ‘invisible, but 
structurally irreducible, frame around the narration’,32 reducing thereby the narrating act 
which posits the truth to a mere ‘“commentary” that “doubles” the drama, […] with no 
specific intervention of its own, like a transparent element, a general diaphanousness.’33 
Similarly, to come back to ‘The Gold-Bug’, what ensures the truthfulness of Legrand’s 
‘presentiment’ – that the events he experiences are not accidental – is no more than our 
motivated presupposition that the events he experiences, including that statement itself, 
are indeed not accidental; in other words, that what the story’s narrator relates is exactly 
what happened, hence what had to happen, or else, in what amounts to the same, that 
what is narrated could not have been narrated otherwise; that the narrative that goes by 
the title ‘The Gold-Bug’ and what this narrative narrates, the ‘how’ and the ‘what’, the 
signifier and the signified, are one and the same. 
But is not literature precisely that which could have always been narrated 
otherwise? Isn’t the literary event precisely unverifiable? How can we ever be sure that 
the story’s narrator (and every story has at least one), whose writing filters not only 
Legrand’s words, but everything we come to know of, is relating to us exactly what 
happened and in the way that it happened? Especially so when that narrator happens to 
take part in the events he narrates. The unreliability of the narrator is not one possibility 
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among others, a deception that one can identify or an accident whose effects one can 
calculate and evade. It is the structural condition of narrative.   
Some thirty years after ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’ and in response to Blanchot’s 
little recit entitled ‘The Instant of my Death’, but quite possibly with Lacan’s ‘Seminar’ 
still also in mind, Derrida reminds us that 
 
literature can say anything, accept anything, receive anything, suffer 
anything, and simulate everything; it can even feign a trap, the way 
modern armies know how to set false traps; these traps pass themselves 
off as real traps and trick the machines designed to detect simulations 
under even the most sophisticated camouflage.
34
 
 
Perhaps, that is, literature is playing a trick on the analyst. Perhaps Legrand’s implicit, 
seemingly inadvertent, avowal of the truth – that it is a fiction – is a trap, designed to 
fool our critical machines, our systems of truth, into thinking that it is a ‘real’ trap. Is it 
not possible, indeed, that the text is actually feigning its self-consciousness, that it is 
simulating the truth? Just when we think we have made the text speak the truth, confess 
that it lies, we find ourselves wondering, and rightly so, inevitably, whether this might 
be yet another of its lies. Always one step ahead of us, like the schoolboy who always 
won in the game of even and odd,
35
 is it not always possible that the text is deluding us 
into thinking that it is ‘truly deluding’ us?  
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We will never know. ‘The problem of the literary text’, as Derrida suggests, is 
not resolvable. The text which proclaims to have resolved it, to have grasped ‘truth 
itself’ as the ‘truth of the lure’, is not to be trusted. Because the text in which it finds 
‘truth itself’ in its truth, is by definition untrustworthy. ‘I, the truth, speak: it was 
supposed to happen this way; this is what I was meant to say’, Legrand avers. To which 
the analyst responds: ‘I, the truth, speak: this is the truth’; unless he is wrong; either 
one. 
This is how Lacan concludes his ‘Seminar’: ‘Thus it is that what the “purloined 
letter”, nay, the “letter in sufferance”, means is that a letter always arrives at its 
destination.’36 To which Derrida responds: ‘Not that the letter never arrives at its 
destination, but it belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable, always, of not 
arriving. And without this threat [...] the circuit of the letter would not even have begun. 
But with this threat, the circuit can always not finish.’37  
In this manner, Derrida is not simply ‘opposing the unsystematizable to the 
systematized, “chance” to psychoanalytical “determinism”, or the “undecidable” to the 
“destination”, as Barbara Johnson’s analysis of his and Lacan’s readings of ‘The 
Purloined Letter’ would have us believe.38 And she would have us believe so, it should 
be noted, not as a result of her misunderstanding ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’ – as is clearly 
the case, for example, with Irene Harvey and her contribution to the same debate;
39
 on 
the contrary. At the end of her essay, ‘The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida’, 
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and after having succeeded in thoroughly misconstruing Derrida’s argumentation as 
some sort of veneration of indeterminacy, Johnson artfully proceeds to appropriate as 
her own what will have always been Derrida’s actual argumentation. All too eager to 
have the last word in the debate about the (im)possibility of last words, Johnson offers 
us now, albeit under the pretence of correcting Derrida, what is admittedly the most 
astute and the most insightful reading of ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’ and of the import of 
chance in deconstruction.   
 
 If it at first seemed possible to say that [To whom did it seem possible? 
To Johnson. –CD.] Derrida was opposing the unsystematizable to the 
systematized, “chance” to psychoanalytical “determinism”, or the 
“undecidable” to the “destination”, the positions of these oppositions 
seem now to be reversed […]. But these oppositions are themselves 
misreadings of the dynamic functioning of what is at stake here. For if 
the letter is what dictates the rhetorical indetermination of any 
theoretical discourse about it, then the oscillation between unequivocal 
statements of undecidability and ambiguous assertions of decidability is 
one of the letter’s inevitable effects. […] “[S]ymbolic determination” is 
not opposed to “chance”: it is what emerges as the syntax of chance. But 
“chance”, out of which springs that which repeats, cannot in any way be 
“known”, since “knowing” is one of its effects. We can therefore never 
be sure whether or not “chance” itself exists at all. “Undecidability” can 
no more be used as a last word than “destination”. “Car”, said Mallarmé, 
‘il y a et n’y a pas de hasard’.” The “undeterminable” is not opposed to 
the determinable; “dissemination” is not opposed to repetition. If we 
could be sure of the difference between the determinable and the 
undeterminable, the undeterminable would be comprehended within the 
determinable. What is undecidable is whether a thing is decidable or 
not.
40
  
 
 
4.4. Metalanguage 
 
‘A “literature”, then, can produce, can place onstage, and put forth something 
like the truth’, Derrida writes. ‘Therefore it is more powerful than the truth of which it 
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is capable.’41 To be sure, Legrand puts forth ‘something like the truth’: this feels like an 
all too carefully, too neatly constructed plot, he avows, too well-designed to be real, too 
extraordinary to be the effect of mere, normal, chance. Such is his peculiar testimony: 
my life, the extraordinary coincidences that make up my destiny, seem to be invested 
with meaning, as if dictated by the other, intentionally, with good reason, as if I were no 
more than a literary character, a writing effect; which, as we think we know, happens to 
be true. A metafictional moment, they will say, those who claim to understand what 
fiction is, seeking to contain in this way the effects of this peculiar doubling.
42
 As we 
will happen to verify, however, a certain constitutive traversal of fiction’s borders is 
actually what is at stake. For as soon as fiction is re-marked and put on stage, for 
everyone to see, its essential indeterminability is all that stands on display. 
‘The idea of a text referring to itself, reflecting on its own language and so on, is 
always already at odds with itself’, Nicholas Royle points out in his Jacques Derrida.43 
‘A logic of the supplement’44 permeates each and every discourse that would appear to 
take itself as its object, to refer, more simply, to itself; ‘there is no metalanguage as a 
discrete language’, because ‘it is both part of and not part of its so-called object 
language. We might consider’, Royle continues, ‘an everyday example such as an 
argument in which one person says to the other, in exasperation: “I can’t believe we’re 
having this conversation!” This statement of disbelief is both part and not part of the 
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conversation.’45 Indeed, on the one hand, in remarking ‘this conversation’ in the course 
of this conversation, one affirms what this very remark necessitates, the conversation 
within which this remark participates; one affirms, in short, the truth. On the other hand, 
however, in remarking ‘this conversation’ in the course of this conversation, one also 
interrupts and exceeds this conversation. In affirming the truth, that is, one inevitably 
also puts the truth in question. How can we be sure that ‘this conversation’ in the course 
of this conversation, refers indeed to the conversation of which it partakes? What 
guarantees that this re-mark is not a citation, for instance, or even a lie? For all we 
know, there might not even be a conversation to begin with; the re-mark of ‘this 
conversation’ might just as well be no more than a little fiction, one that Nicholas Royle 
has made up for the purposes of his demonstration, for example. 
We will never know. But if the re-mark of the truth, of what is necessarily true, 
is potentially fictional, potentially untrue, by reason precisely of its metalinguistic 
aptitude, is that not to say that every text is likewise potentially fictional, potentially 
untrue? Indeed, as Royle writes, ‘metalanguage is in operation everywhere’.46 The very 
condition of meaning, the principle upon which our dictionaries are written and our 
communications conducted, is that language refers to itself as something other than 
itself, that it exemplifies what it is not, that its truthfulness is thus never assured. Indeed, 
every text, every mark, is potentially a literary one, re-markable in the space of 
literature. This does not mean, however, that every text is ‘at bottom literary’; as a 
matter of fact, it almost means the opposite. And the reason is that this ‘peculiarly 
elliptical or non-totalizing logic by which a text refers to itself’ thus rendering 
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metalanguage ‘at once necessary and impossible’, as Royle astutely affirms,47 would 
also have to pertain by the same token to a presumably fictional discourse, which, 
conversely, cannot but remark its fictitiousness at the very moment it claims its clear-
cut independence from the truth, its sovereign self-sufficiency. Derrida stresses this 
confidently: 
 
No doubt all language refers to something other than itself or to 
language as something other. […] What is the specific difference of 
literary language in this respect? Does its originality consist in stopping, 
arresting attention on this excess of language over language? In 
exhibiting, remarking, giving to be remarked this excess of language as 
literature […]? No: for it shows nothing without dissimulating what it 
shows and that it shows it.
48
 
 
Royle’s ‘metalinguistic’ example from above allows us to get a better grasp of 
this, as it ingeniously opens itself up to a ‘metafictional’ reading as well. The logic 
would be the same as above, except its structure would be reversed and what we 
perceive as the origin, what we take to be the truth, would now be upside down. In 
remarking precisely one’s disbelief in ‘this conversation’, as his example has it (‘I can’t 
believe we’re having this conversation’), in the course of what appears to be precisely a 
fictitious conversation, one necessarily interrupts and exceeds ‘this conversation’. 
Pronouncing ‘this conversation’ as unbelievable as a fiction, one thus dissociates one’s 
remark and one’s self from this conversation; one affirms thereby the truth: ‘this is not 
happening’. But then again, in affirming the truth, one also puts the truth in question. 
Because, on the other hand, this statement of disbelief in this conversation also happens 
to instigate, if not perpetuate, this conversation; in order to refute its reality from 
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without, it has to participate within its eventuality. In the same way, the presentiment of 
Legrand, who likewise cannot believe his luck, as they say, such a statement of disbelief 
pronouncing fiction (so improbable that it feels) fictional, non-truth (so incredible that it 
feels) untrue, neither belongs nor does not-belong to the text of which it forms part. 
Rather, it complicates it with an internal fold that renders it unidentifiable: neither true 
nor untrue, neither real nor fictional. For the same reason that the re-mark of the truth is 
incommensurable with truth itself, the re-mark of fiction, fiction announced, delimited 
and unveiled, remains accordingly incommensurable with untruth, the topos of an 
irreducible resistance. It remains undecidable. 
In truth, then, the truthfulness of Legrand’s affirmation of faith in the 
significance of his destiny – in the fictitiousness of the fiction he participates in – could 
not be more uncertain. ‘I can scarcely say why’, he himself confesses in the same 
breath. And how could he? The source of his ‘presentiment’ is unknowable, and so its 
veracity must remain unverifiable, its necessity an upshot of chance. It cannot be 
guaranteed; it is what cannot be guaranteed. Reflecting on the extraordinariness of the 
series of coincidences that make up ‘The Gold-Bug’, Legrand is simultaneously 
reflecting on the extraordinariness of the coincidences that have made himself possible, 
and hence his own reflections on the extraordinariness of the coincidences that have 
made possible his reflections on the extraordinariness of the coincidences – and so 
forth. Reflecting on his chances, in other words, Legrand is also reflecting on the 
chances of his reflection itself, on what is thus already there, by reason of itself. His 
reflection does not come back to a self that is not always already being reflected upon 
by the other, by himself as other, always already in simulation. It has no origin and no 
telos, because its origin is its telos; its necessity is its chance; and vice versa. ‘It is 
immediately metalingual, but its metalanguage has nothing to set it off’, to borrow this 
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excerpt from Derrida’s reading of Francis Ponge’s little poem ‘Fable’; ‘it is an 
inevitable and impossible metalanguage, since there is no language before it, since it 
has no prior object beneath or outside itself.’49 And in the ‘First Session’ of his 
breathtaking reading of Mallarmé’s ‘Mimique’, Derrida writes this:  
 
We are faced then […] with a double that doubles no simple, a double 
that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself already double. 
[…] This speculum reflects no reality; it produces mere “reality-effects”. 
[…] In this speculum with no reality, in this mirror of a mirror, a 
difference or dyad does exist […]. But it is a difference without 
reference, or rather a reference without a referent, without any first or 
last unit, a ghost that is the phantom of no flesh, wandering about 
without a past, without any death, birth, or presence.
50
 
 
Fiction, textuality, the primacy of the signifier, ‘this’ is not the ultimate truth, the 
ultimate signified, of this originary simulacrum, as Lacan and a certain strain of so-
called poststructuralist criticism would have us believe. It is not the final destination of 
its course. Rather, it is the structural condition of its possibility, which perpetually lures 
it away from its destination. It is what keeps it in suspense, always at a distance from 
itself, between truth and fiction. ‘It is the impossible mourning of truth: in and through 
the word.’51 Haunted by literature, truth persists.  
As Derrida so insightfully puts it in ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’, ‘the trap of 
metalanguage – which in the last analysis is used by no one, is at the disposition of no 
one, involves no one in the consequences of an error or a weakness – is a trap belonging 
to writing before the letter’.52 As for the ‘I’ that seeks to appropriate the text which 
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declares itself untrue, fictional, this ‘I’ marks no more than the impossible desire to 
retrieve the authority over oneself, over one’s belief, in oneself, in truth. ‘Perhaps, after 
all, it was rather a desire than an actual belief’, Legrand will concede. This ‘I’, in which 
‘metafiction’ blindly affirms its faith, is but the remainder of the impossible desire to 
dispel the ghostly possibility of literariness and to arrest its contaminating force by 
relocating oneself within literature’s abode. Impossible, because, as it happens, 
literature  
 
does not remain at home, abidingly [à demeure], in the identity of a 
nature or even of a historical being identical with itself. It does not 
maintain itself abidingly [à demeure], at least if “abode [demeure]” 
designates the essential stability of a place; it only remains [demeure] 
where and if  “to be abidingly [être a demeure]” in some abiding order 
[mise en demeure]” means something else.53 
  
As it happens, literature is nowhere to be found. Literature could be anywhere. 
That is to say, literature is nowhere to be found because literature could be anywhere. 
Literature is potentially everywhere; right here and now, as we speak, its potentiality is 
the actuality of what remains. By reason of itself, literature will never present itself. It is 
bound to disappear, as soon as it offers itself to be read, as soon as it re-marks itself. 
‘What would be a literature that would be only what it is, literature? It would no longer 
be itself if it were itself.’54 Literature only ever takes place insofar as it remains 
incognito, in secret. ‘In place of the secret: there where nevertheless everything is said 
and where what remains is nothing – but the remainder, not even of literature.’55 No 
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literature, only literature. Absolute necessity, absolute chance. Always perhaps. 
‘Literature voids itself in its limitlessness.’56 
 
4.5. Testimony 
 
In the course of his brilliant interview with Derek Attridge which forms part of 
the indispensable volume entitled Acts of Literature, Derrida avows that he has always 
been ‘drawn toward texts which are very sensitive to this crisis of the literary institution 
(which is more than, and other than, a crisis)’, texts, as he puts it, ‘which belong to 
literature while deforming its limits’, or else ‘inscribed in a critical experience of 
literature’, bearing ‘within themselves, or we could also say in their literary act they put 
to work, a question, the same one, but each time singular and put to work otherwise: 
“What is literature?” or “Where does literature come from?”’57 All of his essays 
included in Acts of Literature, meticulously trace the singular effects of precisely this 
‘law of overflowing, of excess, the law of participation without belonging’,58 as it is 
formalized by a number of texts, for the most part literary, from Kafka to Joyce, from 
Blanchot to Celan and Ponge, from Shakespeare to Mallarmé and Rousseau. What does 
the law dictate?  
First of all, that no text is literary in itself; Derrida never gets tired repeating 
this: ‘[T]here is no such thing as literary essence or a specifically literary domain strictly 
identifiable as such.’59 ‘[T]here is no essence of literature, no truth of literature, no 
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literary-being or being-literary of literature.’60 ‘Literarity is not a natural essence, an 
intrinsic property of the text.’61 ‘There is no essence or substance of literature: literature 
is not. It does not exist.’62 That the same text could be taken as literary in one context 
and non-literary in another only serves to confirm this. Literature does not even have to 
be fictional, strictly speaking, even if the possibility of fiction is intrinsic to so-called 
creative nonfiction and documentary narratives, such as biographies or memoirs. If it 
remains nonetheless possible to identify certain texts as literary and others as not, as we 
no doubt can do and should do, this is because there is something about the text, which 
meets a certain literary criterion, which fulfils, in other words, a certain, historically 
determined, concept of literariness. Unless a text bears within itself such a literary 
supplement, a ‘metafictional’ re-mark, it is not literary. That is to say, literature needs to 
be introduced; in order to be itself, to stand a chance, someone or something, itself or 
another, has to speak out its name. This is Derrida’s ‘humble axiom’, as he puts it in 
‘The Law of Genre’:  
 
[A] code should provide an identifiable trait and one which is identical 
to itself, authorizing us to adjudicate whether a given text belongs to this 
genre or perhaps to that genre. […] Can one identify a work of art, of 
whatever sort, but especially a work of discursive art, if it does not bear 
the mark of a genre, if it does not signal or mention it or make it 
remarkable in any way?
63
 
 
Now, as Derrida goes on to add, ‘this re-mark can take on a great number of 
forms and can itself pertain to highly diverse types.’64 Most simple of all, it can be a 
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plain mention beneath the text’s title or on a book’s front cover, designating its genre: 
‘novel’, ‘poetry’, ‘drama’, etc. Alternatively, it can be the fact that it is published by a 
specific publishing house or a specific author, presumed to only publish ‘fiction’. It can 
even be another text altogether, such as an author’s prologue or epilogue for instance, 
which refers to his or her work as ‘literary’, or another’s critical review, which confirms 
that the work in question is indeed literary. None of these marks, however, suffices to 
guarantee the literariness of the text it designates as such. Why? Because such marks 
might be literary in themselves; always already, they are re-markable in and as 
literature. This is not an abstract, regulatable potentiality that one could evade or choose 
to ignore. It is not an accident that might or might not befall the mark. It is its very 
condition of possibility. Similar to a text’s signature, the mark that circumscribes the 
space of literature, forms an integral, essential part of its structure, even if it is 
obviously incommensurable with it.
65
 
This is what certain texts (especially, albeit not exclusively, as Derrida makes 
clear, texts associated with the advent of modernism)
66
 give us to think by way of 
including the re-mark of their literariness within their corpus, as part of their content 
proper. A simple example would be the introduction of an internal narrator, whereby a 
fictitious character claims the authorship of the narrated story, as is the case in Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness (1902), for instance, or James’s The Turn of the Screw (1898). In 
Francis Ponge’s poem ‘Fable’, which Derrida analyses extensively in ‘Psyche: 
Invention of the Other’, the re-mark takes the form of an explicit statement verifying the 
text’s own textuality. The first line of ‘Fable’ reads: ‘With the word with commences 
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then this text’.67 And in Poe’s ‘The Gold-Bug’ it becomes the ‘presentiment’ of its 
protagonist, who intuits that the events he experiences are just too good to be true. One 
could multiply the examples indefinitely. What matters is that neither of these ‘internal’ 
marks suffices to guarantee the literariness of the text they designate as such; the reason 
being, again, that they might be literary in themselves. That is, conversely, they remain 
incommensurable with literature, even if they obviously form an essential, integral part 
of its structure.  
Literature is un-introducible. Its name ‘is destined to remain improper, with no 
criteria, or assured concept or reference’, as Derrida writes in ‘Before the Law’.68 There 
is no such thing as a ‘literary status’, if by that one understands a homogeneous, 
identifiable field or type of discourse. ‘Surely one could not speak of “literariness” as a 
belonging to literature, as of the inclusion of a phenomenon or object, even a work, 
within a field, a domain, a region whose frontiers would be pure and whose titles 
indivisible. The work, the opus, does not belong to the field, it is the transformer of the 
field.’69 One can never say ‘I am literature’, any more than one can say ‘this is 
literature’, without irrevocably dislocating at the same time literature’s identity, without 
putting in question the security of its borders, without re-marking, in other words, the 
possibility that one can always say this. 
Again, this is not to advocate a sterile, nominalist equivocation of meaning. To 
repeat, Derrida does not seek to break down the limit between truth and fiction in the 
name of a constitutive, unsurpassable textuality, as it is often naively suggested; on the 
contrary. The unreliability of the literary re-mark, he shows, is the necessary condition 
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of literature’s possibility. In point of fact, the identifiability of ‘a literary functioning 
and a literary intentionality’70 is contingent upon the unidentifiability of a literary 
essence, upon the undecidability of ‘literariness’ as such. ‘The historicity of its 
experience – for there is one [CD’s emphasis] – rests on the very thing no ontology 
could essentialize.’71 In affirming the truth, one also puts the truth in question; which is 
also to say, truth becomes possible only insofar as it remains in question. 
 
Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless 
text, [...] yet such participation does not amount to belonging. And not 
because of an abundant overflowing or a free, anarchic and 
unclassifiable productivity, but because of the trait of participation itself, 
because of the effect of the code and of the generic mark. In marking 
itself generically, a text unmarks itself.
72
 
 
The mark by which one re-marks the difference between literature and the truth, 
by which one affirms the truthfulness of the truth, the literariness of literature, truth in 
its truth or truth as the truth of the lure, belongs to neither truth nor literature; it 
participates in both, it is re-markable within both – it is always potentially both. And so 
it must, or else the possibility to distinguish between the one and the other would 
collapse. A limit, in order to function as such, must partake in the structure of both the 
parties it separates; it must represent both. Difference must remain unidentifiable, 
unascribable, unverifiable, in order to be attestable. Derrida sums everything up for us 
in this excerpt from Demeure: 
 
[T]here is no testimony that does not structurally imply in itself the 
possibility of fiction, simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury – that is 
to say, the possibility of literature, of the innocent or perverse literature 
that innocently plays at perverting all of these distinctions. If this 
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possibility that it seems to prohibit were effectively excluded, if 
testimony thereby became proof, information, certainty, or archive, it 
would lose its function as testimony. In order to remain testimony, it 
must therefore allow itself to be haunted. It must allow itself to be 
parasitized by precisely what it excludes from its inner depths, the 
possibility, at least, of literature. We will try to remain [demeurer] on 
this undecidable limit. It is a chance and a threat, a resource both of 
testimony and of literary fiction, law and non-law, truth and non-truth, 
veracity and lie, faithfulness and perjury. 
Thus an impossible limit. Untenable. This limit permanently swears 
testimony to secrecy; it enjoins testimony to remain secret […]; it is the 
condition of the testimony in a strict sense, and this is why one will 
never be able to demonstrate, in the sense of a theoretical proof or a 
determinate judgment, that a perjury or lie has in fact taken place. Even 
an admission will not be enough.
73
 
 
Every text is potentially literary, potentially untrue. That does not, however, make 
literature true to itself. For this potentiality is not remarkable. It is part of every text, 
remarked with every text, but it belongs to no text; it never presents itself. It is what 
remains to be thought; the condition of the future: a secret. 
 
4.6. Singularity 
 
Let us revisit our starting question then: will it have been possible that the man 
of Aristotle’s imagination, who ‘found treasure while digging a hole for a plant’, did not 
find treasure while digging a hole for a plant? And the same goes for the man of Poe’s 
imagination, William Legrand, who stumbled upon the instructions locating the burial 
place of treasure while looking for a leaf by which to hold a gold-bug; is the literary 
event a matter of necessity or chance?  
- Of course chance, one will respond. Insofar as both Aristotle’s example and 
Poe’s story constitute literary narratives, products of their respective author’s 
imagination, then what is narrated in them could always, in principle and by definition, 
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have been narrated otherwise. Literature, as Derrida defines it, is ‘the institution where 
one can say everything, in every way.’74 To refuse this potentiality, this absolute chance, 
is to deny the very distinctiveness of the literary. Literature, as Aristotle will establish, 
is the accident par excellence; and an accident must be accidental in order to be what it 
is. 
- But of course not, the other will retort. To suggest that the fictitious quest of a 
fictitious character could actually have had a different outcome than the one its creator 
determined for it seems like a rather gratuitous task. After all, one can speculate about 
the chances of what came to pass only under the assumption of its necessity. ‘The space 
of literature’, as Derrida immediately goes on to clarify, ‘is not only that of an instituted 
fiction but also a fictive institution which in principle [CD’s emphasis] allows one to say 
everything.’75 Indeed, in order to attest to its infinite potentiality, to its unconditional 
accidentalness, in order to exemplify precisely chance, literature must be of necessity. 
Surely, one cannot ‘really’, ‘seriously’, suggest that Legrand’s ‘presentiment’ might 
never have been validated, that what happened to happen might have happened 
otherwise, that perhaps no treasure was to be found where he dug. Because then the 
story entitled ‘The Gold-Bug’ would not have been itself; Legrand himself would not 
have been himself; this discussion would never have taken place; obviously. 
And yet, ‘The Gold-Bug’ does seem to go at great lengths to force us to consider 
precisely that impossible possibility, in a way thus validating both viewpoints at once. 
Legrand’s initial attempt was in fact unsuccessful. First time around and after hours of 
arduous digging with the help of his servant, Jupiter, and his friend, the narrator, 
Legrand came up with nothing but mud. He was actually just about to admit defeat, give 
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up altogether on his ‘presentiment of some vast good fortune impending’, pack up and 
leave, when he suddenly realized that his servant had made a terrible blunder,
76
 which 
resulted in them digging a hole a good few feet away from the spot where (according to 
the very fastidious instructions on the parchment) they were supposed to, the spot where 
Captain Kidd’s treasure was indeed lying and waiting to be discovered, as they were to 
soon find out. What if Legrand never realized Jupiter’s mistake? From the first 
‘accidental’ meeting between the narrator and Legrand (‘since, by mere accident, I 
made his acquaintance’, he says), to the countless miraculous, practically ridiculous, 
coincidences that clue Legrand into the significance of the little, half-buried piece of 
parchment he picked up off the ground one chilly afternoon, to Legrand’s own explicit 
affirmation that these coincidences are, indeed, all ‘so very extraordinary’, and up to the 
very end, ‘The Gold-Bug’ remarks in every way imaginable that what eventually came 
to pass was, indeed, just a matter of the most improbable chance. So improbable, in fact, 
that it feels necessary; so improbable that it feels literary. Almost itself. A nearly perfect 
simulation of fiction – of the truth; by absolute chance – of absolute necessity. ‘Giving 
the greatest chance to chance, literature reappropriates chance itself into necessity’, as 
Derrida will say in conclusion to his essay ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’: 
 
[A]rt, in particular the “art of discourse” and literature, only represents a 
certain power of indeterminacy that sustains the capacity of 
performatively circumscribing its own context for its own event, that of 
the oeuvre. It is perhaps a kind of freedom, a large margin in the place of 
this circumscription (découpe). This stereotomic margin is very large 
and perhaps even the largest of all at a certain time in history, but it is 
not infinite. The appearance of arbitrariness or chance (literature as the 
place of proper names, if you wish) has to do with this margin. But this 
is also the place of the greatest symptomatology. Giving the greatest 
                                                          
76
 Interestingly enough, Jupiter happened to confuse right with left in executing his masters orders; not 
because he did not know right from left, but because he did not understand that right is left from the  
perspective of our mirror’s reflection – specifically, in this case, from the perspective of a human skull.   
181 
 
chance to chance, it reappropriates chance itself into necessity or fatality. 
Literature plays nature for fortune –and art.77 
 
In order to realize its infinite potential, literature has to forsake it. In order to be faithful 
to itself, literature must betray what it stands for. And vice versa. In order to remark 
chance, to exemplify accidentalness, literature has to sacrifice it. And vice versa. 
Necessary because of chance, out of chance. And vice versa. Literature is impossible, 
and by reason of its own condition of possibility, ‘tortured by a dependence on 
something that stands in a relation of contradiction to it’, as Rodolphe Gasché puts it.78 
Undoubtedly, if it is to fulfil its destiny, literature constitutes the space where 
‘one can say everything, in every way’, where one can make chance one’s own in 
absolute freedom. It is the means by which one can circumscribe, delimit and control 
chance effects, arrest the unpredictable, determine the future at one’s will. Indeed, one 
can be perfectly, unconditionally lucky in literature, addressor and addressee of one’s 
own dispatch. Just like the little boy in D.H. Lawrence’s short story ‘The Rocking 
Horse-Winner’, who secretly develops the ability to predict the winner of actual horse 
races by riding a wooden rocking-horse in his room: 
 
He wanted luck, he wanted it, he wanted it. […] [H]e would sit on his 
big rocking-horse, charging madly into space, with a frenzy that made 
the little girls peer at him uneasily. […] “Now!” he would silently 
command the snorting steed. “Now take me to where there is luck! Now 
take me!”[…] One day his mother and his Uncle Oscar came in when he 
was on one of his furious rides. He did not speak to them. […] His 
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mother watched him with an anxious expression on her face. At last he 
suddenly stopped forcing his horse into the mechanical gallop and slid 
down. “Well, I got there!” he announced fiercely, his blue eyes still 
flaring, and his sturdy long legs straddling apart. “Where did you get 
to?” asked his mother. “Where I wanted to go,” he flared back at her.79 
 
This wooden horse, ‘the secret within his secret’, ‘his secret of secrets’, as the story’s 
narrator describes it,
80
 fulfils thus the boy’s dream of finally possessing chance. But as 
it happens, to possess chance is to be possessed by it.
81
 To know the future is to 
eliminate it; to be chance is to have no chance; it is to surrender oneself to the necessity 
of its prescription. The omnipotence that literature’s infinite potentiality affords comes 
at the expense of one’s self; to be absolutely lucky is therefore also the worse 
misfortune. And so, inevitably, as if by chance, the boy will pass away in the end, 
muttering from his deathbed ‘I am lucky’. As his uncle observes, in the story’s closing 
lines, ‘he’s best gone out of a life where he rides his rocking-horse to find a winner.’82 
Therein, in this maddening, uncontrollable, irrepressible interface of necessity 
and chance, lies the often evoked and as often misunderstood ‘singularity’ of literature. 
No, literature does not simply represent or mirror the truth, neither in its truth nor as the 
truth of the lure. The literary event is not simply necessary, as Freud would often seem 
to imply rather confusedly, as Lacan would declare unambiguously, and as the ‘literary 
instrumentalism’ that still ‘dominates literary criticism today’,83 in Derek Attridge’s 
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words, more or less naively presupposes, when it treats the literary text ‘as a means to a 
predetermined end’.84 No matter what Aristotle’s definition of definitions would have 
us believe, literature remains incommensurable with a context or a theory, a meaning or 
an intention beyond itself, with the ‘unforeseeable’ yet perfectly determinable cause that 
made it possible in the first place. 
But that is not to say that the literary event is simply an embodiment of or a 
tribute to pure chance; literature is also ‘not [...] some forever yet-to-be-fully 
determined object’ that persistently eludes the truth, as Timothy Clark shrewdly affirms, 
in an effort to distinguish Derrida’s work from unwitting ‘arguments to which so-called 
“deconstructionism” was often reduced to in the 1970s and after’.85 As Clark points out 
in his introduction to his excellent, necessary, monograph The Poetics of Singularity: 
‘Too much of the standard defence of the literary as singular comes down to 
highlighting our not being able to finally identify or fix the meaning of something, and 
then vaunting this inability or resistance as a kind of vaguely democratic challenge to 
dogma.’86 As it happens, the constitutive resistance of the literary text to critical 
appropriation, its incommensurability with a ‘self’ beyond itself, is nothing more and 
nothing less than an effect of its impossibility; in the strict sense. It is not the exclusive 
right or property of literature but what literature loses in order to become itself. ‘There 
is no literature without a suspended relation to meaning and reference’, as Derrida 
makes clear.
87
 And so, if we cannot identify or fix its meaning, this is not because it has 
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none, but because its meaning will have never been its own to begin with. In an 
illuminating essay on Derrida’s conception of the literary in relation to the writings of 
Heidegger and Paul de Man, Joseph Riddel writes:  
 
The limitlessness of “literature” is not the concealed fullness of 
language, but its disruptive and temporalizing function. “Literature” is 
neither a full text nor an empty text, neither a presence nor an absence. 
There is no “literary language,” not even in de Man's sense, for there can 
be no privileged language.
88
  
 
Literature is neither present nor absent to itself, neither true nor untrue to itself; it is in 
suspense – even when, especially when, it re-marks and presents itself, when it delimits 
and denudes itself in its truth; even when, as in the case of ‘The Gold-Bug’, it bears an 
uncanny resemblance to itself; especially then. 
The singularity of literature is not the singularity of literature. ‘Absolute 
singularity’, as Derrida says, ‘is announced in a paradoxical experience. An absolute, 
absolutely pure singularity, if there were one, would not even show up, or at least would 
not be available for reading. To become readable, it has to be divided, to participate and 
belong. [...] It loses itself to offer itself.’89 The singularity of literature, or more 
precisely, the exemplarity of the experience of literature, lies rather in the fact that 
literature is not singular; which is yet another way of repeating that every text is 
potentially literary, that ‘[l]iterature is only exemplary of what happens everywhere’, as 
Derrida affirms in ‘Passions’.90 In order to be itself, literature will never have fulfilled 
its destiny. It remains ‘a would-be singular event’, as Timothy Clark defines it in 
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response to Derrida’s mystifying little text ‘Che cos’è la poesia’,91 or else the ‘desire to 
relate never to itself or to itself only as to otherness: the dream of a total singularity and 
novelty, pure eventhood’.92 Literature is the place where one will never have been able 
to say everything, in every way. ‘There is in literature, in the exemplary secret of 
literature,’ Derrida says, ‘a chance of saying everything without touching upon the 
secret.’93 And he continues, destined to never get there: 
 
When all hypotheses are permitted, groundless and ad infinitum, about 
the meaning of a text, or the final intentions of an author, whose person 
is no more represented than nonrepresented by a character or by a 
narrator, by a poetic or fictional sentence, which detaches itself from its 
presumed source and thus remains locked away [au secret], when there 
is no longer even any sense in making decisions about some secret 
behind the surface of a textual manifestation (and it is this situation 
which I would call text or trace), when it is the call [appel] of this secret, 
however, which points back to the other or to something else, when it is 
this itself which keeps our passion aroused, and holds us to the other, 
then the secret impassions us. Even if there is none, even if it does not 
exist, hidden behind anything whatever. Even if the secret is no secret, 
even if there has never been a secret, a single secret. Not one.
94
  
  
 
4.7. Solution 
 
In order to fulfil its own destiny, philosophy unquestionably treats the literary 
text, the ‘as if’ world of fiction, as a symptom of the truth. Indeed, the analyst or literary 
critic has to presume that his subject is of necessity, that is to say, that the events 
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narrated cannot but have happened precisely in the way they are narrated. This is his 
starting point, the law he represents and enforces: nothing happens by chance in 
literature; or else, more precisely, everything happens by chance. Either way, everything 
happens for a reason. The literary text remains interpretable, an ‘accident’, as Aristotle 
will say, to be explained away, an illusion to be disclosed as such, in its truth. This is 
why it is always so hard to find typographical errors in literature; because literature, the 
critic presumes, is one massive slip of the pen. His responsibility, much like a 
detective’s responsibility, is defined as the disclosure of what the literary text relates, 
what the literary text is, as its absolute repetition in other words, only this time in the 
language of truth. The task of the purveyor of truth will have always been, in principle 
and by definition, to account for what happens, for what comes to pass, to demonstrate 
and so validate the necessity of the event by reducing it to its originating source, to what 
will have made it possible in the first place, what comprehends it always already – to 
the law.  
It is not by chance that the interrogation of this fundamental presupposition that 
pervades literary criticism and safeguards its identity is instigated through the reading of 
detective fiction. In his introduction to ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’, Derrida writes:  
 
For example: what happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text 
when the latter, the deciphered itself, already explicates itself? When it 
says more about itself than does the deciphering (a debt acknowledged 
by Freud more than once)? And especially when the deciphered text 
inscribes in itself additionally the scene of the deciphering? When the 
deciphered text deploys more force in placing onstage and setting adrift 
the analytic process itself, up to its very last word, for example, the 
truth?
95
  
 
The detective story, as Derrida observes, anticipates and so destabilizes the authority of 
the critical operation. Rather than recounting a straightforward narrative with beginning, 
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middle and end, whose analyst would then be called upon to signify in the name of 
truth, the detective story splits itself up and performs the interpretative gesture of the 
other towards itself from within itself. Having first unfolded a sequence of events as a 
seemingly incomprehensible mystery, it then reveals, through the detective figure, its 
true meaning. This is what really happened, the fictional analyst proclaims; this is what 
it really means. However, this appeal to self-identity inevitably exposes at the same 
time the essential impossibility of every text to coincide with itself. As if in spite of 
itself, in repeating, naming, re-presenting itself, the detective story reaffirms its un-
presentability, the irreducibility of its singular performance; it reaffirms, that is, chance 
as an indispensable property of its structure – the necessary, inherent possibility that it is 
otherwise; not as a hypothetical potentiality, a theoretical threat that one could perhaps 
foresee and evade, but as the very condition of its possibility. In explaining itself, the 
‘so-called literary fiction’ makes clear, here and now, that the explanation of the other, 
for example the critic’s interpretation, for example the truth, will have always been 
potentially fictional. Derrida continues from above:  
 
For example, the truth. But is truth an example? What happens – and 
what is dispensed with – when a text, for example a so-called literary 
fiction – but is this still an example? – puts truth onstage? And when in 
doing so it delimits the analytic reading, assigns the analyst his position, 
shows him seeking truth, and even finding it, shows him discoursing on 
the truth of the text, and then in general proffering the discourse on truth, 
the truth on truth? What happens in a text capable of such a scene? A 
text confident, in its program, of situating analytic activity grappling 
with the truth? This surplus does not convey the mastery of an author, 
and even less the meaning of fiction. Rather, it would be the regular 
effect of an energetic squaring-off. Within which truth would play a 
piece: lifted, by the philosopher or the analyst, from within a more 
powerful functioning.
96
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One necessary effect of Lacan’s reading of ‘The Purloined Letter’ as an example 
of the truth, as Derrida argues in ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’, is that it pays no heed to the 
fact that Poe’s story forms part of a trilogy, alongside ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ 
and ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’; an ‘ablation’, as Derrida calls Lacan’s oversight,97 
all the more remarkable in that the story’s narrator explicitly reminds us of those two 
other ‘affairs’ in the story’s opening lines.98 Derrida proceeds thus to discuss in detail a 
number of excerpts from ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’, which serve to highlight 
the irrepressible significance of the narrator’s perception of the events he narrates, that 
is to say, the significance of his presence within the narrative that supposedly reveals 
truth itself. By contrast, however, one notes that he limits himself to no more than a 
single passing reference to ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ and its ‘newspaper 
clippings’.99 Coming back to ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ once more in the course 
of his lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances’, this time on account of Dupin’s allusion to 
Epicurus, Derrida suppresses again the significance of ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’, 
saying now that ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’, which is the first installment of the 
trilogy, ‘can also be read as a preface to “The Purloined Letter”’, the third one.100 
Before we conclude then, it is worth taking a look at this rather neglected of Poe’s 
famous tales of ratiocination. After all, if Poe invented the detective genre, as is 
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commonly admitted, then ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’, forming its primary repetition, 
constitutes no less than the genre’s founding moment.  
And yet, ironically enough, Poe wrote that story not simply as a sequel to the 
‘Murders in the Rue Morgue’, but also in contradistinction with it. In a letter to his 
friend Philip Pendleton Cooke, he admits:  
 
You are right about the hair splitting of my French friend [Dupin]: – that 
is all done for effect. These tales of ratiocination owe most of their 
popularity to being something in a new key. I do not mean to say they 
are not ingenious – but people think they are more ingenious than they 
are – on account of their method and air of method… Where is the 
ingenuity of unravelling a web which you yourself (the author) have 
woven for the express purpose of unravelling? The reader is made to 
confound the ingenuity of the suppositious Dupin with that of the writer 
of the story.
101
  
 
Before he invents the detective story, then, Poe has already abandoned it; founding it, he 
reinvents it. The time had come to put Monsieur Dupin to the test. Published in 1843, 
‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ constitutes thus Poe’s attempt to throw light in the guise 
of his ‘suppositious’ detective on a real murder case, which took place in New York two 
years earlier and was left unsolved. The victim was a young, beautiful woman by the 
name of Mary Cecilia Rogers, who was working in a well-known tobacco-shop, a 
meeting place for many writers and other intellectuals at the time, including Edgar Allan 
Poe himself. Mary left her home one Sunday morning with the intention, as she said to 
her fiancé, to visit her aunt, but she never returned. Three days later, her dead body was 
found floating in the Hudson River. Coinciding with the introduction of the penny press 
and owing to Mary’s reputation, the crime immediately attracted great public attention, 
thus putting a lot of pressure on the New York authorities to bring its perpetrators 
before justice. However, and despite the generous rewards offered to anyone willing to 
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come forward with some useful piece of information, the investigation failed to produce 
any conclusive results. A series of arrests were made, yet all suspects were sooner or 
later released due to insufficient evidence; a number of more or less plausible 
hypotheses were put forward but none came to pass. Until, after three to four months, 
the investigation was eventually abandoned and the mystery surrounding the death of 
Mary Rogers was gradually replaced in the papers’ headlines by fresher news.   
Poe’s story consists in the uninterrupted unfolding of Dupin’s detailed analysis 
of the mystery’s various parameters. Albeit rather tedious and uneventful, ‘The Mystery 
of Marie Rogêt’ remains nevertheless fascinating precisely because it tackles a real 
case. Dupin invalidates very convincingly the most widespread theories circulated 
through the press: that Mary was still alive and well, that she was brutally murdered by 
one of the notorious gangs of New York and, finally, that she had been killed by her 
former employer. Simultaneously, he tentatively builds a case against one anonymous 
naval officer, with whom Mary had allegedly run away a few years prior to her tragic 
end. It would be impossible to sum up here all the mystery’s particulars and so evaluate 
in more detail Dupin’s conclusions. As it happens, Daniel Stashower has done just that 
and with great success in his recent monograph Edgar Allan Poe and the Murder of 
Mary Rogers, offering us thus one of the most comprehensive readings of both Poe’s 
analysis of the case and of the case itself.
102
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Regardless of Dupin’s investigative efficiency, however, what is more 
interesting about Poe’s story is that it attempts to solve this case from the space of 
literature. While it clearly constitutes a practically precise transcription of the actual 
case, the story is actually presented as wholly independent from it. In point of fact, ‘The 
Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ does not deal with the murder of Mary Rogers as such, but 
with another case, set in Paris, which incidentally happens to form a perfect duplicate of 
the Mary Rogers case. The fictionalization of real events might seem like a rather trivial 
authorial ruse, especially nowadays; it is not, however, what Poe is doing here. As we 
will see, ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ attests to a far more radical, perhaps unique, 
distortion of the borders between fiction and non-fiction. In the story’s opening lines, 
the narrator refers explicitly to the mystery surrounding Mary Rogers’s death and thus 
positively dissociates his narrative from it. At the same time, he maintains that the 
events he is about to recount are nonetheless identical to the events that make up the real 
mystery. He proposes, however, that the identicalness between the two cases forms no 
more and no less than an incredible coincidence – extremely improbable, indeed, almost 
impossible, ‘the most intangible in speculation’, as unbelievable as fiction, yet true. 
These are the story’s first two paragraphs:   
 
There are few persons, even among the calmest thinkers, who have not 
occasionally been startled into a vague yet thrilling half-credence in the 
supernatural, by coincidences of so seemingly marvellous a character 
that, as mere coincidences, the intellect has been unable to receive them. 
Such sentiments – for the half-credences of which I speak have never the 
full force of thought – are seldom thoroughly stifled unless by reference 
to the doctrine of chance, or, as it is technically termed, the Calculus of 
Probabilities. Now, this Calculus is, in its essence, purely mathematical; 
and thus we have the anomaly of the most rigidly exact in science 
applied to the shadow and spirituality of the most intangible in 
speculation.  
The extraordinary details which I am now called upon to make 
public, will be found to form, as regards sequence of time, the primary 
branch of a series of scarcely intelligible coincidences, whose secondary 
192 
 
or concluding branch will be recognized by all readers in the late murder 
of Mary Cecilia Rogers, at New York.
103
  
 
What Poe so brilliantly demonstrates here for us is that, insofar as literature constitutes 
the space where everything is possible, where one can say everything and in every way, 
this must mean that it is always possible that literature replicates reality as such. It is 
always possible, indeed, that literature, as literature, without compromising in the least 
its literariness, remains absolutely indistinguishable from reality, that the difference 
between the two remains unverifiable – that it does not exist. Nothing will ever erase 
that possibility. No mark will ever completely and beyond doubt guarantee the 
difference between fiction and non-fiction; no mark will ever safeguard the security of 
their borders. Chance, ‘or as it is technically termed The Calculus of Probabilities’,104 
dictates that literature will never be literary enough, that reality will never be real 
enough. Insofar as every mark, every event, reality ‘itself’, is repeatable in itself, then 
‘literature’, ‘reality’, identity, ‘this’ will have always been impossible.   
On this premise, then, Poe effectively relieves himself of any kind of obligation 
to ‘fictionalize’ the Mary Rogers case. On the contrary, he makes sure to maintain the 
scene of the crime intact and provide all the available evidence with accuracy, he 
unreservedly transcribes a number of articles from the New York press as such, 
attributing them, of course, to the fictitious Paris press, and he even distorts on a few 
occasions the geography of Paris, so as to remain faithful to the original setting. When 
all is said and done, the only significant point of divergence between the mystery of 
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 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ in Tales and Sketches; vol. 2: 1843-1849, p. 723-4. 
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 Poe refers here to the work of the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace, whom he admired 
greatly; Laplace was the prime source of inspiration for Poe’s ‘prose poem’ Eureka.  See Edgar Allan 
Poe, Eureka [1848], ed. Stuart Levine and Susan F. Levine (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
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Mary Rogers and ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ is that the latter gets solved in the end, 
that it is eventually interpreted thanks to the cunning of Monsieur Dupin. Which is also 
to say, in consequence, that by contrast to the basic premise that came to define the 
detective genre, which Poe’s trilogy is supposed to have initiated, that is, that the 
detective’s interpretation is necessarily correct, that the narrative’s denouement reveals 
the truth of the narrative, in ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ the mystery’s resolution 
stands from the outset most decidedly in doubt. The reader, especially the contemporary 
readership familiar with the case of Mary Rogers, cannot help but question Dupin’s 
conclusions, as if the mystery were real, because it is (as real as the) real.  
Even more so, because the mystery’s resolution remains hidden. Dupin’s 
lengthy analysis is succeeded by a fictitious editorial note that reads: 
 
[For reasons which we shall not specify, but which to many readers will 
appear obvious, we have taken the liberty of here omitting, from the 
MSS.  placed in our hands, such portion as details the following up of the 
apparently slight clew obtained by Dupin. We feel it advisable only to 
state, in brief, that the result desired was brought to pass; and that the 
Prefect fulfilled punctually, although with reluctance, the terms of his 
compact with the Chevalier. Mr. Poe’s article concludes with the 
following words.  –Eds.]105  
 
Thus, Dupin’s success, the truthfulness of his interpretation, is not validated through the 
narrative, but through a short, reassuring remark that interrupts the narrative: ‘the result 
desired was brought to pass’. But did it? While eagerly awaiting for precisely the 
‘following up’ of the investigation, for an arrest, a confession perhaps, the readers must 
now make do with this bizarre little note; which incidentally, it is worth noting, even 
designates Poe himself as the story’s author, in case anyone was still under the 
impression that this is anything more than, other than, ‘mere fiction’. It is impossible for 
the reader not to suspect at this point that what he is told that happened, in fact may 
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have happened otherwise, or not at all, that is to say, that Dupin’s interpretation of ‘The 
Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ just might be wrong.  
Even more so, because Dupin’s interpretation is wrong. Poe’s story was 
originally published in three monthly instalments. A few days after the second 
instalment was released, however, in the front page of his morning newspaper, in big 
bold letters, Poe read: THE MARY ROGERS MYSTERY EXPLAINED.  
As it happened, in an incredible turn of events, ‘as though the Calculus of 
Probabilities had risen up to deal a crushing blow’, in Stashower’s words,106 the 
proprietor of the tavern where Mary was last seen alive allegedly confessed now from 
her deathbed that Mary had passed away under her roof undergoing an illegal abortion. 
Although not utterly explaining the mystery (it did not account, for example, for the 
multiple signs of physical violence on Mary’s body), the ‘abortion theory’ was 
immediately accepted as the true one by the public. The timing of these revelations 
could not have been worse. Poe had not made any mention to a possible pregnancy in 
his story’s first two instalments and it was now too late to go back. The story’s readers 
would now have a very good reason, indeed, not to trust that Dupin’s interpretation, 
which incriminated some obscure naval officer for Mary’s murder, albeit apparently 
consistent and relatively convincing, was indeed brought to pass.  
But is it possible that Dupin, the fictional analyst, is wrong? Is it possible that 
‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’, a fictional narrative, did not happen precisely in the way 
it is related? It is not by chance that the vast majority of the critical approaches to Poe’s 
story completely disregard the story’s fictional status, thus missing the theoretical 
significance of Dupin’s potential fallacy. Indeed, as we saw in the course of this 
chapter, this possibility, that what is narrated is not true of necessity, disrupts the very 
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identity of the literary, irrevocably blurring the borders between fiction and non-fiction. 
Guarding themselves against the threat of this uncontainable contamination, critics 
identify thus unquestionably Marie Roget with Mary Rogers and Dupin with Poe, 
thereby also reducing the narrator to a mere vehicle of the truth of the narrative. Poe 
himself, they presume, has simply attempted – and failed – to solve an actual murder 
case.  
But ‘The Mystery of Marie Rogêt’, as the narrator reminds us once more in the 
story’s conclusion, does not deal with the murder of Mary Rogers; it deals with another 
case, set in Paris, which by mere coincidence happens to form a perfect duplicate of the 
Mary Rogers case. And in that other case, Dupin’s interpretation was actually proven 
right. But how is this possible, one will reasonably protest? Insofar as the two mysteries 
are essentially identical, then their meaning must be one and the same. That is to say, if 
the solution to the mystery of Mary Rogers happens to differ from the solution to ‘The 
Mystery of Marie Rogêt’ after all, this must mean that one of them is wrong. And since 
it is impossible, in principle and by definition, that fiction is ‘wrong’, this must mean 
that Poe’s story is not fictional. Which is all very reasonable, of course. It presupposes, 
however, that one does not read the story’s conclusion:  
 
It will be understood that I speak of coincidences and no more. […] [I]n 
what I relate it will be seen that between the fate of the unhappy Mary 
Cecilia Rogers, so far as that fate is known, and the fate of one Marie 
Rogêt up to a certain epoch in her history, there has existed a parallel in 
the contemplation of whose wonderful exactitude the reason becomes 
embarrassed. I say all this will be seen. But let it not for a moment be 
supposed that in proceeding with the sad narrative of Marie from the 
epoch just mentioned, and in tracing to its denouement the mystery 
which enshrouded her, it is my covert design to hint at an extension of 
the parallel, or even to suggest that the measures adopted in Paris for the 
discovery of the assassin of a grisette, or measures founded in any 
similar ratiocination, would produce any similar result. […] The very 
Calculus of Probabilities to which I have referred forbids all idea of the 
extension of the parallel: – forbids it with a positiveness strong and 
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decided just in proportion as this parallel has already been long-drawn 
and exact.
107
 
 
Just because the two narratives are identical, the narrator affirms, it does not mean that 
they have the same meaning, and hence that they should be interpreted in the same way. 
No, in fact, their very identicalness makes it more likely, practically certain to be more 
precise, that their meaning is different, that they should be interpreted otherwise, that 
the one’s solution does not apply to the other. 
But is not Poe just trying to have it both ways? That is, claim to have solved the 
real mystery, if reality happens to confirm his interpretation, and maintain that he never 
intended to solve the real mystery, in case reality proves him wrong? Is he not just 
trying to salvage his story in light of the information that surfaced just before the third 
and final instalment of his story was due to be published, and thus save himself and his 
famous detective from public humiliation? Most certainly.
108
 It is hard to imagine, 
indeed, that Poe’s story would have had the same conclusion, if the revelations 
regarding Mary Rogers’s death had not emerged just before its publication, even more 
so if those revelations happened to confirm rather than contest Dupin’s suppositions in 
the course of the story’s first two instalments. Far from undercutting its significance, 
however, this is what makes Poe’s tale exceptional. The very possibility of ‘having both 
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ways’ is just what this story demands that we try to fathom, against all our critical 
assurances. For ‘having it both ways’ means precisely offering an interpretation, 
attesting to the truth, and simultaneously installing within one’s testimony its inevitable 
limitation – re-marking, almost imperceptibly, the necessary, irreducible possibility that 
truth itself is other than itself. Insofar as the same mystery, the same narrative, carries 
within itself a priori the possibility of its displacement within the space of literature, 
then it can always have two – at least two – different correct interpretations. That is, 
despite appearances, perhaps Monsieur Dupin did get it right in the end; perhaps some 
naval officer did murder Marie Rogêt. But even if he is right, he is most certainly not 
right of necessity. He could just as well have gotten it wrong. Which is also to say, 
Poe’s text might just be ‘mere fiction’ after all; we will never know. As John T. Irwin so 
insightfully comments, 
 
the unexpected divergence between the actual solution of Rogers’s death 
and the one [Poe] had originally envisioned, although it disrupted his 
plans for “Marie Rogêt,” could nevertheless be made to serve a larger 
theme of the Dupin stories as a whole. Which is to say that if Poe’s 
detective stories are about the way that the analytic effort to include the 
process of thinking wholly within the content of thought ultimately 
reveals the essential noncoincidence of the self with itself, then Poe’s 
unsuccessful attempt to double the real case of Mary Rogers with the 
imaginary one of Marie Roget becomes, through the reader’s experience 
of this ultimate noncoincidence of parallel lives, a textual embodiment 
of this theme.
109
 
 
And Derrida concurs in ‘Le Facteur de la Vérité’: ‘If one wished to make it the example 
of a law at any price, the Dupin trilogy [...] exemplifies this uncontrollability, disrupting 
every verification of an identity.’110  
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Every event is irreducible to the text that makes it possible. Every mark is 
always already potentially other than itself and remains thus infinitely resistant to a 
final, transcendent interpretation, to a transparent definition, to the truth. And as this 
chapter has ascertained, this is true even for those events that would have never 
happened unless in the form that they did, in the text that they did, even for those events 
which would have never even been fathomable to begin with unless through the 
narrative that made them possible; even the literary event, whose improbable existence 
relies on one and only one text, is not identifiable with that text. This is the very 
condition of its readability; it is always already divided, always already in translation. It 
attests to a secret beyond itself,  
 
even if one precisely cannot here trust any definite witness, nor even any 
guaranteed value to bearing witness, or, to put it another way, as the 
name suggests, to the history of any martyrdom (martyria). For one will 
never reconcile the value of a testimony with that of knowledge or of 
certainty – it is impossible and it ought not be done. One will never 
reduce the one to the other – it is impossible and it ought not be done.  
 
That remains, according to me, the absolute solitude of a passion without 
martyrdom.
111
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Conclusion 
 
It remains: every text acquires its significance from elsewhere than itself, and 
hence carries within itself the chance that it means something else. No meaning and no 
truth, no concept and no event, is identifiable with the text that provides it with its shape 
and form; no mark is identifiable with itself, no ‘I’ with a self. And this is not a 
potentiality one can calculate, evade or reduce. It is the necessary effect of the mark’s 
own structure: in order to become possible as itself it must be a priori re-markable as 
other than itself. Therefore, what makes truth impossible, unknowable, unverifiable, is 
the very condition of its possibility, knowability, verifiability; and vice versa.  
‘The law of this spectral contamination, the impure law of this impurity, this is 
what must be constantly reelaborated’,1 Jacques Derrida suggests, as we saw in our 
introduction to this thesis. In response, as if it were possible, then, we have sought to 
verify that this law, which binds the possible to the impossible, chance to necessity, 
significance to insignificance, pervades indeed everything that happens, everything that 
is, every text: even the text that proclaims its adherence to the law, as we demonstrated 
in the first chapter; even the text that embodies and represents the law itself, as we 
ascertained in the second; even the text that refuses to abide by the law and claims to 
contain its force, as we argued in the third; and, finally, even the text that surrenders to 
the law and permits it to dictate its destiny, as we confirmed in the fourth. The law is 
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that the law is ‘deconstructible’. And this ‘is not bad news. We may even see in this a 
stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress.’2 There we are:  
 
And this short philosophical dialogue for your distraction: “–What is it, a 
destination? –There where it arrives. –So then everywhere that it arrives 
there was a destination? –Yes. –But not before? –No. –That’s 
convenient, since if it arrives there, it is that it was destined to arrive 
there. But then one can only say so after the fact? –When it has arrived, 
it is indeed the proof that it had to arrive, and arrive there, at its 
destination. –But before arriving, it is not destined, for example it neither 
desires nor demands any address? There is everything that arrives where 
it had to arrive, but no destination before the arrival? –Yes, but I meant 
to say something else. –Of course, that’s what I was saying. –There you 
are.”3     
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 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ in Deconstruction and the 
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